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Papers and Essays
The Gornji Grad Monastery since the Extinction of the Counts of Heuenburg to the Appointment of Abbot Nikolaj I in 1365

A Time of Crisis in the History of the Monastery

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Abstract:
The author presents a Benedictine monastery in Gornji Grad from the first half of the 14th century, when it was undergoing one of its most turbulent periods. With the addition of select fresh sources and including a renewed analysis of the already known ones, he presents one of the most important ecclesiastic institutions that had its seat on Slovenian territory.

Key words:
Church history, Benedictines, Gornji Grad, estate history.

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Maribor, 3 (2005), No. 1, pp. 9-28, 74 notes, 2 pictures.
Language: Original in English (Abstract in English and Slovene, Summary in Slovene).
The Bavarian noble Dipold Kager and his wife Truta founded the Gornji Grad Benedictine monastery in about 1140. That year they issued a document in Aquileia, by which they confirmed their intention and devoted their estate in the Upper Savinja valley for founding the monastery.1 The document indicates that the monastery had already been functioning at this time; this document is again another case of subsequent confirmation after a fait accompli, a case that we come across in almost all the ‘foundation’ documents of medieval monasteries. Of their estate, which seems to have covered a nice rounded part of the Upper Savinja valley, they kept only their allodium in Gornji Grad, which comprises the castle, forest, fields, meadows, pastures, fisheries, hunting grounds, income, paths (access), serfs of both sexes and their offspring, by such a method that the Aquileian Church gets possession of the castle, the adjoining court, ten farms and two ‘sintmen’ with their farms, groves and forest with one farm close to the grove, a mill with the adjoining farm, about a hundred ministers of both sexes who were granted the rights of Aquileian ministers, and all their lands. All the remaining estate, all the tilled and untilled fields and some 500 serfs with families, were to become the absolute property of the Gornji Grad monastery (translated by Franc Kos in Material for the History of Slovenians IV.). Günther Bernhard had in recent times extensively discussed the document, its authenticity and the many traps that it may be hiding.2 In regard of the fact that the beginnings of the monastery are not the topic of this paper, our intention is not to go into details on this topic, rather only to bring them to attention. From its beginnings the monastery had a deep impact on the events in the Upper Savinja valley area and soon the monks managed to get possession of a larger estate elsewhere in the Styria province, which considerably expanded the monastery’s area of influence.3

However, the monastery’s estates and its economic activity were not the only reason why its influence spread to the nearby and broader environment. It became indisputably the most important ecclesiastic institution in the area of the Upper and Lower Savinja valley and the Saleška valley, by its moral authority as well as by its extensive estates that covered large rounded lands in the area and lands in Friulia. It also exercised its archidiaconate rights at its incorporated parishes. The Gornji Grad monastery was thus an important factor in this area, as well as in the broader

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1 1140, April 7. Aquileia; 17th century transcription in NALj KAL, f. 82/17, published in StUB I, no. 180, p. 188; abstract in: Franc Kos, Gradivo za zgodovino Slovencev v srednjem veku part IV, Ljubljana 1915, no. 157, p. 94. The original document was lost and is preserved only as an interpolation in a document from 17 May 1243 belonging to Patriarch Bertold. Gornji Grad: original document on parchment in NALj, document no. 575. 17th century transcript in NALj KAL f. 82/30. Published in StUB II, no. 420, p. 532. Abstract in: Milko Kos, Gradivo za zgodovino Slovencev v srednjem veku part V, Ljubljana 1928, no. 811, p. 388.


territory of present day Slovenia and Austrian Carinthia, to which all nobles who wished to achieve power in the area had to pay heed.

Another consequence of the monastery’s economic power was that, due to its lucratively, the office of the monastery’s advocate became one of the most desired offices among the Savinja region nobles. Among the monastery’s advocates we find members of the most prominent families in the region (Žovnek, Konjice (as partial lawyers) and Ptuj families, Counts of Heuenburg). The Counts of Heuenburg took over the advocacy completely at the break from the 13th to 14th century. This was also a period during which the latter intensified their attention to their estates in the Savinja and Saleška valleys and began establishing their new center of power in this region. The beginning of the 14th century was also a time when the monastery endured its first crisis in its operations, due to tensions in the relationship between the monastery and its Abbot Wulfing I (1295-1308) and its advocates (with Count Friderik Heuenburg in particular). The count even kept the abbot in custody at his Pliberk castle for a short period. After the abbot was replaced (Wulfing was replaced by Abbot Leopold (1309-May 1342), the relationship between the two sides improved, but not for long. The last male descendents of the Counts of Heuenburg, Count Herman, was assassinated in 1322. Already in the summer of the same year

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6 28 June 1322; published in MDC VIII, no. 624, p. 182 (“IV. Kalendas Julii comes Hermannus de Hewen-burch est interfectus.”)
his widow, Countess Elizabeta Goriška, issued a document in which she ensures the Gornji Grad monastery and its abbot, after he had pledged his loyalty that she will continue defending the monastery as her husband did before her. If she should re-marry, the monastery reserved the right to choose a new advocate.\(^7\)

Such protection was of course too weak for the monastery, and on 4\(^{th}\) September the same year the most important Heuenburg heir, Count Ulrik V. of Pfannberg took over the advocacy (at least by title), promising to respect all the pledges that the late monastery advocate Herman of Heuenburg had made in writ or orally.\(^8\) Ulrik of Pfannberg’s most important mediation as the monastery’s advocate was certainly his mediation regarding the illegal building of the Rudenstein castle.\(^9\) We will also find that the preserved documents help us reconstruct the twenties of the 14\(^{th}\) century as a relatively calm period in the monastery’s history. This discovery is somewhat surprising considering the rivalry for the Heuenburg legacy between the heirs, which took place near the monastery estates.

A document proving that things did not run so smoothly was issued in 1323. March 10\(^{th}\) of that year in Cividale, Konrad, the nephew of the Gornji Grad Abbot Leopold, confessed unlawful and improper conduct towards the abbot and the Gornji Grad monastery at the monastery’s estates in Budrio and Cividale. He also confessed that the documents he had used were forged and inaccurate, and he pleaded to the monastery and the abbot to pardon him, pledging to return all the documents in question.\(^10\) It is difficult to discriminate all the events in connection with the Friuli estates of the Gornji Grad monastery from the available abstract, but it appears that Konrad tried to use his family ties with the Gornji Grad abbot and proclaimed some of the monastery’s estates (among them the document lists the estate in Budrio and the house in Cividale) to be family property. The preserved material further indicates that it was not only Konrad who tried to profit from the monastery’s Friuli estates during the conflict between the monastery and the Vrbovec family. Due to the high costs of this conflict the monastery and its abbot were forced to pledge their estate in Friuli, more precisely in Budrio and Kosica, and the house in Cividale for 200 marks in shillings. They wanted to buy off the pledge in 1326,\(^11\) but apparently had difficulties doing so. One more court meet-

\(^7\) 10 July 1322, Pliberk; original parchment in NALj, document no. 1903\(^{v}\). Cf.: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 99-100.
\(^8\) September 4, 1322, Gornji Grad; abstract published in CKL, no. 112, 123; Karlmann Tangl, Die Freien von Suneck, Ahnen der Grafen von Cilli part IV, MHVSt 13/1864, p. 61. Compare also: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 100.
\(^9\) 1326, April 4, Pliberk; orig. doc. on parchment NALj, document no. 1948. Cf.: Dušan Kos, Med gradom in mestom. Odnos kranjskega, sloveneštajerskega in koroškega plemstva do gradov in meščanskih naselij do začetka 15. stoletja, Ljubljana 1994, p. 98, and Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 102, 103. Events connected to the dispute regarding construction of the Rudenstein castle were thoroughly analyzed in the above quoted work by Dušan Kos, and we will skip it in this article, which in no way means that we do not recognize its real importance.
\(^10\) 1323, March 10, Cividale; publication Giuseppe Bianchi, Documenti per la storia dell Friuli II, Udine 1845, no. 336, p. 557; 19th century transcript in StLA, no 1911d; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 100.
\(^11\) 1326, April 8 Gornji Grad; transcript in StLA, no. 1947\(^{v}\); cf. and: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, 103. The monastery authorized brother “Lempold”, to hire a loan of 200 marks in shillings and use this money to pay for the costs of the dispute with the Vrbovec family.
ing took place in Udine in 1330; the Gornji Grad Abbot Leopold together with the priest Henrik were summoned on one side and the brothers Nikolaj, Rapotton and Odorik on the other. The meeting regarded the damage the brothers had done to the monastery and its estates in the village of Budrio. As the brothers did not respond to the subpoena, Patriarch Pagan, as the president of the court meeting, by Leopold’s initiative, accused them of rebellion, ordered that they must cover all the damage they had caused to the monastery, decreed that they have no rights to the monastery’s estates, and revoked their right to advocacy. It appears that unlawful profiting from the estates was the main subject of the conflict. However, the difficulties with the Friuli estates continued. Prior to 1335 the monastery was in dispute with the brothers Ivan and Henrik, the sons of Ingelpert of Cucanea (”nobiles viri d’omini Iohannes et Henricus fratres quondam d’omini Ingalperti de Cucanea”), who were advocates for the monastery’s estates in Budrio. The core of the dispute was that the brothers had a ten year contract for advocacy over four farms in the village - and of course the right to collect the relevant income (“...quatuor.../.../man- sis monasterii Obrumburch, sitiis in villa Budrii, super quibus mansis dicti fratres advocattiem et jus advocatie dignoscitur habere”). This contract expired in 1335 and the monastery was apparently unwilling to renew it. On the contrary, the brothers were interested in further collecting of the income for legal representation. Since the parties could not come to an agreement on the matter, the patriarch himself had to intervene in April, and decided (as expected) on behalf of the monastery. In May, only a month later, the monastery handed all their estates in Friuli, comprising the villages of Artezza and Kosica and the aforementioned four farms in Budrio, in permanent feud to the nephew of the Gornji Grad Abbot Leopold - Konrad ‘de Neunburch’, citizen of Cividale - for nine marks annually. The same person that had twelve years earlier unlawfully appropriated the monastery’s estates!

But the troubles in Friuli did not stop Abbot Leopold from further enlarging the monastery’s estates. The same year he purchased a farm in Spodnja Bistrica, with the adjoining mill at the Poreber office, from Kamnik residents Martin Walch and his son Lev, and with the consent of both their wives - all for 21 marks in Aquileian pfennigs. On September 17th the same year, Abbot Leopold rounded up the monastery’s Kamnik estate by purchasing a farm near Trobelno north of Šmartno in the Tuhinj valley (‘Trobel’) from Gerolh Pircher and his son Bartolomew. In 1330 the aforementioned Martin Walch sold to the monastery another farm in Zagorica (near

14 1335, April 25 Udine; 19th century transcript in StLA Graz, no. 2082.
15 1335, May 16 Udine; orig. doc. on parchment NALJ, document no. 2084.
17 1323, September 17; orig. doc. on parchment NALJ, document no. 1916; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 101.
Rove) for 18 marks in Aquileian pfennigs.18

After the dispute between the monastery and the Vrbovec family concerning the Rudenstein castle was settled in 1325 and 1326, Abbot Leopold continued expanding the monastery’s estates. In 1327 he bought an estate from Guncel of Turn in Cerovo and later from Dipold of Chatzenstein in the Šaleška valley. On October 2nd, 1327, Guncel of Turn, his wife Katarina and brother Nikolaj, sold their estate “datz Cerau da Ulreich vnd sein sun auf gesessen ist /.../ ze richtem aygen um acht marcht silber die wir gaentzlichen empbangen haben.”19 This was an estate the Turns possessed near Šmarje pri Jelšah, as we had argued in an article devoted to this important noble family of the Šaleška valley.20

At the end of the same year Dipold of Chatzenstein, his wife Gertrud, and both their (unnamed) children, sold a piece of their property to the monastery. It comprised of five farms, two in Paška Vas, one in the forest near (the river) Paka, one on Križna Gora and one in Skorno, together with four vineyards along the Paka, for 55 marks in Savinja pfennigs. In this transaction Dipold and his wife negotiated the right to buy back these estates during the next two years, if they failed to do so within the agreed time the estates would become the monastery’s permanent property. As an annex to the sales contract they added the statement of both Dipold of Chatzenstein’s warrantors “vnser genaediger herre her Fridreich von Saeneck vnd vnser besunder vreunt Vlreich der Mertinger,” that they will see to it that everything is done as written, and if this fails that they and their knights (“rittermazzigen chnecht”) will go to the inn in Žalec and stay there until all agreements are fulfilled (“obstagij”).21

Another of the monastery’s gains is worth mentioning. In 1334, Nikolaj of Vrbovec and his wife Gertrud sold to the monastery a farm in Juvan for 10 marks in Aquileian pfennigs reserving the right to re-purchase it.22 In this document the sellers named their brother-in-law Wulfing II of Podkrnos as their warrantor (in the document he is addressed as “vnsern lieber aydem,” which means son-in-law, yet the next quoted document indicates that he was a brother-in-law, since Wulfing names Nikolaj I of Vrbovec “meines lieber swacher”).23 The latter confirmed

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19 1327, October 2 Gornji Grad; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 1964; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 104.
23 Wulfing of Podkrnos was married to Neža Vrbovška, the sister of Eberhart of Vrbovec, as shown in
his willingness in writing the same day. The father of Wulfing II of Podkrons (or maybe grandfather) Wulfing I, had connections with the Gornji Grad monastery already towards the end of the 13th century. In 1296 he gave the monastery Margareta, the wife of Wallun of “monte beati Stephani” (Štefanja Gora near Cerklje in Gorenjska).

Another important event took place a few years before these, which had a direct and strong influence on the Gornji Grad monastery and to which Abbot Leopold had to react to settle the new relations. In 1323 Friderik of Khungsperg was forced to pledge his castles in Velenje and Hekenberg to his two nephews Hardegen and Friderik of Ptuj, together with forty marks of property, for two hundred marks in silver for (he claims) the damage he had suffered in the service of the Heuenburg family on his way to Frankfurt. Friderik could not fulfil this pledge and both the castles remained in the hands of the Ptuj family until their extinction in 1438. The document doesn’t tell when Friderik of Khungsperg escorted Ulrik of Heuenburg to Frankfurt, nor whether the damage was only from travel expenses or whether he suffered some other unforeseen costs along the trip. One way or the other, this document and some others indicate that at the time Friderik of Khungsperg was in serious difficulties. In 1320 he sold some estates around Mureck to Ziggrid of Chranichpreg (of Mureck). These comprised eight houses in Mureck and eleven farms, of which six were in “Cosdichendorf” (maybe the village Gosdorfs north-east of Mureck), three in “Nuczendorf”, one in “Jansdorf” (Janežovci, a village near Ptuj?) and one in the village of “Lint” (Lipje, village near Velenje?) for twenty six marks of property.

a document from 25 November 1358, (19th century transcript in StLA Graz, no. 2676) in which she confirmed that she had given a tithe from Šentpeter in the Savinja valley to the Celje count Friderik, who does not owe her anything for it, but from his kindhearted grace gave her 50 marks in Graz phennigs.

24 1334, September 11 Gornji Grad; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, document no. 2070; 19th century transcript in StLA Graz; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 115. (Ich Wulfing von Gurenz presenibis profiteror me legasse annuente consenso et voluntate Heinrici fratrei mei, Conuentui ordinis sancti Benedicti domus in Obernburch, Margaretam uxorem Walchuni de monte beati Stephani cum suis heredibus quos habet et habita est.)

25 Probably father and son. A document from March 12 1301 shows that Wulfing I of Podkorns had a brother Henrik and a son named Ditmar, but there is no word about the other son Wulfing. Yet the span between 1296 and 1334 is quite large and we can presume that Wulfing I of Podkorns had (at least) two sons, Ditmar and Wulfing II, who was married to Neža Vrbovška and lived at least until 1358.

26 1296, May 22 Cerklje; orig. doc. on parchment in StLA Graz, no. 1505 (“Ego Wluingus de Gurenz presentibus profiteror me legasse annuente consenso et voluntate Heinrici fratrei mei, Conuentui ordinis sancti Benedicti domus in Obernburch, Margaretam uxorem Walchuni de monte beati Stephani cum suis heredibus quos habet et habita est.”) 1323, February 3 Ptuj; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS, documents returned from HHStA Vienna; abstract in: Ignaz Orožen, Das Bisthum und die Diözese Lavant, Teil V, Das Dekanat Schallthal, Graz 1884, p. 272, Albert Muchar, Geschichte des Herzogtums Steiermark, VI. Theil, Graz 1859, p. 226.

27 Locating according to Pavle Blaznik, Historična topografija slovenske Štajerske in jugoslovanskega dela Koroške do leta 1500, part I, A-M, Maribor 1986, p. 302, as all the locations were close to Mureck it is perhaps better to presume that this is the village Janhovo between Radgona and Mureck.

28 Locating according to Blaznik, Historična topografija part I. p. 434. Considering that in the document Friderik claims to be bestowing the estate in the environs of Mureck, locating “ze Lint” around Velenje is at least questionable; it would be perhaps more correct to locate the toponym in the village Lind bei St. Veit am Vogau, west of Mureck.
marks in silver.\textsuperscript{30}

The same year Friderik of Khungsperg was forced to sell some more property. This time he sold twelve farms for 25 marks and 100 marks in pfennigs of the old Graz weight to Gunter of Hekenbergh. The farms lay “in dem Laz ain buob da Georg auf gesessen ist, in dem Merchtlein auf einer buob ist gesezzen Herman auf einer Heinereich auf einer Volreich auf einer Hertweich, dazz Gaberk auf einer Marin auf einer der Supan, datz Praprotschach auf einer Predan auf einer sein sun Marin auf einer Tomas, ondem Cbolm auf einer Marin auf einer lank.”\textsuperscript{31} Locating these four places proved slightly troublesome. Pavle Blaznik located them in Gaberke, a village in Plat north of Podčetrtek, Tržec, a village near Polskava near Ptuj, Laze, with a question mark, west of Celje, while he couldn’t locate Prapreče.\textsuperscript{32} The list of witnesses that attended the event argues that it would make more sense to seek these locations around the Hekenberg castle and maybe also in the area of the Velenje castle, since both were governed by members of the same family.\textsuperscript{33} At least for Prapreče we can confidently postulate that it is a village west of Vransko, and Laze is most probably either Laze in the Tuhič valley (part of the estates of Miss Hekenberg) or Laze near Velenje (part of the estate of Miss Velenje). Dušan Kos similarly assumes that Gunther of Hekenberg purchased the estate around the Hekenberg castle from Friderik of Khungsperg, and not somewhere else.\textsuperscript{34}

What did the change at Hekenberg and Velenje mean for the Gornji Grad monastery? Primarily, a new solution was needed for the question of advocacy of the estates around Velenje; the Khungspergs had donated them to the monastery, but remained advocates for these estates and they continued defending them. A preserved document exists from 1328, issued by the Styrian Marshal Hardegen (in the document Neitdegen!) of Ptuj, the Gornji Grad Abbot Leopold and the convent; it regards advocacy of these estates, which once belonged to Hekenberg and which Hardegen’s uncle Friderik of Khungsperg pledged to the monastery for 20 marks in pfennigs (“umb die vogtey, die von alter zue Heckhenberg hat gehört unnd dabey gelegen ist, die mein oheim herr Friderich von Khungsperg versatzt hat umb zwaintzig marckh phening”). By agreement this advocacy now belonged to Hardegen of Ptuj without a pledge, but he had to promise to uphold only those advocate’s rights, which these farms had always enjoyed.\textsuperscript{35} It is almost certain that the pledge for

\textsuperscript{30} 1320, March 8.; after GZS of SAZU.
\textsuperscript{31} 1320, September 29; transcription at GZS at SAZU.
\textsuperscript{32} Blaznik, Historična topografija, relevent terms.
\textsuperscript{33} The listed witnesses were: “her Wifinf von Guotenstein, her Diepolt von Chazenstain, Gundach- er von Robats, Fridman der Chutenpacher, Tomas von Hechenberch, Vischalch von Osterwicz und Voschalch von Precep.” They are all knights from the Savinja and Šaleška valleys, the only exceptions are Wulfing of Guotenstein, who is probably in relation with Dipold of Chatzenstein and Gundaker Rogaški, whose name allows the postulation that he is from the Hekenberg family and that he is one of the administrative nobles, of which the Žovnščki’s settled in Rogatec (cf.: Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 193.). Once more I must emphasize the probable kinship between Mert Rogaški and Oton Schurprant from Eckenstein, who have already been mentioned.
\textsuperscript{34} Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{35} 1328, June 18 Ptuj; transcription in NALj KAL f. 83/33; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 105.

“Ich Gunther von Hechenberch /.../ daz ich mit verdachtem muete vnd mit gutem willen und gunst al-
advocacy of the Gornji Grad monastery, of which the document speaks, occurred because of Khungsperg’s aforementioned financial problems. On the other hand it is also quite probable that Friderik of Khungsperg and his nephew Hardegen of Ptuj wanted to make a profit from the period when the Gornji Grad monastery was without an advocate. This is a period when Count Ulrik IV of Pfanberg was already moving from the Savinja valley and the relationship between Konrad of Aufenstein and Friderik of Žovne was still unsettled.

Gunther of Hekenberg thus managed to partially gain sovereignty on his estates and feudal estates from the Khungsperg family as well as from the Gornji Grad monastery. In 1329 he donated two farms from his estates the monastery, one, which Gunther had previously purchased from the abbot and the convent for 8 marks in Savinja pfennigs, lay in Prekopa and the other in the area of Tešova (near Vransko), which Gunther purchased from someone named Geyer. In return for the farms the abbot and convent promised Gunther that after his death they would commemorate the anniversary with masses, intercession and vigils. Three relatives sealed the document: the person who issued it, Herman of Khungsperg and Tomaž Škudnik of Hekenberg (“Thomas der Schuednik von Hechenberch”)38. And the knights from the area participated as witnesses: “Vleitich der Mertinger von Ekenstain, Guntzel von Turn purccraf zu Prasperch, Niclau von Obernburch.”39

Another important document relating to the question of the fate of the Gornji Grad monastery estate is known from the time when the question of heritage was being settled between the Žovne and Aufenstein families. In 1331 Ulrik Mertinger of Eckenstein40 declared that the estate in Mozirje (“ze Prausperch”), which he pledged to the Abbot Leopold and the Gornji Grad monastery for 56 marks in silver, was now free of the pledge, since Ulrik had received the pledged sum. Thus Ulrik promised to reimburse the monastery all documents concerning the topic that were still in his possession by the next St Michael’s Day (20 September).41 We can add to this period the document from 1332, by which Konrad of Vrbovec donated four farms in Carniola in the village of Zapoge below Smlednik in the Vodice parish to the Gornji Grad monastery, for commemorating the anniversary.42 The condition was that at least twenty priests commemorate the anniversary for him, his wife and
his ancestors two days each year within eight days before All Saint’s Day. To ensure this would be done, he divided the tithe from the four farms so that the convent received a half, the abbot received a quarter and the last quarter was allotted to the nuns; but the monastery’s official, who was appointed as manager of this donated property, had to use these funds for food. The witnesses of this event were “mein prueder her Seifrid erziagen in Chrain der sein redner ist gewessen vnd mein prueder Niclau vnd Wilbalm vnd der erber ritter her Niclau von Rotenpuhel vnd meiner wirtin prueder Fridreich, her Gerloch, Perchtold, Niclau von Gerlochstain, Thomas der Zender purger vnd richter ze Stain.”

The mention of nuns in the document is interesting because it is one of the rare occasions where they are referred to in connection with Gornji Grad. Ignac Orožen brought to attention that an oral tradition exists, according to which the burial church of St Magdalene in Gornji Grad is a remnant of the nunnery church; this tradition explains the data from the property records, which the Tirovšek office had collected, and among other things, also 300 pieces of so called t.i. “Nunnenkäse.”

This of course wasn’t cheese used by the nuns or intended for the nunnery, rather, as Ferdo Gestrin already pointed out, sheep’s cheese, which was referred to as “Nunnenkäse” in the records, as opposed to cow’s cheese, which is referred to as “Herrenkäse” or “caseos vacinos.” However, in the quoted part of the comment, Ignac Orožen suggests that, concerning the mention of nuns in the document, it might be more sensible, instead of looking for a nunnery in Gornji Grad, to think of either the Dominican nunnery in Velesovo, founded in 1238, or the nunnery in Mekinje, founded in 1301. Most probably we are speaking of the Velesovo nuns, since the connection between the Dominican monastery in Velesovo and the Benedictine monastery in Gornji Grad had been known since the foundation of the former. The Gornji Grad Abbot Albert (1228-1240) was one of the initiators of the foundation of the Velesovo monastery and he donated fourteen farms in Polica to it, which he purchased for 100 marks. Despite some occasional tensions between the two monasteries that occurred when the successor of Abbot Albert, Abbot Henrik I (1241-1246) demanded that the Velesovo monastery returns the 100 marks donated by Abbot Albert - his demands failed to be realized - the relations between the monasteries remained tight. Consequently, the most probable assumption is the mention of the nuns in 1332, where the Velesovo Dominican nuns are referred to.

However, let us return back to the document from April 1332. We have to inspect one more piece of information from this document - the presence of Sigfrid of Vrbovec, who was at the time the Archdeacon in Carniola. Of all the people originating from the area, Sigfrid probably achieved the greatest ecclesiastic career.

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43 Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 109.
44 Gestrin, Gospodarska in socialna struktura gornjegrajske posesti, p. 482.
45 1238, (before December 11); KUB II, no. 102, p. 74, abstract in: Kos, Gradivo V, no. 698, p. 334, 335. 1238, December 11 Velesovo; KUB II, no. 103, p. 75; abstract in: Kos, Gradivo V, no. 699, pp. 336-338.
First he was the parish priest in Podjuna, then the priest in Laško, and the archdeacon in Carniola and simultaneously also a canon in Cividale. His excellent career must primarily be attributed to his own capacities, but we can and should also recognize in his career the result of the two hundred years of presence and work of the Gornji Grad monastery; this was not only a group of feudal lords, as most of the preserved documents would indicate, but the monastery was also a powerful moral authority that widely spread its beneficent goal. Just as this fact radiates in the personage of Sigfrid of Vrbovec, the influence of the monastery can also be seen in the architecture, in the construction of the parish and subsidiary churches and in the attracting of good building workshops to the area of the Savinja and Saleška valleys. Nevertheless, since the monastery was disbanded in the 15th century and its influence was 'covered' by the activities of its successor the Ljubljana diocese, the monastery's influence was obscured and poorly studied.

Abbot Leopold remained in his position for an exceptionally long period. The beginning of his service was marked by the dispute between the former Abbot Wulfing I and the Counts of Heuenburg. In 1308 Abbot Wulfing voluntarily (?!) resigned, and Abbot Leopold, an Augustinian monk, was appointed to the office. We have already spoken of his fruitful efforts to settle with the Counts of Heuenburg and struggle for the fate of the monastery in the complicated situation during the struggle for the Heuenburg heritage. We have also called attention to the problems that the abbot managed to overcome with great difficulty at his Friuli estates. Despite all these drawbacks, we can proclaim his period as a successful period in the history of the monastery, during which the position of the monastery was reconsolidated and during which it managed to acquire a great number of estates. Yet, the end of his career was marked by an affair that throws a shadow over all the abbot's good deeds. In 1341 Abbot Leopold had to confess that he remained in debt to his nephew Konrad “de Neuburg” (whom we know in a not very positive light from the thirties of the 14th century) for 40 marks, on account of the caretaking he and his escort and their horses, all of who lived with his nephew, enjoyed, and for a blanket that he and his escort had bought in Cividale at the craftsmen Gubertin and Lott. The abbot pledged, with the entire monastery’s wealth (!), to return his nephew the debt by the next St. Michael’s Day (20 September). This docu-

visokem srednjem veku, Kamnik 2001, pp. 65-75.

47 1307, March 8; abstract published in MDC VII, no. 609, p. 222 (“Sifrid von Atenburg, plebanus ecclesie sancti Michaelis de Juna.”).

48 1315, September 14; abstract in: Otopeč, Videmske, no. 361, p. 83 (“Discretus vir dominus Syuridus de Albimburch plebanus de Tyuir.”); 1332, June 28 Graz; orig. doc. on parchment in NAIj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 2033; published in CKL, no. 142, pp. 157-159 (“her Seifrid von Altenburch pharrer ze Tyuer und sein prueder her Fridreich und Eberhart von Altenburch.”).

49 He succeeded his uncle Ulrik I to this position (1307, March 8; abstract published in: MDC VII, no. 609, p. 222).


51 1341, August 7 Cividale, orig. doc. on parchment in NAIj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 2192;
ment was issued in the presence of: monastery brothers “Federik von Obbradraf” “Nikolaus von Neuburg” and the knights Dipold of Chatzenstein, Peter, son of the late Lupold of Cividale, “Sanda” of Cividale, Nikolaj, son of the late Cirulina of Cividale, and Nikolaj, son of the late “Pruginus de Thaglans.” It may be concluded that on his trip from the Upper Savinja valley to Friuli in 1341, only the two monks and Dipold of Chatzenstein escorted the abbot.

In view of the contents of this document we must ask ourselves whether the monastery was really confronted with such financial difficulties during this period that it had to pledge its property for a loan of 40 marks, which is quite a fortune. The material in the document does not allow such a conclusion. The monastery’s situation (as it can be discerned from the material) certainly wasn’t immaculate, but also not as desperate as the abbot’s dramatic pledge would suggest. In his quoted work, Ignac Orožen probably correctly concluded that the document is most likely to be the result of financial and maybe some other problems pestering the Neuburg family, which evidently endeavored to profit from their kinship with the Gornji Grad abbot. Ignac Orožen also refers to a document issued on October 17th the same year and which exposes the monastery’s problems, those of Abbot Leopold in particular. It cites a complaint against the abbot that was on that day discussed with Patriarch Bertrand. The complaint declares that Abbot Leopold was appointed to his office after he had to leave the Augustinian brothers due to an earlier trial, claiming that, as the abbot, he did not protect and manage the monastery’s estates properly, but operated with them as a tenant and finally - that he lived a life inappropriate for an abbot. The abbot was absolved of the first two accusations. The arbitration court ruled that the abbot had managed the estates suitably, that it is true that he sold the house in Kamnik, which was one of the main incriminations in the indictment, but that the house didn’t benefit the monastery and that in its stead he bought a better house in Cividale. But he was found guilty of the third charge, that he lived an inappropriate life. Due to his age a further process against him was not initiated. He had to pledge to obey orders and to behave appropriately to his position: that he will not wear laymen’s underwear as a sign of penance, that he will not eat meat on Mondays and that he will go to confession every Friday. The prior of the monastery and the entire convent were ordered to be respectful towards the abbot, who was evidently going to stay at the monastery, and to recognize him as their abbot and the monastery’s manager.

The patriarch’s decisions indicate that the abbot was at this time already old and ailing. He died in May the next year (1342) when another abbot was elected, the former Braslovče parish priest Janez II Abbot Leopold’s office, which started so dramatically in the shadow of the dispute with Ulrik of Heuenburg, then disturbingly ended, symptomatically, almost the same year when the successors of the Heuenburg and Žovnek freemen were promoted to counthood.

The period of Abbot Janez II proved relatively short. He performed the duties

17th century transcript in: NALj KAL f. 83/44. Cf.: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 121.

52 Probably another of the abbot’s relatives and Konrad “de Neuburg.”

53 After: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 122-123.

54 1352, November 21; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 128.
of the abbot between the years 1342 and 1352, after which we no longer find any mention of him in any documents.\textsuperscript{54} In addition to the mentioned document, which we will deal with later, we must also mention a document issued during the last year of Janez’s office. In February 1352 Count Friderik I of Celje declared that he had appointed lower judicature and advocacy over the estates to Abbot Janez, Prior Nikolaj and the convent of the Gornji Grad monastery for an annual tribute of 50 marks in Graz phennigs. The tribute was due for Christmas, the exceptions were ius iudicium sanguinum sangvinis and advocacy over the churches in Braslovče and Škale (“di vogte ze Vrazzla und ze Sand Jörgen in Schaflechtaf”), which the count kept for himself.\textsuperscript{55} In the instance that the monastery should fail to pay the 50 marks, the count reserved the right to cover his damages from the monastery’s property. At the same time, the monastery made a document in which it recognizes the Counts of Celje as their permanent advocates. During the period of Abbot Janez, in 1345, the dispute between the Counts of Celje, supported by Ulrik of Wallsee, Ulrik, the bishop of Krško, Count Ulrik Pfannberg and the Planina family versus the Ptuj family, in connection with the Rudenek castle was settled.\textsuperscript{56}

The Gornji Grad monastery’s financial difficulties, which we had discussed at the end of the abbotcy of Janez’s predecessor Abbot Leopold, continued. Thus in 1347 Abbot Janez pledged Eberhard of Vrbovec, his wife and his successors the tithes in Vrhpolje (“Aerendorf”), Šentjanež near Vrhpolje (“St. Johanns in dem Dorf”) and in Pobrežje (“Pobersach”) for 100 marks in Aquileian phennigs. In the document they agreed that the tithe from Pobrežje will be returned to the monastery after four years, without compensations, while the pledge on the tithes of Vrhpolje and Šentjanež can be extended for a period of six more years after the expiration of the four year period and, if after the expiration of these six years the monastery fails to pay the 100 marks in Aquileian phennigs, these will be fully free and will belong to the Vrbovec family.\textsuperscript{57} Ignac Orožen mentions a document from 1476, which proves that the above-mentioned pledge was not settled the due year.

Of course the monastery and its abbot did not only pledge properties. On the contrary - as in the previous periods, the active policy of buying and rounding up the monastery’s estates continued (only maybe at a slower pace) during the time of Janez II. In 1348 Kunigunda Fofojčer and her son Ivan sold the monastery two cellars and a house, all located below the Pištanj castle.\textsuperscript{58} The document was sealed by

\textsuperscript{55} 1352, February 19; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 120; 19th century transcript in: StLA Graz, no. 2440.

\textsuperscript{56} 1345, April 21 Dunaj; 19th century transcript in: StLA Graz, no. 2258. For the dispute compare: Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 96, Hans Pirchegger, Die Untersteiermark in der Geschichte ihrer Herrschaften und Güten, Städte und Märkte, München 1962, p. 198, 199. The failure of the Counts of Ptuj is one of the key moments (in addition to the loss of Chatzenstein) in the retreat of this family from the first line of the Savinja and Saleška knights. A special discussion should be devoted to this interesting passage of events.

\textsuperscript{57} 1347, Avgust 15, orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, no. 2329; 16th century transcript in NALj KAL f. 83/46; compare Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{58} 1348, April 24; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, no. 2352; Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 128; Ignac Orožen, Das Bisthum und die Diözese Lavant, Teil VI, Das Dekanat Drachenburg, Marburg 1887, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{59} Prim.: 1320, February 22 Vitanje; orig. doc. on parchment StLA Graz, no. 1866 (‘Wfr Otto und Eber-
her husband Bertold Ložničan of Pilštanj. The Ložničan’s, who were Krško knights at the Pilštanj castle, also governed the Valdek castle near Dolič at the end of the 13th and the first half of the 14th centuries, which additionally highlights the connection between the (Krško knights) family, the Savinja valley and the Gornji Grad monastery.

We could say that the abbacy of Abbot Janez II proved relatively short and calm, but the last document from 1352, which he issued while he was still the monastery abbot, is somewhat disturbing. In it, the prior and convent of the Gornji Grad monastery promised that if Abbot Janez resigns they would care for his livelihood, as Count Friderik of Celje had prescribed. Why was the Count of Celje so interested in the wellbeing of Abbot Janez? A document from 1359 can answer this question. There is a document in the Turjak archive, by which the Gornji Grad Abbot Ulrik, bart von Waldekk,” and: 1321, December 20; orig. doc. on parchment in StLA Graz, no. 1894 (“Dietmert von Eberstain, Eberhartz des Lösenzer von Waldeck uittib.”).

Documents from the Turjak archive are still privately owned and practically inaccessible. We thus had to work with abstracts made and published by Franc Kommatar, Das Schlossarchiv in Auersperg, Mitteilungen des Musealvereins für Krain XVIII/1905, XIX/1906 in XX/1907. Unfortunately these ab-
who replaced Janez in 1353, Prior Nikolaj and the conven agreed with knight Rudolf of Chatzenstein and his heirs (the owners of Chatzenstein) that a mass will be conducted daily in St. Martin’s chapel in the monastery, where the Chatzenstein’s vault was located. For conducting this mass the monastery received 70 marks in Graz pfennigs from Rudolf, for which the latter received the tithe around the church of St. Tilen in the Šaleška valley (probably in the village of Arnače). Moreover, this document is additionally interesting because of the preserved coat-of-arms of Abbot Ulrik and the covenant. Abbot Ulrik’s coat-of-arms depicted a standing figure of the abbot. At the feet of the abbot, marked by his hat and abbot’s staff, stand two more coats-of-arms: to the right is a shield with three stars and to the left a shield with two logs! These are evidently the old and new coats-of-arms of the Celje and Žovne families. The fact that Abbot Ulrik could use them as his personal coat-of-arms proves, beyond doubt, that the abbot was a member of the Counts of Celje family. The most probable assumption would be that he was Friderik’s illegitimate son, whom his father wanted to promote to an appropriate position, worthy of his descendent. On the other hand, Ulrik, as an illegitimate son, could not make any claims to his father’s heritage. A good position in the church, especially if it was in the ‘home’ monastery was an ideal solution. For this reason Friderik of Celje went through the ordeal of ensuring Abbot Janez a suitable indemnity and thus made room for his illegitimate son.

Abbot Ulrik’s career at the Gornji Grad monastery was short-lived and ended as sorrowly as that of Abbot Leopold. Abbot Ulrik officiated the monastery between 1353 and 1365, when he is last mentioned as the monastery’s abbot. The most important event during his abbacy was probably the rivalry for the Vrbovec castle between the Vrbovec brothers Nikolaj II and Friderik II, the Counts of Celje Ulrik I and Herman I and the monastery. In the middle of the 14th century the Vrbovec knights suffered a serious crisis, which forced them to sell their estates. The brothers Burkhard and Eberhard sold half the estate to the Counts of Celje in 1360 for 521

61 1359, January 25, transcription in StLA Graz, no. 2686; abstract in: MMVK 18/1905, no. 120, p. 185 (Wir Vlreich von gotes gnaden abt des gotshaus ze Obernburch, ich Nycla prior vnd aller conuent daselbs, wir veriehen offenleich mit disem prief, vnd tu chunt, allen den die in sehent oder ho erent lesen, daz der erber ritter her Ruedolff von Chatzenstain, vnd all sein nach chomen, die Chatzenstain inn babent, sich mit vns vereint, vnd gutzlich verricht habent vnb ain miess, die wir alle tag tliglich vnd auch ewiehlech an allez geuerd, singen oder sprechen sullen, in sand Merteins cappell ze Obernburch in dem mu enter da des vorgenanten hern Ru edolfs vatter, vnd mu etter vnd alle sein vordern inn ligent. Da haben wir vnb von in empbanget sybentzich marcb grätzer phening, der wir gar, vnd gutzlech von in gewert sein. Vnd wir wreyen seu darumb auf insers gotshaus ehenten der gelegen ist ze sand Gyligen in dem Schëlachtal. Wann daz ur, das wir vns daran vergezen, vnd die mess nicht volferten als wir in verhauzen haben, so schellen si vns ermanen mit dem vorgenanten zehenden.

62 1365, March 12; after: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 138.

63 1360, April 28 Celje; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 183.
marks and 50 Aquileian pfennigs. The brothers Nikolaj II and Friderik II pledged the other half in 1362, with the permission of Duke Rudolf IV, to the Gornji Grad monastery; the counts Ulrik and Herman of Celje rebelled against this pledge and achieved precedence to purchase it. Already in 1361 (!) the Celje family bestowed the Vrbovec castle in full (!) to the brothers Oton and Hans of Bistrica near Ilz (“... daz si (i.e. Counts of Celje) vns vn dvern erben dy selben vest Altenburch mit alle dew vn darczu gehõrt, sui daz genant vn gebaizzen sei, lehen sullen vnuerzogentlichen ze rechtem leben”).

One more document significant for the fate of the Gornji grad monastery was issued during the period of Abbot Ulrik. In 1360 the abbot declared that the monastery’s officials have no right to intervene in the legal rights of counts Ulrik and Herman of Celje in the vicinity of Gornji Grad. However, the count’s officials are permitted to pursue the criminals, if the monastery does not surrender them, also on the grounds of the monastery. With this the Counts of Celje successfully interfered with the monastery’s legal immunity, which was adamantly defended during the advocacy of the Counts of Heuenburg.

In 1365 (between March and July) Ulrik terminated his abbotcy, not as a result of his death or his choice to resign, but (like his predecessor Janez) he was forced to resign from the office. A document from January 1363 cites that Abbot Ulrik had declared that he is returning to the monastery all the estates of which he illegally took possession and that he will cover any and all the damage he incurred therewith; moreover, that he will not make any new contracts or conduct any monastery business without the permission of the counts Ulrik I and Herman I of Celje. It is evident that the abbot’s past conduct was extremely harmful to the monastery’s economic situation and that the damaged caused already should be limited, as well as any new damage prevented. We also imagine that, due to his kinship, Abbot Ulrik felt almost untouchable and consequently allowed himself more than he otherwise might have. Nonetheless, despite their kinship both the Celje brothers acted as the monastery’s real advocates and tended to the benefit of the institution vested in them. After the document from 1363, Abbot Ulrik is mentioned again only in the aforementioned document of March 1365. By July of the same year the new abbot of Gornji Grad, Nikolaj (1365-1404/8), is mentioned in a document by which Ortel von “Preiß” (i.e. Greiß = Griže!) and his wife Gertrud pledged two farms “datz Cilli...”

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63 1362, November 12 Vienna; following the transcription in GZS of SAZU. 1362, December 20; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 196.
64 1361, July 12; 19th century transcript in StLA Graz, no. 2788’. Cf. also Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 106.
65 1360, June 15; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 184.
66 Prim.: 1241, December 18 Mozirje province; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj GG, no. 563; 17th century transcription in NALj KAL, f. 82/28, in which the Heuenburg count Viljem donates several estates in the Mozirje area to the Gornji Grad monastery, together with all the pertinence, reserving for himself only iudicium sanguinum.
68 1365, July 4; 17th century transcription in NALj KAL f. 83/57.
69 The village Silovo near Šentilju near Velenju. Compare document: 1356, July 15; orig. doc. on parch-
by “St. Ilggen”\textsuperscript{70} to the Gornji Grad monastery and its Abbot Nikolaj for 40 marks in Graz pfennigs, and that these estates will belong to the monastery if the couple does not repay the pledge by the next St. George’s Day. It follows that the replacement of the abbot occurred between March and July 1365.

Further events prove that Abbot Ulrik did not easily acquiesce to his removal. Ulrik refused to recognize the newly elected Abbot Nikolaj and continued considering himself the legitimate Gornji Grad abbot. This caused a conflict between him and Nikolaj, who had the monastery’s convent on his side. The two parties could not settle their dispute and Count Herman I of Celje had to intervene. On January 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1369, both the parties and a part of the Celje knights convened at a court meeting and resolved the conflict. Count Herman I of Celje presided over the arbitration court and a resolution was reached under his supervision. Three well-preserved documents make it possible to establish a detailed reconstruction of the event and the determinations accepted on this day in Celje.\textsuperscript{71} Abbot Nikolaj and the monastery convent first handed count Herman the parish of St. George in Škale, with everything the former parish priest (a monastery brother) Nikolaj Vaist possessed\textsuperscript{72} (“dar vber geben habent, vmb di pharrlichen ze sand Jörgen in dem Schalach tal, daz wir disselbe chirchen mit alle dew vnd darzu geboert sei daz gehaizzen ist, swi sey pruder Nikla der Vaizzt innegehabt bat …”). The count immediately passed on the parish, but he was allowed to do this only once (this was an exception that was probably the compromise, which both sides had to accept in the end) and never again (“zu ainigen mal vnd furbuzz nicht mer”). The condition to which both the count and the person to whom the parish was intended agreed comprised the following: that all taxes, including papal, belong to the monastery and nobody may pass them on directly ("Vnd swen wir si also laazen vnd empelhen, geben vnd antwurten, der sol dem abt vnd dem comuent vnd dem gotshaus ze Obernburch dbaines dinstes, noch dbain geborsame nicht gepunden sein, noch von derselbe chirchen zegeben dbain geborsame nicht gepunden sein, noch von derselbe chirchen zegeben dbain zins noch des pabstes zebende, noch collecten den legaten, noch dem patriarcher"). By this means the monastery assured itself permanent inflow of funds from Škale and protected itself from the danger that the Škale parish and its priest would become too independent. Thus the incorporation of this parish remained unchanged. The recipient of the parish could remain its priest for life or until he found a more suitable office (“vnd er sol di chirchen schuldig vnd freilich mit allen iren nutzen inne-haben vntz an seine tod oder als lang vntz dz er mit ainer pezzern gotsgabe beraten wirdet”). As soon as Count Herman received the parish he, with regard for an old friendship (in this formulation there is probably also a hidden hint of their kinship)”\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{71} 1369, January 10 Celje; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, no. 2577, by which “Oertell von Greizz” pledged the same two farms for six years for a sum of 20 marks in Aquileian pfennigs. The pledge on the two farms in Silovo had evidently been extended several times.

\textsuperscript{72} Ignaz Orožen presumes that Abbot Nikolaj I is same the Škale parish priest Nikolaj Vaist (Orožen, Das Dekanat Schallthal, p. 71), but from the document’s text, in which abbot Nikolaj and the covenant relinquish their right to the incorporated Škale parish and all the rights that “brother Nikolaj Vaist” enjoyed, it becomes clear that in this case these are more probably two people with the same name.

\textsuperscript{73} 1405, marec 25.; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 4206 (“er-
between himself and the former Gornji Grad Abbot Ulrik, immediately handed over the Škale parish to the latter ("Nu haben wir angesehen di freundschaffe di der erber mann her Vreicb der alt abt te Obernburch zu uns hat, vnd haben im geben, vnd geben im auch mit disem brif di eigen chirchen ze sand fürgen in dem Schalachtal, mit alle dew vnd darzu gehört mit allen nutzen vnd mit allen würden vnd rechten in aller der mazze, als vor in disem brif begriffen worden ist").

Abbot Ulrik issued his last document as an abbot, in which he renounces all his claims against the new Abbot Nikolaj and the demand that he resumes the abbotcy ("Ich Vreicb pharer ze sant Jörgen in dem Schalachtal, vergich mit disem briefe vnd tun chunt daz ich lobe vnd gelöpt ban pey mein trewen an aydes stad vnd pinde mith sein auch mit disem brief vmb alle dy stozz cbrieg, vnd vordrung, dy ich an ainem tail vnd abbt Nyclia vnd der conuent des Gotshaus ze Obernpurch an dem andern tail gebalt haben vmb dy abbtey da selbs daz ich darvmb willlicheb vnd gern, vnd vnbetwungeleich gentzlicheb vnd gar gangan ban, vnder dy edeln mein gndigen Herren graf Vreicb vnd graf Herman bruder von Cyli, vnd was dy oder ir ainer dar vmb vnd vmbgevord und prchsel daz lobe ich alles an meinem tail gentzlicheb stet ze haben vnd volluren an all anzztig vnd widered vnd an alles geuder in dem sahelde und sol da vnder nicht tun mit worten noch mit wercken, beimlicheb noch offenlicheb, ewichlicherb"). He also pledges to return all the letters he kept and which belonged to the monastery ("vnd der vber han ich in ze ainer vrbunde vnd ze ain statbait gebn vnd geantwurtt all mein briefe, dy ich gebalt ban, oder noch vinden mochte an alles gewerd über dy egenante abbtey, /…/ wie die sein si sein weltlicheb oder geistlicheb, gen Christen oder gen Juden, di dem egenanten abbt Nyclan vnd dem conuent, vnd dem Gotshaus ze Obernpurch ze frumen oder ze schaden chomen mochten, das ich in die vnuerzogenlieb gebn vnd antwurten sol an alles geuerd"). The document was sealed by Ulrik himself and by two Celje knights who originate from two of the most important castles in the Šaleška valley during that time, Rudolf of Chatzenstein and Ulrik of Turn. Ulrik of Turn was a representative of the original Turn family; his coat-of-arms still bore a baton and three stars, while the symbol on the coat-of-arms of the other Turn family depicted a fish (at the time the latter governed the Turn castle). This time Abbot Ulrik no longer used the Celje symbols in his coat-of-arms, rather he sealed the document with a coarse seal bearing the image of a standing St. George, with a lance and a star below it, and the inscription: S.VLRICI.P.S’.GEORII IN SCHELACH. Hence he already used the seal of the priest of the St. George parish of Škale. The purpose of the documentation that took place in January 1369 was to confirm a situation that was already in force.

This event ended the dispute that seriously threatened the work and existence of the Gornji Grad monastery. Abbot Nikolaj, who assumed his position in such a distressing situation and with such difficulty, lived and governed the monastery at least until 1405, when he is last mentioned in any document.73 Since his successor Abbot Wulfing II is for the first time mentioned as the abbot in 1408, we can presume that Abbot Nikolaj died between 1405 and 140874. The abbotcy of Abbot Nikolaj was not only one of the longest periods that the monastery was under the
leadership of the same person, but also one of the most peaceful periods in the monastery's history. It seems almost as if the monastery was preparing itself for the troubled events of the 15th century that culminated with the death of the last Count of Celje in 1456 and disbandment of the monastery in 1461.

Tone Ravnikar

GORNJEGRAJSKI SAMOSTAN OD IZUMRITJA GROFOV VOVBRSKIH DO NASTOPA OPATA NIKOLAJA I. LETA 1365
Krizni čas v zgodovini samostana

POVZETEK


To obdobje se je začelo, ko se je opat Wulfing I. zapletel v vojno za češko krono med Habsburžani in Goriškimi. V tem sporu je nastopal na strani koroškega vojvode in pretendenta na češki prestol Henrika Goriškega, odvetniki samostana in ena najmočnejših rodin na obravnavanem področju, grofje Vovbrški, pa so stali v vojni skupaj še z npr. svobodniki Žovnškimi, gospodi Ptujskimi itd. na strani Habsburžana. Rezultat vojne v korist Habsburžanov je v škripce spravil tudi gornjegrajskega opata, ki je bil nazadnje pod hudim pritiskom grofov Vovbrških prisiljen leta 1309 odstopiti.

Zamenjal ga je opat Leopold iz družine Neuburg. Po tem, ko je uspel urediti odnose z Vovbrškimi in je kazalo, da bo uspel samostan voditi po mirni poti, je umrl leta 1322 zadnji vovbrški grof Herman, kar je povzročilo veliko turbolenco v odnosih tako med posameznimi plemiškimi družinami, kot se polegali za bogato dediščino, kot seveda tudi v odnosu le-teh do samostana. Pri tem posebej izstopa poskus gospodov Vovbrških, ki so na svojih alodialnih tleh nad Ljubnim v Zgornji Savinjski dolini zgradili grad Rudenštajn. Gradnja tega grada bi lahko ogrozila celoten odnos te družine do samostana in posledično celotno, sicer samostansko posest, na kateri so rezidirali Vrbovški. Tega opat in samostan seveda nista mogoče dopustiti, zato sta dosegla, da se je takratni odvetnik Ulrik Pfanberški leta 1325 zavezal,
Städtische Kultur in nordwestlichen Kroatien im 16. Jahrhundert

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Kurzfassung:
Der Autor beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob sich in den nordwestlichen Städten Kroatiens - Zagreb und Varaždin - im 16. Jh. eine Form städtischer Kultur entwickelte, oder folgten ihre Bürger vielmehr Kulturformen des Adels und der Kirche. Er schliesst, dass sich das Bürgertum, unter dem Druck der höfisch-humanistischen Kultur einerseit, und der kirchlichen andererseits, mit beiden identifizierte und mittels der Kultur die Ideologie der feudalen Führungsschichten annahm, statt eine eigene zu bilden.

Schlüsselwörter:
Städtische Kultur, Beziehungssystem, Zagreb, Varaždin, Oligarchie, höfisch-humanistische Kultur, kirchliche Kultur.

Sprache: Original in Deutsch (Kurzfassung in Deutsch und Slowenisch, Zusammenfassung in Slowenisch).
Ich möchte mich keineswegs in diesem Beitrag mit einer Definition der Stadt beschäftigen, aber um die städtische Kultur definieren zu können, muß man unbedingt verstehen, was man mit den Begriffen Stadt und städtisch in diesem Fall eigentlich meint.


Aus diesen Gründen muß man schließen, daß nur die soziale und wirtschaftliche Struktur dieser zwei Städte als eigentlich städtisch zu bezeichnen sei und deswegen auch nur binnen ihrer Stadtmauern die städtische Kultur Nordwestkroatiens zu suchen ist.


Dabei darf man aber nicht vergessen, daß auch diese zwei Städte der Peripherie der westlichen Städteverbreitung gehören und daß ihre Entwicklung, was den Ausmaß an Bevölkerung, Handel und der Wirtschaftsproduktion betrifft, mit der der mitteleuropäischen Zentren nicht zu vergleichen ist. Zur gleichen Zeit aber besaßen sie auch keine der Züge osteuropäischer (byzantinischer, türkischer) Städtekultur und Entwicklung.6

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Der Begriff “städtische Kultur” ist keineswegs so eindeutig, wie er auf dem ersten Blick zu sein erscheint. Eine klare Abtrennung der “städtischen Kultur” von der “Kultur in der Stadt” ist notwendig, um das bürgerliche Charakter der Kultur festzustellen.7


Muß es aber sein, daß ein Autor nur dann der städtischen Kultur gehört, wenn er selbst Bürger ist, und nicht ein Angehöriger der Kirche oder des (Stadt)Adels? Die Antwort ist sicherlich negativ: es hängt vom Inhalt seiner Werke ab, und nicht von seiner sozialen Herkunft oder Zugehörigkeit, ob ein Autor als Erzeuger des städtischen Kulturgutes zu betrachten sei.10


Es ist selbstverständlich, daß es in beiden Städten, d.h. in Zagreb und Varaždin, auch schon früher eine schriftliche Kultur gab, nur wurde sie nicht von den Bürgern getragen, sondern von den Geistlichen. Das war besonders der Fall in Zagreb, wo die bischöfliche Kanzelei wenigstens seit den Bemühungen Bischofs Stjepan II in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jhs. eine hervorragende Rolle in Bücherproduktion und -sammeln, sowie in der Ausbildung junger Kleriker gespielt hatte.

Die Verschriftlichung des städtischen Lebens hatte jedoch in beiden Städten unterschiedliche Entwicklungsstufen erreicht. Das hing vor allem mit den sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Differenzen zwischen Varaždin und Zagreb zusammen. Während in den ersten Phasen des Urbanisierungsprozesses (bis etwa 1450) Zagreb eindeutig das stärkere Zentrum war, wurden beide Städte gleichermassen von der Krise des ausgehenden Mittelalters betroffen (bis etwa 1550). Gleich danach erhöhte...

Man kann für Gradec das folgende Schema vorschlagen:

1. Rückzug der italienischen Kaufleute aus dem zagreber Handel (cca. 1400) + allgemeine wirtschaftliche Krise (nach cca. 1450) — 2. wirtschaftliche und soziale Rückständigkeit der Stadt + demographischer Niedergang (nach cca. 1500) + Nähe der türkischen Grenze — 3. wirtschaftliche und geistliche Isolierung

Das letztere kann man gut an der Zahl der Studenten aus Zagreb beobachten. Die meisten studierten an der Wiener Universität in den Jahren 1511-1529, als Gradec zum letzten Mal für eine kürzere Zeit seine ehemalige Stelle im Viehhandel zwischen Italien und Ungarn beanspruchte und dadurch seine wirtschaftliche Lage verbesserte. Vor dieser Zeit gab es für die Bürger zwar finanzielle Möglichkeiten, ihre Söhne zum Studium nach Wien zu schicken, es fehlte aber wahrscheinlich an Interesse, weil die wenigen, die überhaupt studieren wollten, lieber die italienischen Universitäten aufsuchten. Im 16. Jh. wurde dann die Wiener Universität die bevorzugte alma mater der Studenten aus Zagreb. Mit der wirtschaftlichen Krise aber verloren die Bürger die Möglichkeit (oder auch den Willen), die höhere Bildung ihrer Söhne zu finanzieren.

Am Ende des 16. Jhs. trat dann noch eine Änderung auf, die vielleicht auch Einfluß auf die städtische Kultur ausübte hat. Im Laufe der Zeit entwickelte sich nämlich eine oligarchische Schicht, die die bisherige, mehr oder weniger demokratische Verwaltung ersetzte. Angehörige dieser Oligarchie waren Literaten, Kaufleute und

Alle diese verschiedenen Einwirkungen (wirtschaftliche, demographische, kulturelle) verursachten eine gewisse geistige Isolation, die dazu brachte, daß sich in Gradec/Zagreb keine städtische schriftliche Kultur (abgesehen von der Administration) bis in das 17. Jh. entwickelt hat.


Unter solchen Umständen bildete sich in Varaždin der sogenannte Varaždiner literarische Kreis.29 Als seinen Vorläufer betrachtet man den protestantischen Prediger Mihajlo Bučić, dessen Werke allerdings nicht erhalten geblieben sind.30 Den Kreis bildeten vier Schriftsteller: ein Pfarrer (Anton Vramec) und drei Literaten (Ivan Pergošić, Blaž Škrinjarić und Blaž Antilović). Vramec war vorher auch Pfarrer in Gradec, aber er mußte die Stadt verlassen, da er nicht bereit war, seine Frau und Kinder, mit denen er lebte, zu verlassen. Man muß betonen, daß Vramec, trotz der Ehe und der scharfen Kritik über die Mißbräuche in der Kirche, doch katholisch geblieben ist, was man auch in seinen Werken erkennen kann.31 Vramec war der Autor der ersten weltgeschichtlichen Chronik in kajkavischer Sprache und einer

Ivan Pergošić, der zweite bedeutende Mitglied des varaždiner Kreises, übersetzte das bekannte ungarische Gesetzbuch Tripartitum des István Verböczy auf Kroatisch, und zwar gleich in zwei Varianten, eine mehr kajkavische und eine mehr schtokavische. Es handelt sich dabei um feudarechtliche Gesetze, die auch die Stellung der Städte in der mittelalterlichen Gesellschaft regelten, aber weder war dieses Thema ihr Schwerpunkt, noch konnte das Tripartitum als Ausdruck des bürgerlichen Willens verstanden sein. Leider ist das zweite Werk Pergošićs, Prefationes et epistolae Desiderii Erasmi Rotterdami, verlorengegangen. Wir wissen nur, daß das Buch auch eine Rede gegen die Türken enthielt, was ein typisches Merkmal der kroatischen humanistischen Literatur der Zeit war. Alles deutet in die Richtung, in Pergošić einen Humanisten zu sehen, dessen Interesse sich dem gesamten kroatischen (oder slavonisch-kroatischen) Königreich widmete, aber die Stadt und ihr Bürgertum eigentlich mißachtete. Es ist den Humanisten wegen ihres Elitismus auch sonst nie gelungen, die bürgerliche Mentalität zu bestimmen.


Der einzige Autor, der eindeutig für das Bürgertum sein Werk geschaffen hat, war Blaž Antilović. Sein wiederum einziges Werk ist die Übersetzung der Zunftordnung der Metzger aus dem Latein auf Kroatisch.

Meiner Meinung nach ist es also eindeutig, daß es auch in Varaždin keine eigentliche städtische Literatur gab. Alles was wir haben ist “Literatur in der Stadt,” die entweder vom kirchlichen oder feudalen und humanistischen Kreisen beeinflußt war, aber keine bürgerliche, d.h. städtische Züge enthielt. Zunftordnungen,

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52 A. Vramec, Kronika vezda znovich zpravliena kratka szlouenzkim iezikom (Eine kurze Chronik neußlich in slavonischer Sprache geschrieben), Ljubljana 1578; ders., Postilla na vsze leto po nedelne dni vezda znouich szpraulena szlouenszkim iezikom, Varaždin 1586.
54 Putanec, Kajkavski pisac, S. 334.
55 Sprandel, Gesellschaft, S. 244.
57 Budak, Gradovi, S. 133.
Protokolle, Rechnungen, Petitionen - das war die Realität der städtischen schriftlichen Kultur in Gradec und Varaždin im 15. und 16. Jh.


In Varaždin war die Lage nicht viel anders. Die Stadt besaß die wesentlichen architektonischen Merkmale schon im 15. Jh.: die Pfarrkirche, den Stadturm, ein Hospital, Palisaden. Sie hatte aber das wichtigste Zeichen der Stadttlichkeit noch


Die Zahl der tatsächlichen Bürger im nordwestlichen Kroatien, also nicht aller StadtEinwohner, sondern nur solcher, die man als Bürger bezeichnen kann, war sehr gering. Obwohl es noch keine genauere Berechnungen gibt, darf man sie auf nicht mehr als 10% der Gesamtbevölkerung schätzen. Dazu gehörten viele von den reicheren Bürgern, den ausländischen Kaufleuten und Unternehmern, was in der Anfangszeit der sich bildenden Nationen als Kulturgemeinschaften für die Entwicklung der städtischen Kultur sicher nicht von Vorteil war.

43 Budak, Gradovi, S. 141.

Es war gerade diese Bewegung innerhalb der katholischen Kirche, die das gesamte kulturelle Leben Kroatiens in den folgenden zwei Jahrhunderten so deutlich prägte. Unter der Kultur der Jesuiten und Pauliner lebte das Bürgertum mit seinen Zunft- und Fastnachtfesten als einzigen, wenn auch von der Kirche bestrittenen Identifikationsmitteln.

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Neven Budak

**MESTNA KULTURA NA SEVEROZAHDU HRVAŠKE V 16. STOLETUJ**

POVZETEK

Avtor se ukvarja z vprašanjem, ali se je v severozabodnih mestih Hrvaške - Zagrebu in Varaždinu - v 16. st. razvila kakšna oblika mestne oziroma meščanske kulture ali pa so njuni meščani zgolj sledili kulturi plemstva in cerkve. Obe mesti sta se takrat uvrščali med manjša oziroma srednje velika evropska mesta in so se soočali s skoraj celo stoletje trajajočim gospodarskim, demografskim in družbenim propadanjem. Nabavali sta se na periferiji zabodnoevropske razporeditve mest, zato njenega razvoja v smislu rasti števila prebivalstva, obrti in gospodarske proizvodnje ne moremo primerjati z razvojem v ostalih srednjeevropskih središčih.

Da bi ugotovili meščanske značilnosti kulture, je treba ločiti med pojmom mestna kultura in kultura v mestu. Vsako kulturno ustvarjanje v mestu namreč ne moremo označiti za mestno. Pomembna značilnost mestne kulture poznega srednjega veka je bila vsakdanjega življenja, pa tudi produkcija kronik in ostalih literarnih del.

Ob koncu 16. st. se je v Zagrebu in Varaždinu izoblikovala oligarhija, b kateri so spadali književniki, trgovci in obrtniki, ki so bili nobilitirani in so tako skupaj z maloštevilnim plemstvom tvorili najvišji mestni sloj, ne pa tudi najvišjega meščanskega sloja. Igrali so pomembno vlogo v centralistični politiki kralja in so zato spadali k dvorno-plemiškem krogom. Številni vplivi (gospodarski, demografski in kulturni) so povzročili neko vrsto duhovne izolacije, tako da v Gradcu/Zagrebu vse do 17. st. z izjemo administracije ne najdemo razvite pisne kulture. V Varaždinu se je oblikoval t.i. varaždinski literarni krog, toda dela njegovih avtorjev sodijo k literaturi v mestu, saj ne vsebujejo buržoaznih prvin, temveč se v njih zrelojo vplivi cerkvenih, feudalnih in humanističnih krogov. Cehovski pravilniki, protokoli, računi, peticije - to je bila realnost mestne pisne kulture v Gradcu in Varaždinu v 15. in 16. st.

V Zagrebu v 16. st. tudi ni bilo pogojev, da bi mestno podobo okrepili z meščanskimi zgradbami; prav nasprotno, še tistim obstoječim je grozil propad. Podobno je bilo tudi v Varaždinu. Ozkemu krogu visokega meščanstva iz različnih razlogov ni nikdar uspelo ustvariti svoje mestne kulture. Po pretnji kriz je buržoazija postala prešibka. To velja tako za njen gospodarski kot tudi za družbeni položaj proti plemstvu. Kralj je sicer podpiral mesta v njihovem boju proti plemstvu, a ne zato, ker bi bilo ponovno oživiti njihovo srednjeveško samoupravo, temveč z očitno namero, da bi jih vključil v nastajajočo teritorialno državo. Književniki, edini potencialni uradniški sloj te države, so se postavili vladarju na razpolago.

Buržoazija, ki se je nabavila tako pod pritiski dvorno-humanistične kulture kot cerkve, se je identificirala z obema. S tem, ko se je identificirala s kulturno dveb skupin, v kateri ni sošila, je, namesto da bi tvorila svojo, dejansko prezvala ideologijo vodilnih feudalnih slojev. Za oblikovanje lastne ideologije je bilo meščanstvo očitno prešibko. Medtem ko je v bolj razvitih državah meščanstvo svojo posredniško vlogo v širjenju cerkveno-dvorne kulture naredilo bolj autonomno in kreativno, pa je meščanstvo severozabodne Hrvaške še nadaljnje stoletje ostalo potrošnik in posnemovalec nemeščanske kulture.
Das Haus Habsburg und das Ende des Patriarchats von Aquileia

Argumente und Polemiken

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Kurzfassung:
Das Patriarchat von Aquileia, eine der wichtigsten Kirchen der mittelalterlichen Christenheit, wurde in der Neuzeit, als sich die modernen Staaten bildeten, zu einem anachronistischen Gebilde. Spätestens seit der Aufklärung achteten die modernen Staaten darauf, daß ihre staatlichen mit ihren kirchlichen Grenzen übereinstimmten. Denn eine Kirche, die noch immer Ansprüche auf Lehenrechte verfechten konnte, war instrumentalisierbar für politische Zwecke. Das erklärt, warum die Republik Venedig und die Habsburger so verbissen um die Kontrolle über das Patriarchat Aquileia stritten und die längste Zeit mit historischen Argumenten versuchten, ihre jeweiligen Standpunkte durchzusetzen. Die Auflösung des Patriarchats von Aquileia war ein politischer Kompromiß, denn beide Seiten verzichteten auf ihre aus dem Mittelalter rührenden historischen Ansprüche. Die Auflösung des Patriarchats ist somit als ein rationaler Vorgang zu werten auf dem Weg hin zum modernen europäischen Staatensystem.

Schlüsselwörter:
Haus Habsburg, Patriarchat von Aquileia, Republik Venedig.

Die Ausgangslage ist bekannt. Im Spätmittelalter war das Patriarchat von Aquileia fest in das System der Reichskirche im Heiligen Römischen Reich integriert. Der

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² Federico Seneca, La fine del patriarcato aquileiese (1748-1751), in: Paolo Sambin, Federico Seneca (Hrsgg.), Saggi di storia ecclesiastica veneta, Venezia 1954 (= Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie. Miscellanea di studi e memorie, vol. 9), S. 1-104.
⁴ Giuseppe Trebi, Il Friuli dal 1420 al 1797. La storia politica e sociale, Udine-Tricesimo 1998 (= Storia della società friulana, vol. 2).


Die Grenze zwischen dem venezianischen und dem Gebiet des Heiligen Römischen Reichs blieb vielfach unklar, weil die lehenrechtliche Qualität vieler Görzer

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7 Referat der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei für Kaiser Karl VI., [ca. 1720], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.
9 Referat der Hofkanzlei für Kaiser Karl VI., [ca. 1720], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.; Trebbi, Il Friuli, S. 22.
10 Sergio Tavano, Massimiliano I e Leonardo di Gorizia. Il Friuli e il Litorale in nuovi documenti (1496-


Bis zum Jahre 1564, dem Ende der Regierung Kaiser Ferdinands I., war der Streit um das Patriarchat von Aquileia vornehmlich ein politisch-territorialer Konflikt, eine Auseinandersetzung um Lehenrechte. Doch spätestens mit den habsburgischen Länderteilungen von 1564 gesellte sich zum territorialen Konflikt auch ein religiöser. In den Jahrzehnten davor waren auch in jenen habsburgischen Territorien, die zur geistlichen Jurisdiktion des Patriarchen von Aquileia gehörten, also in Görz, in Teilen der Steiermark, Kärntens und Krains, protestantische Ideen eingedrungen.13 Die habsburgischen Behörden in Innerösterreich machten dafür auch die unbefriedigende kirchliche Situation verantwortlich. Denn der in Udine residierende Patri-
arch visitierte seine Kirchenprovinz nicht wirklich,15 was als eine der Ursachen für den Verfall des Katholizismus angesehen wurde. Außerdem hatte es die Republik Venedig geschafft, die Besetzung des Patriarchenstuhls unter ihre ausschließliche Kontrolle zu bringen,16 was besonders Erzherzog Karl von Innerösterreich mißfiel. Unter seiner Regierung entstand daher erstmals der Versuch, die Diözesengrenzen den veränderten politischen Gegebenheiten anzugeleichen.


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17 Trebbi, Il Friuli, S. 263-270.
18 Friedrich Edelmayer, Asburgo d’Austria e Asburgo di Spagna nella Guerra dei Trent’Anni, in: Silvano


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20 Vgl. die Instruktion Ferdinands II. für Dr. Kaspar Tertz, Ödenburg 1625 November 15, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

21 Ebenda.
ne des Heiligen Römischen Reichs, mit stattlichen, ansehnlichen, uralten fürstlichen Häusern und Geschlechtern, mit geistlichen Dignitäten, Klöstern und vornehmen Stiften ausgestattet worden. Eine Übertragung des Patriarchentitels an die Republik Venedig betrachtete der Kaiser zusammenfassend als ganz und gar unsittlich.21


Schließlich sollte Tertz vehement gegen die Praxis protestieren, dem Patriarchen gleich Koadjutoren mit Nachfolgerecht im Patriarchat zur Seite zu stellen. Venedig hatte damit ein gut funktionierendes Mittel gefunden, das Wahlrecht des Domkapitels von Aquileia zu beschneiden und zu verhindern, daß ein Nicht-Venezianer zum Patriarchen gewählt werden konnte. 1622 war so Antonio Grimani zum neuen Patriarchen geworden, was Ferdinand II. bekämpft hatte. Eine neuerliche Nachfolge eines Koadjutoren im Patriarchenamt wollte er nicht mehr dulden. Tertz sollte drohen, daß der momentane Koadjutor in Aquileia, sollte er dem Patriarchen automatisch nachfolgen, in den habsburgischen Territorien nicht mehr anerkannt werden würde, weder in temporalibus noch in spiritualibus.22

Die weiteren Gespräche in Rom müssen an dieser Stelle nicht mehr erläutert werden. Tertz versuchte zwar, alle Kardinäle, die dem spanischen und dem österreichischen Zweig des Hauses Habsburg freundlich gesinnt waren, zu mobilisieren, doch brachten die Verhandlungen nur geringe Fortschritte. Im Juni 1626 hieß es zwar, Aquileia würde geteilt werden in Aquileia Vetus für den österreichischen Teil, in dem die Kathedrale verbleiben und das Sitz und Stimme am Reichstag haben sollte, und Aquileia Nova mit dem Bischofssitz in Udine.23 Doch bevor es zur Durchführung dieses Beschlusses der römischen Konsistorialkommission kommen konnte, verhinderte die politische Lage in Italien einen Abschluß der leidigen Streit-

22 Ebenda.
23 Rainer, Entwicklung, S. 273.
24 Trebbi, Il Friuli, S. 273.

De facto war damit die Diözese von Aquileia in zwei Teile zerfallen, die endgültige juristische Klärung der Frage sollte dennoch mehr als 130 weitere Jahre dauern. Der negative Nebeneffekt des kaiserlichen Dekrets war der, daß die habsburgischen Untertanen der Diözese Aquileia keinen Oberhirten mehr hatten, was die ohnehin kritischen religiösen Zustände noch verschärfte. Im Jahr 1628 war neu- erlich klar geworden, daß der Konflikt um das Patriarchat Aquileia nur lösbare sein würde, sollte es möglich sein, zu einem Vergleich zwischen dem Kaiser und Venedig zu kommen. Während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges war dies ebenso unmöglich wie in den Jahren danach, als das Haus Habsburg im Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Europa mit Frankreich lag und die Wiener Habsburger ab 1683 neuerlich Krieg gegen die Osmanen führten.25 Venedig war in all diesen europäischen Konflikten ein möglicher Bündnispartner, auch wenn die Beziehungen an der Grenze in Friaul gespannt blieben.


Die Stiftung Gullins nahm Kaiser Leopold I. zum Anlaß, wieder einmal einen Anlauf zur Lösung der Fragen um Aquileia zu unternehmen. 1690 richtete er ein ausführliches Schreiben an den Kardinal Johann von Goëss in Rom. Er argumentierte, seine Vorfahren bis zurück zu Erzherzog Karl hätten sich um Görz bemüht. Denn die Republik Venedig würde sich in jenen Teilen Aquileias, die zum Heiligen Römischen Reich gehörten, zwar nicht direkt, wohl aber indirekt einmischen. Daher versuchten die Venezianer auch, die Gründung eines Bistums in Görz zu verhindern. Leopold beschuldigte den damaligen Papst Alexander VIII., als gebür-
ger Venezianer parteiisch zu sein. Goëss sollte daher über einige vertraute Minister des Papstes herausbekommen, wie dieser zur Bistumsgründung stehen würde. Zu Aquileia a parte Imperii gehörten die schönsten Städte, so Görz mit seiner Grafschaft, Gradisca mit seiner Grafschaft, Villach in Kärnten oder Cilli in der Steiermark, um nur einige Orte zu nennen. In allen Städten, Abteien, Kollegiatstiften, Schlössern und Gütern lebten mehr als eine Million Menschen. Diese - und hier ist eine verstärkte Betonung religiöser Argumente im Gegensatz zu früheren Jahren zu bemerken - würden große spirituelle Schäden erleiden: Bischofliche Visitationen würden nicht stattfinden; das heilige Öl müsse von auswärtigen Bischöfen erbeten werden; viele Menschen wären nicht gefirmt, käme doch einmal eine Firmung zustande, wäre sie so teuer, daß das Land sie nicht zahlen könne; die Diözese sei zu groß, was für seine Untertanen große und beschwerliche Reisen bedeute; unter den Klerikern und Priestern würden die größten Exzesse und Skandale geschehen; die Priesterausbildung sei untauglich; viele fragwürdige Subjekte würden im Priesterrat sein, die die Seelsorgeaufgaben nicht wirklich wahrnehmen könnten, etc.27


Es existieren zwei lange, jeweils mehr als einhundert Seiten umfassende Referate der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei an den Kaiser, die beide um 1720 entstanden sind.30 In ihnen wiederholen sich all jene Argumente und Vorschläge, die bereits

28  Ebenda.
29  Leopold an Goëss, Ebersdorf 1691 September 12, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.
30  Referate der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei für Kaiser Karl VI., [ca. 1720], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart.

Diese grundlegende Zusammenfassung der habsburgischen Standpunkte sollte die Basis werden, auf der die weiteren Verhandlungen rund um Aquileia in Venedig und vor allem in Rom betrieben wurden. Es war also Kaiser Karl VI., der gezielt die Lösung des Problemfeldes anging - er und seine Räte bereiteten das vor, was unter Kaiserin Maria Theresia zu einem Abschluß geführt werden konnte, nämlich die Auflösung des Patriarchats von Aquileia. Zwar konnte auch Karl VI. keine Fortschritte erzielen, doch in der Zwischenzeit hatte auch Rom zur Kenntnis genommen, daß die religiösen Zustände im habsburgischen Teil von Aquileia un- haltbar geworden waren. Deutliche Worte fand hier der päpstliche Nuntius in Wien in einem Schreiben an den kaiserlichen Hofkanzler, den Grafen Zinzendorf, dem er 1737 ein Memorale überschickte, mit dem er wollte "di rappresentare /.../ il lacrimevole infelicissimo stato, in cui si ritrova la diocesi di Aquileia a parte Imperii per la salute delle anime, atteso che, per trovarsi interdetti i sudditi austriaci a ricevere da quel Patriarca gl'ordini sacri, ogli santi, approvazioni e licenze di sentir le confessioni et investiture ai beneficii, vengono ormai ridotte iti le parrocchie a non avere piú chi le amministri, e per conseguenza i parrocchiani rimangano privi dei sacramenti piú necessari, cosa che tra fedeli cattolici, e sotto un piissimo e religiosissimo Imperadore fa terrore e pieta a pensarvi ..."32 Zinzendorf antwortete auf diese Klagen sehr bestimmt, der Nuntius möge seinen Einfluß beim Papst ausnützen, "per apportarvi il rimedio conveniente al caso, o con providenza diffinitiva o almeno con qualche temperamento provisionale, per cui Sua Maestá potesse passare senza magior lesione della sua dignità e senza pregiudizio piú diuturno di quei sudditi della Maestà Sua, li quali nello spirituale dipendono dal Patriarca d’Aquileia."33

123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.
31 Ebenda.
32 Päpstlicher Nuntius an Zinzendorf, [Wien] 1737 April 1, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.
33 Zinzendorf an den päpstlichen Nuntius, [Wien 1737], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.
34 Vgl. den Bericht der innerösterreichische Räte an Maria Theresia, Graz 1742 Februar 13, AVA Wien,
Im September 1741, also noch in ihrem ersten Regierungsjahr, richtete Maria Theresia eine Anfrage an die innerösterreichische Regierung bezüglich des Standes und der Beschaffenheit der oben erwähnten Stiftung von Gullin, was als Hinweis darauf zu werten ist, daß die Monarchin das Problem Aquileia wirklich lösen wollte. Zugute kam ihr dabei der endgültige Machtverfall der Republik Venedig, über den sie sich immer wieder äußerte. Sehr deutliche Worte fand sie beispielsweise in der Instruktion für Antonio Turinetti, Marquese di Prié, der 1747 als kaiserlicher Botschafter nach Venedig geschickt wurde.


Die Instruktion der Kaiserin gibt sehr deutlich das Bild wieder, das die meisten europäischen Kanzleien von der Markusrepublik hatten. Doch spricht aus den Worten Maria Theresias nicht nur eine gewisse Besorgnis über den Zustand Venedigs,

Auch an den finanziellen Gegebenheiten konnte eine Abtrennung des österreichischen Teiles des Patriarchats von Aquileia und die Schaffung eines Bistums in Görz nicht mehr scheitern, da 1747 der Görzer Adlige Agostino Codelli von Fahnenfeld nicht nur 90.000 Gulden für die Errichtung eines Bistums stiftete, sondern auch seinen Palazzo, der früher im Besitz der Familie Kobenzl gewesen war, als Haus für den Bischof zur Verfügung stellte.37 Die kaiserlichen Räte in der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei befürworteten die Genehmigung der Stiftung Codellis mit allem Nachdruck.38 Maria Theresia genehmigte nicht nur gnädig die Stiftung und gewährte Codelli das Vorschlagsrecht für den ersten Bischof,39 sondern nahm die Stiftung zum Anlaß, neuerlich vehement die Gründung eines Bistums in Görz zu fordern.40 Da Codelli außerdem sehr rasch Karl Michael von Attems als ersten Bischof für Görz vorgeschlagen hatte,41 wandte sich die Kaiserin noch im November 1747 an Papst Benedikt XIV. und präsentierte Attems als Kandidaten für den zu schaffenden Bischofsitz.42


1747 August 2, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 25 ex 1747, fol. 22r-23v.
38 Vortrag der Kommission für Kärnten und Krain der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei an Maria Theresia, Wien 1747 September 4, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 23 ex 1747, fol. 4r-17v.
39 Maria Theresia an Agostino Codelli von Fahnenfeld, Wien 1747 November 8, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 25 ex 1747, fol. 1r-7v+fol. 26v.
40 Vgl. Maria Theresia an Kardinal Alessandro Albani, Wien 1747 Oktober 14, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 23 ex 1747, fol. 1r-2v+18r-19v.
41 Vgl. den Vortrag der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei an Maria Theresia, Wien 1747 November 3, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 25 ex 1747, fol. 18r-19v.
42 Maria Theresia an Benedikt XIV., Wien 1547 November 15, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 25 ex 1747, fol. 24r+v.
43 Seneca, La fine, S. 12.
44 Vorstellung der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei an Maria Theresia, Wien 1748 Mai 29, AVA Wien, Alter
Mitteln behindere, und beschuldigte die Kaiserin, sich selbst zu wenig zu engagieren. Daher drohe das Bistumsprojekt wieder einmal zu scheitern. Denn aus den römischen Antworten sei zu entnehmen, daß die Sache wieder nur verschoben werden würde. Außerdem betonte Codelli sein Alter von siebzig Jahren. Noch vor seinem Tod wollte er die Durchführung der Bistumsgründung sehen. Andernfalls bestünde die Gefahr, daß die Stiftung bei seinen Kindern und Erben ins Stocken geraten könnte. Aus all diesen Gründen bat er daher die Kaiserin, sich in Rom neu erlich für die Errichtung eines Bistums einsetzen, auch den Kardinal Mellini einzuschalten und gegen die venezianische Politik etwas zu unternehmen. Auch den päpstlichen Nuntius in Wien beschuldigte Codelli, an der Ernsthaftigkeit des Willens der Kaiserin zu zweifeln. Diesem sollte daher mitgeteilt werden, daß er das Projekt in Rom zu befördern habe.44

In ihrem Votum stellte sich die Hofkanzlei nachdrücklich auf die Seite von Codelli und griff die Republik Venedig heftig an. Positiv vermerkten die Räte allerdings, daß der Papst prinzi piell für die Errichtung eines Bistums in Görz zu sein schien, hatte er doch den Auditor und den Datarius beauftragt, die Sache in die Wege zu leiten. Und auch die Räte beschwerten sich darüber, daß die Republik Venedig die Bistumsgründung mit allen Mitteln zu hintertreiben suche.45


Genau genommen war das die entscheidende gedankliche Leistung, die es einerseits ermöglichen konnte, daß Rom die Frage Aquileia weiterhin behandelte, und andererseits für Venedig einen Weg hin zu einem Kompromiß zeigte. Denn damit wurden zwar die lehenrechtlichen Ansprüche des Reichs auf Aquileia nicht aufgegeben, aber nicht mehr weiter verhandelt, weil derartige Verhandlungen oh-

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44 Ebenda.
45 Maria Theresia an Kardinal Alessandro Albani, Wien 1748 Juni 8, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.
46 Protokoll der Sitzung der Konferenz der Hof- und Staatskanzlei, Wien 1748 August 14, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.
47 Ebenda.

Nachdem in dieser Frage ein einstimmiger Beschluß gefaßt worden war, kam Bewegung in die Angelegenheit. Die Konferenz diskutierte nun, ob man in Rom einen apostolischen Vikar für Görz fordern solle oder einen Bischof. Prinzipiell hätte die Konferenz zwar die sofortige Errichtung eines Bistums bevorzugt, doch beschloß man, sich einsteilen mit einem apostolischen Vikariat zufrieden zu geben und die Bistumsfrage erst danach weiter zu verfolgen. Die Mitglieder der Konferenz versprachen sich davon mehr Erfolg, hatte doch der Papst bereits einmal die Errichtung eines Vikariats in Aussicht gestellt. Auch dachten die kaiserlichen Minister daran, daß Venedig weniger gegen ein Vikariat als gegen ein Bistum opponieren würde. Daher sollte sich die Kaiserin einsteilen um die Errichtung eines apostolischen Vikariats bemühen, erst später wollte man sich um ein Bistum in Görz kümmern.


Nach dieser entscheidenden Sitzung schrieb die Kaiserin an den Papst und forderte neuerlich ein Bistum in Görz oder ein apostolisches Vikariat in den österreichischen Teilen des Patriarchats Aquileia.49 Ähnlich lautende Schreiben gingen auch an die Kardinäle Albani und Millini.50 Und tatsächlich kamen bald aus Rom Mitteilungen, daß die Errichtung eines apostolischen Vikariats in den österreichischen Teilen Aquileias möglich sei, nicht aber die Gründung einer Diözese in Görz.51 Die Kaiserin und ihre Minister hatten mit dem Ende des Jahres 1748 einen

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49 Maria Theresia an Benedikt XIV., Wien 1748 September 4, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.
50 Maria Theresia an die Kardinäle Albani und Millini, Wien 1748 September 8, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.
51 Kardinal Albani an Maria Theresia, Rom 1548 September 21, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.; derselbe an dieselbe, Rom 1748 Oktober 5, ebenda.
ersten Etappensieg errungen.


Am 27. Juni 1750 bestellte der Papst endlich Karl Michael von Attems zum apo-

52 Maria Theresia an die Repräsentation und die Kammer in Krain, Wien 1749 August 9, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 32 ex 1749, unfol.
54 Vortrag der Staatskanzlei an die Kaiserin, Wien 1749 Oktober 18, HHSTA Wien, Staatskanzlei, Vorträge 63/X, fol. 71r-74v; vgl. auch den umfangreichen Aktenbestand zu den Grenzverhandlungen im HHSTA Wien, Österreichische Akten, Innerösterreichische Grenzakten 21.
55 Maria Theresia an die Repräsentation und die Kammer in Krain, Wien 1749 August 9, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 32 ex 1749, unfol.; dieselbe an dieselben, Wien 1749 November 1, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 34 ex 1749, unfol.
56 Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 April 25, HHSTA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 31, fol. 113r-114r.
57 Vgl. Seneca, La fine, S. 44.
58 Maria Theresia an Prié, Wien 1750 Mai 30, HHSTA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Weisungen 7, unfol.
59 Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 Juli 6, HHSTA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 31,
stolischen Vikar in den österreichischen Teilen des Patriarchats Aquileia. Die Aufregung in Venedig war groß, denn nun hatte der Papst offensichtlich endgültig einer künftigen Teilung des Patriarchats zugestimmt, erhielt Attems doch den Titel eines Bischofs von Pergamon. Die Aufregung, die das päpstliche Breve in Venedig hervorrief, kommentierte der kaiserliche Botschafter Prié mit Häme: “Sa il mondo intiero quali siano le pie e sempre giuste intenzioni della Maestà Vostra, ma trattandosi con questa Repubblica che altro non conosce che la conservazione di quanto possiede a che titolo sia, ho sempre avuto motivo di prevedere che gli affari d’Aquileia, che già da tanto tempo vertono, sarebbero quelli su’ quali la medesima non intende rebbe ragione, né colla Santa Sede, né a riguardo della Maestà Vostra.”


Während in Venedig die Sorge herrschte, nach der Gründung zweier Diözesen würde der Papst dem Bischof in Görz die Patriarchenwürde verleihen und das Heilige Römische Reich beginnen, die weltliche Herrschaft über Friaul zu fordern, erregten sich die Kaiserin und ihre Minister über die Republik. Eigentlich, so Maria Theresia, müßte sie die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Venedig abbrechen, Prié nach Wien zurückberufen und Tron des Landes verweisen. Angeblich aus Rückicht auf Rom entschloß sich Wien, diese Maßnahme einstweilen zu unterlassen. Und der kaiserliche Botschafter in Venedig betonte die moderate Politik Wiens und den Extremismus der Markusrepublik: “Confessòri, come deve la mia sincera fedelità alla Maestà Vostra, che ogni uno qui si attendeva, che la Maestà Vostra, ad esempio dell’estremità alle quale si è portata questa Repubblica contro la corte di Roma, mi richiamerebbe. La somma moderazione della Maestà Vostra prova sempre più la grandezza di quell’animo, che non ba pari e che ad esempio de’ suoi augusti antenati deve provare al mondo intiero li superiori sentimenti, che regnano negli animi de’ monarchi, a quelli d’una confusa Repubblica, in cui predomina bene spesso la passione, l’odio e la vendetta, senza riflesso ai fastidiosi seguiti che ne nas-

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60 Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 Juli 11, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 31, fol. 31r-36v; vgl. Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 Juli 18, ebenda, fol. 43r-46v; Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 Juli 25, ebenda, fol. 53r-62v.
61 Protokoll der Sitzung der Konferenz der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei, Wien 1750 Juli 17, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 26 ex 1750, unfol.
63 Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 August 1, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte
Purché la Repubblica ci si presti di buona fede, proveranno evidentemente a chi ne avrà conoscenza quali siano le grandi massime di una sì augusta e moderata principessa, sempre egualmente attenta a dare al mondo intiero quella pace e quiete, contro la quale quelli che son privi di sì alti sentimenti, non hanno in mira. Credo poter dire in quest’occasione che ammirabili sarebbero anche simili grandiosi sentimenti, se questa Repubblica fosse una potenza a pretendere pariità colla Maestà Vostra; ma la manifesta disparità rende secondo me il ritegno de Vostra Maestà praticato ancor più grande, e deve servir di esempio a quei principi che solo si occupano della grandezza loro…

Im Sommer 1750 bestand durchaus die Gefahr, daß zwischen Habsburg und Venedig Krieg ausbrechen könnte. Denn die päpstliche Maßnahme provozierte eine Vielzahl von Problemen. So weigerten sich beispielsweise die venezianischen Domkapitulare von Aquileia, die päpstlichen Breven anzuerkennen und argumentierten mit den Beschlüssen der Konzilien und des kanonischen Rechts. Die kaiserlichen Vertreter in Krain schlugen der Monarchin vor, gnadenlos gegen die venezianischen Domherren vorzugehen und ihnen die Einkünfte zu sperren. Außerdem mehrten sich im Sommer 1750 die Grenzstreitigkeiten zwischen Österreich und Venedig, und zwar nicht nur zwischen Friaul und Kärnten, sondern auch in Istrien. Im September drohte die Kaiserin neuerlich, sie werde Prié aus Venedig abberufen, sollte die Republik nicht ihre Beziehungen zu Rom neu erlich aufnehmen und bereit sein, den Streit um Aquileia in Frieden fertig zu verhandeln. Nur der große Langmut Wiens habe die Republik davon abhalten können, zum großen Ärger der gesamten Christenheit zu werden, schrieb sie. Venedig wolle keine Kompromißvorschläge Wiens verhandeln, sei unvernünftig, hochnäsig und dürfe sich nicht erlauben, Österreich weiter zu reizen. Nicht einmal eine bedeutendere Macht als die Republik würde das wagen, betonte die Kaiserin. Eindeutig sind aus derartigen Äußerungen Drohungen einer europäischen Großmacht gegen die zum politischen Zwerg gewordene Republik herauszuhören.

Die habsburgische und die venezianische Position in der Streitfrage schienen im Herbst 1750 weiterhin unvereinbar. Wien verlangte die endgültige Auflösung des Patriarchats von Aquileia und die Schaffung zweier gleichberechtigter Diözesen in Görz und in Udine, Venedig beharrte darauf, daß das Patriarchat von Aquileia nach Udine transferiert werden müsse. Beide Standpunkte widersprachen sich vollständig. Venedig versuchte zwar, die Unterstützung Frankreichs gegen Österreich zu bekommen, was allerdings nicht gelang. Die französischen Diplomaten sahen vielmehr im habsburgischen Vorschlag zur Schaffung zweier gleichberechtigter Diözesen durchaus einen gangbaren Weg, was wohl auch darauf zurückzuführen ist, daß der französische Botschafter in Wien lange Zeit mit dem Minister Kaunitz...
über die Sache verhandelt hatte. Daher begann auch Frankreich, verstärkt Druck auf Venedig auszuüben und die Annahme dieses Vorschlags zu empfehlen. Und Maria Theresia drohte weiterhin, die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Venedig abzubrechen, sollte die Markusrepublik nicht an den Verhandlungstisch zurückkehren und die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Rom wieder aufnehmen.  


von Aquileia und der Gründung zweier Erzdiözesen ein.\textsuperscript{74} Die Angelegenheit von Aquileia gibt es eindeutig nicht mehr, sie ist als beendet zu betrachten, schrieb der kaiserliche Botschafter in Venedig im August 1751. Alle Welt sei mit den päpstlichen Bullen zufrieden.\textsuperscript{75} Ein Dauerstreit von 250 Jahren hatte seinen Abschluß gefunden.

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\textsuperscript{79r-80v.}
POVZETEK

Od začetka 16. st. naprej pa vse do leta 1751 so prepriči okrog oglejskega patriarchata predstavljali enega ključnih problemov v odnosih med Habsburžani in Beneško republiko. V tem prispaku je predstavljen doslej skoraj povsem zapostavljen aspekt diskusij o patriarchatu, namreč argumenti in polemike Habsburžanov v zgodnjem novem veku, s katerimi so skušali dokazati, da so Benečani na nekorekten način prevzeli oblast nad patriarchatom in da bi Oglej moral pripasti habsburški nadoblasti. V 250 letih so se teh argumentov in polemik ponovilo, nazadnje pa so se jim Habsburžani tik pred koncem patriarchata odrekli. Številne strokovne utemeljitve, s katerimi so Habsburžani skušali dokazati svoj prav, so izhajale iz zgodovinskega razvoja.

KO se spomnimo bleščeče zgodovine oglejskega patriarchata v srednjem veku, se nam nje-gov konec leta 1751 zdi nespektakularen in neslaven. Za eno najpomembnejših srednjeveških šrščanskih cerkva v novem veku ni bilo več prostora. V času oblikovanja modernih držav se je spremenil v zastarelo tvorbo. Najpozneje od časa razsvetljenstva naprej so države stremele za tem, da so se njihove državne in cerkvene meje ujemale, kajti le to je bilo zagotovilo, da se nobeden od sosedov ne bo vmešaval v njihove notranje zadeve. Argumenti za izboljšanje dušnega skrbstva so tej politični nuji morali dati prednost. Cerkev, ki je še vedno imela pravico do feudalnih posesti, je bilo namreč moč zlorabiti za politične namene. To tudi pojasni, zakaj so se Beneška republika in Habsburžani tako zagrizeno borili za prevlado nad oglejskim patriarchatom ter skušali svoja stališča utemeljiti s historičnimi argumenti. Benečani so sprva v tem sporu imeli boljše karte, kajti za obrambo svojega zaledja so labko uporabili bolj koncentrirane sile kot na drugi strani Habsburžani. Ko pa je republika izgubila svojo politično moč v Italiji in se je Habsburška monarhija povzela do statusa velesile, Benetke dokončne rešitve tega sporja niso več mogle preprečiti. Kljub temu je bila razpustitev patriarhata politični kompromis, kajti obe strani sta se odrekli svojim na srednjem veku temelječim zabietvam, ki sta jih poprej tako zagrizeno zagovarjali. Zato labko razpustitev oglejskega patriarhata označimo kot racionalno potezo na poti k oblikovanju modernega sistema držav.
Tirnberger, the Jesuit Scientist from Ptuj

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Abstract:
We researched the work of the important Lower Styrian scientist Tirnberger (1731-1780). Until the suppression of the Jesuit order he held the most sophisticated pedagogical and scientific positions in monarchy. He collaborated with Hell, the most important Habsburg astronomer of his time. As the supreme specialist Tirnberger lectured on physical sciences at the new and prestigious Miners academy at Schemnitz. He published his data about weather and Aurora Borealis in a special booklet.

Key words:
Ptuj, Graz, Schemnitz, Tirnberger (1731-1780), history of the Jesuit mathematical sciences.
Biography

In Tirnberger's time there was no secondary school in Ptuj. He enrolled in the Jesuit Gymnasium and entered the Jesuit society in Vienna in 1750. He spent two novice years in Vienna in the 1750 and 1751. Next year, he taught lower classes at Gymnasium of Leoben in Styria. Between 1753 and 1757 he studied philosophy in Vienna and also repeated the courses of mathematics as help for senior students of philosophy. At the same time he was the first assistant of the emperor's astronomer Hell in the years 1757 and 1758. In 1757 Hell published the first volume of his famous ephemerides with Tirnberger's help. In 1758, Tirnberger taught higher classes of Gymnasium at Judenburg and also headed the Jesuit seminary there. Between 1759 and 1762 Tirnberger studied theology in Graz. As usual for the Jesuit of Austrian province of his time, he made his last vows in Judenburg in 1763.

In that way he was well over thirty when he finished his studies and began his career as a professor. Between the years 1764 and 1771 he was the professor of special astronomy, the head of observatory and the custodian of cabinet for physics in Graz. He spent next two years as the professor of mechanics and hydraulic in the Miners academy in Schemnitz. In 1773, after the suppression of the Society, he settled in Schottwein in Lower Austria for the rest of his life.

Observations of the satellites of Jupiter

Galileo was the first to describe the satellites of Jupiter. He claimed that the observation of the satellites could be used for the exact estimation of time on the open sea. At the end of 17th century Italian born Parisian astronomer Cassini forwarded Galileo's idea again. But in Tirnberger's own time the time estimation with Jupiter's satellites already lost some of its prestige because of the development of mechanical clocks of John Harrison (1693-1776) and other mechanics.

Tirnberger's fellow astronomers still observed Jupiter's satellites quite a lot. The Vienna astronomer Hell published Tirnberger's data while Tirnberger still taught special astronomy in Graz. The term "special" was used for the observational part of astronomy in the same sense as for the experimental physics.

Tirnberger observed at the observatory of Graz on February 14, 1770, April 22, 1770, July 29, 1770, and August 5, 1770. On July 10, 1770 that Jupiter was on opposition. The Earth was situated between Jupiter and Sun. Jupiter was in his nearest position towards the Earth and was therefore seen on the maximal visual angle. At least some of Tirnberger's observations of Jupiter were made at the most favorable conditions.

On the first occasion in February Tirnberger observed the immersion of the first...
satellite, secondly the emersion of the third satellite and for last two occasions he noted emersions of the first satellite. During the first two observations the sky was without a cloud, for the third occasion it was clear and for the last observation he got a cloudy weather.

On February 5, 1770, Tirnberger observed how 2/3 of a dark Moon covered the constellation of the Bull on 33 minutes 12 seconds past midnight.4

The satellites of Jupiter were also measured in China. In Tirnberger’s time Carniolian Hallerstein5 in Beijing was nearly seventy and left the observations of Jupiter satellites to his younger collaborators. Between October 15, 1772 and December 15, 1773 the Jesuit Joseph Bernard observed with a telescope 13 feet in length. The Jesuit Aloys Cibolla from Palermo on Sicily used the similar telescope between May 13, 1772 and January 20, 1773.

On the other side of the Chinese wall the Portuguese Jesuit Felix de Rocha observed the satellites of Jupiter during his geographical research.6 Hallerstein mailed their data to Hell in Vienna.7 Hell published Hallerstein’s report in the first part of his Ephemerides where he also published Tirnberger’s observations of the Jupiter’s satellites.

The European planet astronomy especially developed with the specialized Lambert’s magazine Astronomisches Jarbuch established in 1774. In Lambert’s magazine for a while all the observations of Jupiter were published.8

Aurora Borealis

In 1776, Tirnberger published his observation of Aurora Borealis among his meteorological data. He observed in Graz on 47° 4’ 10” of north latitude. Tirnberger observed nine months before Hell in Vienna and Hallerstein in Beijing. On December 14, 1769 Tirnberger began to observe at 9 p.m., and on December 27, 1769 half of hour earlier. On December 30, 1769 he began to measure at half past five a.m. and continued the observations during the next night. Tirnberger did not just note the light and its changes as Hell and Hallerstein, but also measured with the magnetic needle as Cotte9 in Montmorency in France. Tirnberger’s needle moved towards the east when the stormy clouds with a strong wind covered the sky over the mountains. He used the special equipment to measure the declination of the magnetic needle. He found that the needle trembled facing the point declined from

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5 Ferdinand Avguštin Haller von Hallerstein (Lieou Song Ling K’iao Nien, * August 27, 1703 Ljubljana; SJ October 27, 1721 Vienna; † October 29, 1774 Beijing).
9 Louis Cotte (* 1740 Laon; † 1815 Montmorency).
In 1769, after the decade of very rare Aurora Borealis observable south from 55° of the Earth latitude, the phenomena became much more common for about a quarter of century. In 1769, the Sunspots also had a maximum. As much as 106 spots were registered at that year, more than ever before. But Tirnberger’s Aurora Borealis was not recorded by anybody else and Tirnberger’s data had never been included in later list of Aurora Borealis. The closest to his data was Aurora Borealis seen from the castle Deainvilliers on December 20, 1769, and later published by the academy of Paris. In Graz and in Vienna Aurora Borealis was observed on October 24, 1769. Next Aurora Borealis was observed in Vienna, Trnava and several German towns on January 18, 1770.

Many Tirnberger’s contemporaries were interested in the Aurora Borealis. In 1777, Tirnberger’s former teacher Hell published the theory and data about Aurora Borealis in appendix of his Ephemerides. He wrote in the form similar to the Newton’s Principia a century ago. Hell published 125 paragraphs in 118 pages with several pictures. He described the research of Kircher, Mairan, Musschenbroek and Johan Lambert (1728-1777) in his photometry of 1761. Hell mentioned the mathe-

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Mathematical tools for determining the height of Aurora Borealis,\textsuperscript{12} and the observations made in Russia.\textsuperscript{13} Hell used his own research of magnetism in medicine to connect Aurora Borealis with the electrical charge of the Earth.\textsuperscript{14} In 1769, Hell observed the transition of Venus over the disc of Sun in Lapland and had a lot of opportunity to watch the Aurora Borealis there.\textsuperscript{15}

**Meteorology**

The astronomer Tirnberger published his observations of Aurora Borealis among his meteorological notes. In 1768 and in 1769, he measured the relative humidity of the air.\textsuperscript{16} Between the years 1765 and 1768 he took notes about the wind, clouds, average atmospheric pressure and temperature. The results were tabled by months.\textsuperscript{17} He noticed the greatest diurnal variations in April 1769.\textsuperscript{18}

Tirnberger described two earthquakes on December 31, 1767 at 12\textsuperscript{th} p.m., and on February 27, 1768 at 2\textsuperscript{nd} p.m. He did not connect the data about the earthquakes with the weather or Aurora Borealis,\textsuperscript{19} although such theories were popular at his time.

Tirnberger’s meteorological observations can be compared with the similar work of Schöttl\textsuperscript{20} in Ljubljana few years later in 1775 and 1776.

**Hell’s pump in Schemnitz**

The first director of the Mining academy in Schemnitz established in 1762/1763 was professor of mineralogy and metallurgy Nikolaus Joseph baron Jacquin (1727-1817) from Leyden. Jacquin later accepted the chair for botany and chemistry at the University of Vienna.\textsuperscript{21} The botanist and physician Jacquin published in his collected papers some of the data of the Jesuit Franc Ksaver Wulfen (1728-1805), the first professor of Newton’s physics in Ljubljana.

In 1769 Janez Anton Scopoli (1723-1788) left Idria in Carniola and became the

\textsuperscript{12} Maximilian Hell, Aurorae borealis theoria nova. Pars I. Ephemeridae Astronomicae Anni 1777. (March 1770, Appendix ad ephemerides Anni 1777), Appendix 21, p.112.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibidem, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibidem, p. 8, 115.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{16} Karl Tirnberger, Auszug aus den Wetterungsbeobachtungen, welche in der Sternwarte zu Grätz von 1765-1769 gemacht werden sind, Grätz 1770, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibidem, pp. 7-16.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibidem, pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{20} Gregor Schöttl (* February 14, 1732 Steyr; SJ October 18, 1747 Vienna; † November 5, 1777 Ljubljana).
professor of mineralogy and metallurgy at the Mining academy in Schemnitz. In 1776 he accepted the chair of chemistry and botany at the University of Pavia.

Former Jesuit baron Ignaz Born (1742-1791) also taught at the academy in Schemnitz. In 1780, Born moved from Prague to Vienna and became the custodian of the court natural history museum in Vienna.

Hell's pump in Schemnitz - (Nocolaus Poda, Kurzgefasste Beschreibung der, bey dem Bergbay zu Schemnitz in Nieder-Hungarn, errichteten Maschinen, Prag 1771, p. 54)
In the mid-18th century Joseph Karl Hell (1713-1789) constructed his famous pump in Schemnitz without the power supply, just with the help of hydrostatic pressure. It pumped the water form the underground of the Schemnitz mine. Joseph Karl’s younger bother Maximilian Hell helped with calculations. Maximilian was at that time teaching in the nearby town Banská Bystrica.

When the compressed air left the pump through the Hell’s pipe, the pipe was covered by ice that looked like snow. Gabriel Jars (1732-1769) was the first to describe the effect to the scientific Europe. Jars’ father was the director of the mines in the Ghessy and Sain-Bel near Lyon. Between the years 1757 and 1759 Jars traveled with Jean Pierre Fançois Guillot-Duhamel (1730-1816) through Saxony, Bohemia, Austria, Tyrol, Carinthia, Styria, Schemnitz and the Hungarian towns. After his return he was elected honorary member of the Paris academy on January 10, 1761, and the ordinary member on May 19, 1765 in a competition with the first candidate Lavoisier.

Tirnberger’s friend Nikolaus Poda von Neuhaus (Boda, 1723-1798) later occupied the chair for mining at the Mining academy of Schemnitz. Tirnberger cooperated with Poda already in 1766 in Graz. Together they wrote a manuscript about the fossils from the collection of the museum of Graz. Poda was the professor of mathematics and physics in Graz and he also directed the nature museum. After Poda left Graz, Tirnberger replaced him as the director of the Graz observatory.

Before he left Graz for Schemnitz, Poda published a treatise about the iron mines in Styria. In 1770, Poda published with Born and Tirberger’s help a treatise about the mechanism of the famous Hell’s pump. Short after the publication, Tirnberger replaced Poda as the professor of mechanics and hydraulics on the Mining academy in Schemnitz in 1772.

Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), the grandfather of Charles Darwin (1809-1882), published the explanation of the Jars observation from Schemnitz. The famous Slovene Jesuit Gabriel Gruber and his brother Tobias criticized Darwin’s ideas on January 1, 1791.22 Hell’s pump principle was used for the oil pumping in Pennsylvania almost a century later. In 1867, the famous Slovenian geologist Markus Vincenz Lipold (1816-1883) published a book about the mine of Schemnitz.

**Conclusion**

Until recently, Tirnberger was relatively poorly known in Slovene historiography. We proved that his works and positions were important enough to be known by broader public.

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22 Tobias Gruber, Bemerkungen über H. Erasmus Darwins Folgerungen aus Versuchen auf die Erzeugung der Kälte durch die mechanische Ausdehnung der Luft u.s.w. Journal der Physik 1 Heft 8. 73, Gren’s J. Phys. (1791), 5, pp. 188-196.
The Mine in Schemnitz
(www.antiqueprints.com/Prints/europe_views.html)
Stanislav Južnič

TIRNBERGER, JEZUITSKI ZNANSTVENIK IZ PTUJA

POVZETEK


Ob astronomskih meritvah se je ukvarjal tudi s sorodnimi opazovanji narave. Opisal je potresa leta 1767 in 1768 ter od leta 1765 do 1768 zapisoval natančne podatke o vremenu. Zbrane meritve je leta 1770 objavil v knjigi. Njegove znanstveno dobro zastavljene meteoro-loške meritve spadajo med najstarejše zapise o vremenskih pojavih v monarhiji in so izjemno pomembne za sodobna razmišljanja o dolgoročnih vremenskih spremembah.


Tirnberger je iseskozi ostal povezan z rodno Spodnjo Štajersko. Sorodniki so ga v Mariboru negovali med boleznijo. Umril je razmeroma mlad, še pred srečanjem z Abrahamom. Kljub prezgodnjemu koncu nas njegovi dosežki navdajajo s ponosom.
The Slovenian Self-government in November 1918

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Abstract:
In the treatise, the author presents the autonomous position of Slovenes in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which was formed by Habsburg dominion Yugoslavs at the secession from Austria-Hungary on 29 October, 1918. This state existed until 1 December, 1918, when it associated with the Kingdom of Serbia into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The State of SCS encompassed Slovenia, Croatia with Istria and Dalmatia, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this state, Slovenes, for the first time in history, ruled themselves. They had their National Government of the SCS in Ljubljana, which was the first independent and democratically formed Slovene national government. The Slovene National Government, to which the National Council of SCS in Zagreb, the supreme authority in the state of SCS, transferred the supreme authority upon Slovene territory, conducted independently entire political, military, social and economic affairs. Thus, on the territory, which was under its administration, the sole, it was the full and legally supreme authority and bearer of Slovene national statehood in the State of the SCS. Independent state-legal position, which Slovenes achieved in the State of SCS was not preserved at the formation of the centralist Kingdom of SCS.

Key words:
Slovene statehood, State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, November 1918.

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Maribor, 3 (2003), No. 1, pp. 71-84, 37 notes, 3 pictures.
Language: Original in English (Abstract in English and Slovene, Summary in Slovene).
One of the important features in the process of Yugoslav unification in 1918 is certainly the fact that the basis for this process was present in the independent national position of the ‘Habsburg Yugoslavs’ (Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire), which took shape in the formation, in November 1918, of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (the State of SCS). The State of SCS, therefore, occupies an important place in trends toward Slovene national emancipation, since this was the first time that the Slovenes demonstrated their ‘distinctive state-forming component’.1

The State of SCS was a state established by the Hapsburg Yugoslavs when they seceded from the Austro-Hungarian Empire on 29 October 1918.2 It existed until 1 December 1918 when it was united with the Kingdom of Serbia, becoming the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (The Kingdom of SCS). At its formation the State of SCS consisted of Slovenia (without the Prekmurje region), Croatia with Istria and Dalmatia (without Medjimurje) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prior to uniting with the Kingdom of Serbia - which was joined by Vojvodina and Montenegro on 25 and 26 November 1918 - the actual territory of the State of SCS became smaller. That is, in the first half of November 1918 the army of the Kingdom of Italy, in accordance with the 1915 Treaty of London, started to occupy Slovene Primorska, Istria, the Quarnero islands of Cres and Lošinj, northern Dalmatia and the Dalmatian islands. The State of SCS was headed by Narodno Vijeće SHS (the National Council of the SCS) in Zagreb, the highest body of authority in the State of SHS, the president of which was Dr. Anton Korošec, the leading politician of the time and the leader of the All-Slovene People’s Party (VLS).

In the State of SCS, which was, in addition to the Kingdom of Serbia - the second predecessor state of the Kingdom of SCS established on 1 December 1918 - the Slovenes knew a brief period as a politically independent nation which had achieved its own national statehood. It must be pointed out that the State of SCS, which included a political framework for Slovene national and political independence at that time, realised all demands required by international law for the establishment and existence of states. It had its national territory, formed after the Yugoslav lands broke national legal links with Austria and Hungary. It also had its own population, since from 29 October 1918 forward, the population of the Yugoslav lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire belonged to the new State of SCS. The State of SCS also had its own organized government for, after the secession, the authorities of Austria-Hungary no longer exercised absolute power in the Yugoslav lands of the former Empire. Power was exercised by individual provincial (national) governments, and at the state level by Narodno Vijeće in Zagreb, which was the supreme authority, independent in foreign matters and therefore the sovereign state authority. Furthermore, the State of SCS conducted international relations with other countries, realising the last of the requirements for the establishment and existence of states as determined by international law.

Here, it has to be pointed out that the State of SCS proved its capability for

1 Fran Erjavec, Slovenci: zemljepisni, zgodovinski, politični, kulturni, gospodarski in socialni pregled, Ljubljana 1923, p. 76.
conducting international relations with other countries despite that it was not internationally recognised. Attention should first be drawn to the fact that the Allied governments - despite not recognising the State of SCS as a state under international law - “acknowledged the national legal change which took place on 29 October 1918 in the south of Austria-Hungary.”\(^3\) The supreme commander of the Allies at the Salonika Front, the French general Louis Franchet d'Esperey, thus telegraphed to *Narodno Vijeće* on 6 November 1918 that the Allied military forces in the east “were enthusiastically saluting the Yugoslav *Narodno Vijeće* in Zagreb and Ljubljana, and the new Yugoslav land and naval military forces.”\(^4\) In addition, the last monarch of the Hapsburg Empire, Karel I, ordered on 30 October 1918, a day after the formation of the State of SCS, that the Austro-Hungarian military fleet be handed over to “the Yugoslav *Narodno Vijeće* in Zagreb.”\(^5\) The view of Karel I of Hapsburg concerning the State of SCS was manifested in a statement by the commander of the First Isonzo Armada of the former Austro-Hungarian army, Lieutenant General Baron Wenzel Wurm, at a meeting with the president of the National Government of SCS, Hon. Josip Pogačnik, on 5 November 1918 in Ljubljana. Wenzel Wurm said “that be acknowledges the sovereignty of the free Yugoslav state, which was acknowledged also by His Majesty” and that “be bimself (Wurm) was prepared to appear before the government and repeat that.”\(^6\)

The national legal change and the sovereign authority of the *Narodno Vijeće* in the South Slavic territory which had been incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian state framework until 29 October 1918 was recognised by a number of other political and diplomatic factors. Thus, at the end of October and in November 1918 the Zagreb *Narodno Vijeće* received greetings, requests and notifications from the Hungarian National Council; the president of the Polish government; the papal nuncio from Vienna as the doyen of the diplomatic corps; the state secretary for foreign affairs of German Austria, Dr. Otto Bauer; the American mission to Bern; the Romanian National Council; the Danish Prime Minister; the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Bavarian mission to Vienna.\(^7\) In addition, the senior diplomats of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic became of the opinion that the Zagreb *Narodno Vijeće* was a sovereign body. The then people’s commissar for foreign affairs, Georgij Vasiljević Čičerin, signed a document intended for the *Narodno Vijeće* in Zagreb saying that “the Soviet government /…/ wished to conduct direct negotiations with the Yugoslav national council with the view of defining the conditions for the return to the homeland of all those Yugoslav people who wished to return to the countries under the rule of the Yugoslav *Narodno Vijeće* based in Zagreb.”\(^8\)

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\(^3\) Ferdo Čulinović, *Državnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja XIX. i XX. Vijeka*, Zagreb 1953, p. 345.


\(^7\) Perovšek, *Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918*, pp. 69-70.

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The fact that various foreign political and diplomatic factors recognised the national legal change in the South Slavic countries of the Hapsburg Empire, and Narodno Vijeće in Zagreb as the authority in this territory, was not the only way the State of SCS participated in the international arena at that time. The State of SCS established international relations with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, German Austria and the Kingdom of Serbia. It must be emphasised that the State of SCS was itself individually recognised by German Austria, the Kingdom of Serbia and the Democratic Republic of Hungary. The executive committee of the temporary National Assembly for German Austria thus informed the president of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, in a special note of 30 October 1918 concerning the establishment of a German-Austrian state and recognised Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as “entirely independent states.” Moreover, at the Geneva Conference on Yugoslav unity on 8 November 1918, the president and minister for foreign affairs of the government of the Kingdom of Serbia, Nikola Pašić, recognised on behalf of his government Narodno Vijeće in Zagreb as “the representative and the government” of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from the former monarchy. According to the expert on issues of Yugoslav unification in 1918, Dr. Momčilo Zečević, “by recognising the Narodno Vijeće of SCS, the Serbian government also recognised the new State of SCS.” This assessment was confirmed by the declaration of the Serbian heir to the throne, Aleksandar Karadordević, on the occasion of Yugoslav unification on 1 December 1918. He said that he “declared the unification of Serbia with the countries of the independent State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (underlined by J. P.) into a united kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.”

In addition, the State of SCS also received individual internationally recognition from the Democratic Republic of Hungary. Its diplomatic representative, Dr. Aladar Balla, declared, upon arriving in Zagreb on 9 November 1918, that he “was authorised by the trust of the Hungarian National Council and the Hungarian people’s government” to greet “Narodno Vijeće of the absolutely freely formed sovereign Yugoslav state” (underlined by J. P.). Thus, considering the facts stated, it can be established that the State of SCS de facto had the nature of an international legal entity, and was a real state community of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs who had until 1918 been incorporated into the state framework of Austria-Hungary.

If we focus on Slovene national and political as well as national legal independence achieved in the State of SCS, it must be first emphasised that these were based on the internal organization of the State of SCS. It enabled the Slovenes to assert themselves as a sovereign nation, in charge of its own destiny, making independent decisions on all issues which demonstrate the independence of a sovereign and
free national community. In the State of SCS the Slovenes had their own National Government which, with the exception of foreign affairs, incorporated all the highest decision-making, executive and administrative bodies of a state. The National Government had twelve administrative departments (branches): for internal affairs, food, education and religion, justice, social welfare, finance, transport, industry and commerce, public works and trade, agriculture, national defence and health care. This 1918 government, which was the first free and democratically formed Slovene government, consisted of all existing Slovene political parties: the Catholic All-Slovene People’s Party, the liberal Yugoslav Democratic Party and the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party. The most powerful party in the National Government was the All-Slovene People’s Party, with six representatives, followed by the Yugoslav Democratic Party with five representatives, and the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party with one representative. The president of the National Government was Josip Pogačnik, a member of the VLS.

The formation of a national government provided the Slovenes with an independent state authority. Narodno Vijeće, the supreme authority body in the State of SCS, retained the authority for conducting foreign and military affairs, as well as for decisions on exercising the right to pardon, annulling laws and appointing senior officials. This division of authority between the Slovene National Government and Narodno Vijeće in Zagreb first kept its original form; however the National Government later changed it, also starting to exercise state authority in areas which had originally been within the competence of Narodno Vijeće. Within Slovenia it thus eventually exercised all state authority, that is, the state authority from its own competence and from that of Narodno Vijeće. The Slovene National Government also conducted international relations, and its existence was taken into account by certain European governments in developing their international relations. The Polish ministry of foreign affairs thus communicated to the National Government at the beginning of November 1918 that “they appointed Dr Marceli Szarota as the charge d’affaires at the Yugoslav government in Ljubljana.” The Polish representative office in Vienna informed the National Government in mid-November 1918 that “General Adam Novotny had been accredited to represent military interests of the Polish government at the National Government.” Regular diplomatic channels were also established between the government of German Austria, or the German-Austrian national office for foreign affairs and the ministry of military affairs, and the Slovene National Government. On 14 November 1918 the commissar Dr. Josip Fasching was presented to the president of the National Government, Josip Pogačnik, “as the authorised person of the German-Austrian state office for foreign affairs in Ljubljana.” In addition, the National Government in Slovenia also independently conducted all military affairs, and its authorised bodies (the Department of Justice

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14 Uradni list Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, 4. 11. 1918, no. 1, Državljan! (further reading: UL NV SHS).
15 Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 81-82.
16 Ibidem, pp. 77-85.
and the Department for National Defence) pardoned persons sentenced by Austrian judicial bodies. It also annulled, independently and at its own discretion, certain of the highest legal acts issued by the bodies of the Austrian state administration, and the acts with the highest legal force adopted by the Austrian state government. The National Government also appointed senior officials.20 These practices were confirmed in a national legal respect by a special "Decree of the entire government on the transitional administration in the territory of the National Government of SCS in Ljubljana" (the Decree on transitional administration), which was issued on 21 November 1918 by the National Government in agreement with Narodno Vijeće. Under this decree Narodno Vijeće as the supreme governmental body in the State of SCS, allowed the National Government to manage Slovene territory on its behalf "as part of the national, free, independent State of SCS observing democratic principles."21 With this, in Slovene territory the National Government became, also in a formal respect, the only, the complete and legally the highest authority, and the holder of Slovene national sovereignty, in the State of SCS.

20 Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 89-102.
21 Ul. NV SHS, 21 11. 1918, no. 11, Naredba celokupne vlade o prehodni upravi v ozemlju Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani.
The thus emphasised national emancipation achieved by the Slovenes in the State of SCS only strengthened the already existing basis for a free national development. It was based on the activity of the National Government, which upgraded Slovene statehood in the State of SCS in different areas of social, political, military, economic, and national and cultural life. First it removed all leading representatives of the Austrian state administration on Slovene territory, and determined that heads of courts and heads of public prosecutors' offices must take a vow to the State of SCS while they were in public service. Similarly, it was determined that all Slovene military and gendarmerie must take the oath to the National Government. In so doing it established, as in every state authority, that all natural persons permanently residing in Slovene territory were legally linked to Slovenia or the State of SCS in terms of citizenship.22

The next action by which the National Government confirmed Slovene national and political independence after seceding from the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the abolition of the political and administrative division of Slovenia into individual regions. Thus, in terms of politics and administration the Government united Slovenia, which then became a national legal entity. With that, the programme of United Slovenia was realised in the first real form. The United Slovenia of 1918 comprised, between 3 and 23 November of that year, given the Italian occupation of Trieste, the Gorizia region, Istria and the Postojna district in Carniola, the majority of the former Duchy of Carniola and the Slovene part of the former province of Styria; in other words, approximately two-thirds of the present territory of the Republic of Slovenia.23

In the politically and administratively United Slovenia the National Government paid particular attention to creating a new, Slovene state organization in all pivotal areas of state operation - the areas of administrative, judicial and military protection. On 7 November 1918 it thus established a special Administrative Commission committed to drawing up a plan for reforming the public administration, while also reorganizing the structure of judicial institutions in Slovene territory. For this purpose it established a higher provincial court in Ljubljana. This court constituted the highest judicial authority within the territory it covered (former Carniola, Styria and Carinthia), and made the ultimate decisions in all legal matters which had up to that point been under the jurisdiction of the Austrian Supreme Court and Court of Cassation.24 The National Government also established a new independent Slovene military and security system. The Slovene army consisted of 12,375 well-armed and supplied officers and solders, and 1773 Serbian solders and officers who offered to be under the command of the National Government at the beginning of November 1918 as they were returning from Austrian captivity.25

In addition to the political, national legal and military areas, Slovene independence was also reflected in November 1918 in the creation of new elements of the nation’s social and political life. The National Government thus annulled the

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22 Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 91, 95, 159-160, 163, 166-168.
23 Ibidem, pp. 105-106.
24 UL NV SHS, 21 11. 1918, no. 11, Naredba celokupne vlade o prehodni upravi v ozemlju Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani.
Austrian state acts on society and assembly laws from 1867, and paragraph 23 of the Austrian state act on the press. In so doing it legalised, in accordance with the requirements of all Slovene political camps (the social democrats, liberals and Catholics) the freedom of gathering, association and free sale of newspapers and magazines. At its first session on 1 November 1918 it adopted the decision that the official language in Slovenia was Slovene, thus giving it a formative role in the new Slovene social life.

Before concluding the review of the key features of the gaining of Slovene national and political independence in 1918, attention must be paid to another, very important expression of the Slovene independence and national statehood of that time. It was represented by the aforementioned decree on transitional administration, drawn up by the Administrative Commission established on 7 November 1918. The decree on transitional administration had the character of an act with the highest legal force, higher than that of the laws, for it legitimised the bases of the newly established social and political life in a way which was otherwise regulated by constitutional provisions or the constitution. The decree did not only determine the National Government as the supreme authority in Slovene territory, but it also governed the method of Slovene state organization and prescribed the activities of the bodies of Slovene state authority. It also defined in detail the method and form of operation of political administration and self-government in Slovenia, while at the same time freshly justifying the other vital issues of social and economic life in the Slovene lands. Re-formation of its foundations was asserted in education, justice, trade supervision, financial management, post and railway communications, commercial and trade associations, mining management, measurement supervision, agrarian operations, the gendarmerie and the administrative judiciary. The decree on transitional administration thus confirmed Slovene statehood in the form of a planned legal act, and the Slovene state-forming capacity, active only during the one-month existence of the State of SCS, was proven.

Slovene independence in November 1918 was, however, not represented merely by the assertion and organization of a national state authority. The Slovenes proved during the existence of the State of SCS that a nation which “establishes, as the realisation of a political self-determination, its own sovereign, independent state, or realises its self-determination in a common state, is entitled to a right to determine its economic organization and development.” The factor in the new economic development in Slovenia was the National Government, which placed extreme significance on economic issues. The degree of attention paid to them is demonstrated by the fact that as much as half of its departments were assigned to the economy. Namely, the National Government executed its authority via the departments for food, finance, transport, industry and commerce, public works and trade, and agriculture.

Already in its first measures, the National Government began to create suitable conditions for fresh and independent Slovene economic development. First it abolished the militarization of industry plants, thus enabling the introduction of peace-
time production in Slovenia. Then it began to build the Slovene national economy, and in so doing justified in different stages this important element of the Slovene national sovereignty and freedom at the time.

The National Government defined the first stage of building the Slovene economy with nationalisation, that is, declaring Austrian state capital as owned by Slovenia. Thus it started to create Slovene national property. Using a special Transitional Economic Office in Ljubljana it took possession of all military plants previously owned by the Austrian state, while the others (a chemicals factory in Moste and a soap factory in Šiška) were taken over by supervising or renting. In addition, all road and other vehicles of the former Austro-Hungarian armada were proclaimed the property of the National Government. Moreover, all estates and forests of the former Austrian state and religious treasury were declared the possession of the National Government or, as emphasised by the Government itself, a national possession. Slovene national property was also established by taking over for management and use the remainder of Austrian public property in the Slovene lands (the coal mines in Velenje and Zabukovica, the zinc factory in Celje, the powder manufacturer in Kamnik, the tobacco factory in Ljubljana and for a brief period the mercury mine in Idrija). In so doing it put itself in the position of the new owner of these public properties since the former owner, the Habsburg state, no longer existed. The National Government also took possession of the entire production and disposal of material from the paper factory in Goričane which was, however, owned by foreign private capital. Except for introducing supervision of Goričane

29 Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, p. 112.
paper factory production, the National Government did not take any measures concerning foreign private property in the Slovene lands. It decided that "the property of those foreign citizens, who could not manage the property on their own, on account of their absence, should stay under the aegis of the government until the owner returned or took any other relevant measures."31

The National Government also took all necessary measures to enable undisturbed financial management, and it obtained the necessary financial means for the operation of the Slovene state authority. With respect to this second foundation of the Slovene economy of that time, the National Government decided that the medium of payment issued by the Austro-Hungarian bank, the krona (K), would remain legal tender, and that from 1 November 1918 all taxes, duties and fees were to be paid, accepted and charged in favour of the State of SCS (that is, in favour of the National Government). At the same time it obtained larger quantities of financial means, thus establishing the financial basis for its operation. K 36,500,000 were gathered, and this was the basis for the Government to be able to fund in November 1918 the operation of various governmental bodies and institutions in Slovene territory in the total sum of K 3,086,000, and to allocate a total of K 9,470,000 for the needs of its departments.32

After providing the foundation for financial operations in the Slovene lands, the National Government proceeded to the third basic stage of building the Slovene economy, namely connecting the national economic forces. The aforementioned decree on transitional administration enabled the government to take control of various branches of the Slovene economy, and to take over the management of trade supervision, mining and measurement offices in Slovenia, and all financial authority, financial offices, treasuries and all monopolistic companies. For the Slovene territory it established a post and telegraph directorate, a directorate for national railways and management for the Southern Railway, which were subordinate to the government. In addition, by adopting certain other decrees it spread the operation of important economic institutions from Ljubljana to the whole of Slovenia, such as the Slovene Agricultural Society, the financial administration and management, the office for foodstuffs, and the chambers of commerce and trade; moreover, the head office of the chamber of engineers was transferred from Trieste to Ljubljana and assigned the entire Slovene territory in which to operate.33 Parallel to these economic and political measures and wide organizational activity, the National Government also enabled the continuing operation of the existing industrial and agricultural production in Slovenia while paying all necessary attention to the issue of uninterrupted railway transport and the formation of unified supply organization in the Slovene lands.34

During the brief, one-month existence of the State of SCS, the National Government was not able to carry out all ideas related to Slovene land gaining economic independence after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Alongside the

30 Ibidem, pp. 113-114.
31 Zapisnik seje Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, z dne 5. novembra 1918, Sejni zapisniki I, p. 76.
32 Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 114-117.
33 Ibidem, pp. 118-120.
34 Ibidem, pp. 120-122, 124-125.
presented measures in the economic sector, the government did not tackle the
problems of agrarian reform and the formation of principles for a future customs
policy. It also did not take up economic reorganization of the Primorska region and
did not assess the role of Trieste in future economic development, which was due
to the Italian occupation of both Primorska and Trieste. Despite this, the govern-
ment defined a historically new quality of national life for the Slovene people, who
in the State of SCS proved to be more than capable of meeting key requirements in
the economic sector, which constituted the precondition for free national develop-
ment.

At the conclusion, let us pay some attention to another aspect of the Slovene
scene of that time. Parallel to reforming the foundations of the economic sphere,
individual spontaneous revolutionary phenomena occurred in November 1918 tak-
ing the form of peasants encroaching on the property of large landowners. While
the working class at its gatherings limited their demands to fundamental social and
political measures,35 the peasants in the beginning of November 1918 briefly took
over local power in individual areas (Gerkšte, Brestanica, Semič and Bloke). Similar
was the case of the workers in the Mežica Valley, who temporarily assumed power
in Prevalje na Koroškm at the end of November and founded their revolutionary
headquarters. However, the peasants were more direct in their actions. In addi-
tion to brief assumption of power in individual areas they plundered some large
estates (Libelič pri Dravogradu, Haasberg v Planini, Snežnik pri Ložu), and even
attempted, spontaneously, to carry out agrarian reform. Such a situation was also
observed in November 1918 in the Slovene territory outside the State of SCS. In
Prekmurje, on 5 November 1918 returning soldiers attacked the castle of the coun-
tess of Zichy in Beltinci, and in the following days the revolt spread to neighbour-
ing places. Hungarian authorities soon crushed the revolt.36 At the end of November
the Slovene territory which was the constituent part of the State of SCS saw more
distinct movements toward strikes by railway and postal workers, as well as court
employees in Maribor, all of whom were of German nationality. In expressing so-
cial and economic demands this movement supported German tendencies toward
Slovene territory and was mainly of a political character. With the support of the
Slovene general Rudolf Maister, and after consenting to all social demands, the
National Government in the beginning of December 1918 quelled this strike move-
ment in Maribor.37

This is much material for this condensed survey of the situation of the Slovene
nation in the State of SCS in November 1918. At the end attention must be drawn
to the fact that the national statehood achieved by the Slovenes in the State of
SCS constituted only a brief experience of national political independence which
marked their path to a new state community of Yugoslav nations formed on 1
December 1918. Within the Kingdom of SCS (in 1929 it was renamed the King-
dom of Yugoslavia) Slovenia did not retain its previously achieved national legal independence. The first Yugoslav state constitutionally enacted Yugoslav state centralism and national unitarianism; the latter did not acknowledge the existence of the historically formed individual Yugoslav nationalities, but the existence of only one, that is, the Yugoslav nation. This was the reason why the majority of Slovenes had developed, already by the beginning of the 1920s, demands for national self-determination and an autonomous and federalist re-arrangement of the Yugoslav state. The Slovenes did not give up these demands all the way up to the end of the first Yugoslavia in 1941, and also within all existing Slovene military and political factors during the Second World War. The demand that the Yugoslav state should enable an entirely free and independent Slovene national swing was present also in the second, federative Yugoslav community. In the end it was realised outside of it, with the establishment in 1991 of the independent Slovene national state, the Republic of Slovenia.
Jurij Perovšek

SAMOVLADA SLOVENCEV NOVEMBRA 1918

POVZETEK

Po prelomu državnopravnih vezi s habsburško monarhijo je pred oblikovanjem Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (Kraljevina SHS) 1. decembra 1918 večina slovenskega naroda živela v kratek čas obstoječi Državi Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov (Država SHS). Ta država ima v razvoju slovenskih narodnoemancipacijskih teženj pomembno mesto, kajti v njej so Slovenci prvič v svoji narodni zgodovini dokazali sposobnost za lastno državno organiziranost.

Država SHS je bila državna skupnost, ki so jo ustanovili habsburški Jugoslovani ob državni odcepitvi od Avstro-Ogrske monarhije 29. oktobra 1918. Obstajala je do 1. decembra 1918, ko se je s Kraljevino Srbijo združila v Kraljevino SHS. Država SHS je ob svojem nastanku obsegala Slovenijo (brez Prekmurja), Hrvaško z Istro in Dalmacijo (a brez Medžimurja) ter Bosno in Hercegovino. Državi SHS je kot predsednik Narodnega Vijeća SHS v Zagrebu (Narodno Vijeće), najvišjega organa oblasti v Državi SHS, načeloval tedanjji vodilni slovenski politik, prvak katoliške Vseslovenske ljudske stranke, dr. Anton Korošec.


Z Narodno vlado so Slovenci dosegli lastno nacionalno državnost, ki jo je utemeljeval federativni, deloma pa tudi konfederativni položaj slovenskega ozemlja v Državi SHS. Supremacija zagrebaškega Narodnega Vijeća nad Narodno vladjo je veljala le glede vodenja zunanjih in vojaških zadev, to pa je bilo v zgornjih pristojnostih, razloženih v Narodnem Viječu. Slovenska Narodna vlada je presegla to razdelitev pristojnosti in vdržalo Narodno Viječe. S tem je v Sloveniji izvrševala vso oblast, to je oblast iz svojih pristojnosti in iz pristojnosti Narodnega Vijeća. To je bila na slovenskem ozemlju edina, popolna in pravna najvišja oblast in nosilka slovenske samostojnosti v Državi SHS. Ozemlje, ki je bilo pod upravo Narodne vlade in ki ga je Narodna vlada politično in upravno združila v državnopravno enoto, je glede na italijansko zasedbo Trsta, Goriške, Istre in postojanskega okrožja na Kranjskem med 3. in 23. novembrom 1918, obsegalo večino nekdanje dežele.
Kranjske in slovenski del nekdanje dežele Štajerske, to je približno dve tretjini današnjega ozemlja Republike Slovenije.

Slovenska državnoprawna samostojnost, dosežena v Državi SHS, se po oblikovanju Kraljevine SHS ni obranila. V centralistični jugoslovanski državi so bili prisiljeni v ponovni boj za narodno samoodločbo, ki jo je izražala že v začetku dvajsetih let poudarjena zahteva po slovenski avtonomiji v avtonomistično-federalistično preoblikovani jugoslovanski državni zvezi. Tej zahtevi, ki jo je podpirala večina slovenskega naroda, se niso odrekli ves čas obstoja prve jugoslovanske države, polno nacionalno svobodo in suverenost pa so dosegli po drugi jugoslovanski politični in državni izkušnji - z vzpostavitvijo samostojne slovenske nacionalne države Republike Slovenije leta 1991.
Development of Political Catholicism in Styria in 1918-1923

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Abstract:
The basic organizations of the Catholic side, after World War I active in the framework of the Slovene People’s Party in Styria, were the Slovene Peasants’ Association, the Yugoslav Professional Association, the Slovene Catholic Social Association - in its framework the Slovene Catholic Women’s Association - and the Athletic Society Orel (Eagle). The two conservative newspapers in Styria, i.e. the agricultural political weekly Slovenski Gospodar and the political newspaper Straža, played the most important role in the mentioned period as heralds of the catholic political thought in Styria. To them goes the merit for the spreading of the Catholic movement in this region. The newspapers were issued and printed in the Printing Press of St. Cyril in Maribor. The latter was the connecting point of the Styrian Catholic movement in terms of ideas as well as organization. Here the seat of the Secretariat (Tajništvo) of the Slovene People’s Party for the whole of Styria, the Mežiška Valley and Prekmurje was from March 1920 to February 1921. Up to the assembly elections in March 1923, the Catholic movement in Styria in the political sense sought support in the organization of the Slovene Peasants’ Association, established in 1907, but this did not present a threat to the uniform character of the main Slovene People’s Party.

Key words:
Slovenian political history, political parties in Styria, political Catholicism, printing house of st.Cyril.
The Slovenian People’s Party developed into a central Slovenian political force owing to widely projected work in the field of ideology, organization, economy and culture in 1908-1911. While the rise of the party stopped in the Carniola region just before the First World War broke out, it was on the peak of its power in Styria after the last parliamentary election in 1911.

A disagreement, which originated in various programme orientations and viewpoints of the party leadership’s policy, aroused in the party leadership between the old (Ivan Šušteršič, Ph.D.) and young wing (Janez Evangelist Krek) in 1912. Unlike Ivan Šušteršič, the head of the party, Janez Evangelist Krek was actively striving for close collaboration of the South Slavonic representatives in the middle of 1916, on the basis of the May Declaration which anticipated the establishment of a special
Yugoslav community within the framework of Austria-Hungary.\textsuperscript{7}

In December 1916, the clash of opinions continued and caused division between the supporters of Šušteršič and Krek in numerous cultural, educational and professional Catholic organizations, and especially in the Cooperative Union, a business giant of the Slovenian People’s Party. In November 1917, Ivan Šušteršič and his closest collaborators were suspended from the leadership position of the Slovenian People’s Party.\textsuperscript{8} At the party’s rally, on 27 December 1917, a new executive committee was elected (Josip Hohnjec, Ph.D.,\textsuperscript{9} and Franc Pišek\textsuperscript{10} were elected to the Central Executive Committee as the representatives of Styria) and Ivan Šušteršič, the leader of the party, was replaced by Anton Korošec\textsuperscript{11}, which ended the

and Croats (on the demand of Ivan Šušteršič, devoid of the Serbs) at a meeting on 25 May 1917. The party, as the most powerful Yugoslav party in the Vienna Parliament, managed to gain the majority of Yugoslav deputies to cooperate in the implementation of the programme aims, which is why its deputies were the most deserving for solving the Yugoslav issue and for the acceptance of the May Declaration. At the beginning of 1918, the party leadership managed to attract increasing number of population in the so-called declaration movement which was crucial for the declaration’s success. By the middle of 1918, the deputies of the Slovenian People’s Party increasingly began emphasizing the principle of national self-determination, which indicated the discontinuation of the May Declaration frame and the acceptance of the possibility of a complete downfall of Austria-Hungary. Zečević, p. 59, 61, 64, 67, 98 and 110.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibidem, pp. 38-40 and 89.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibidem, p. 42 and 88.
\textsuperscript{9} Josip Hohnjec, Ph.D., (1873-1964), a theologian and politician in the Slovenian People’s Party. He studied theology in Maribor from 1885 to 1897. In 1901, he conferred the doctor’s degree in Vienna and was appointed professor of dogmatics at the Theological College in Maribor in 1905. Prior to the First World War, he was mainly concerned with non-political organizations, religious, educational, national defence and economic activities in the Slovenian Christian-Social Union of Styria, where he functioned as Vice-President (President since 1919). In 1917, he worked for the popularization of the May Declaration, which led him into politics. At the time of the 1918 coup, he was the President of the National Council for Styria in Maribor. In 1919-1929, he was a deputy in the Temporary National Representative Body, in the Constituent Assembly and in the National Assembly. As deputy, he was known for his fundamental, well prepared and researched speeches (some of his speeches were issued in a booklet entitled Za svobodo in pravo, Maribor, 1923).

\textsuperscript{10} Franc Pišek (1856-1922), a farmer and politician in the Slovenian People’s Party. After elementary school he worked in farmers’ organizations on the Drava plain (in 1882, he became a trustee of the Savings Bank of Slovenia in Maribor). He strived for the Town Council’s activities in the Maribor’s surroundings. As a Mayor of Orehova vas, he managed to carry out road repairs and open the railway station in 1912. He was one of the founders of the Slovenian Farmers’ Alliance. In 1907 he was elected to the Vienna Parliament and in 1909 in The Styrian Provincial Assembly. After the coup, he was a member of the National Council for Styria, appointed to the Temporary National Representative Body in 1919 and elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1920. He worked as Vice-President of the Slovenian Farmers’ Alliance and was a member of the Cooperative and Business Association committee. In the National Council he represented peasantry’s interests, strived for tax equalization, food subsidization for the poor and also for aid granted by the state for natural disasters.

\textsuperscript{11} Anton Korošec, Ph.D. (1872-1940), a theologian and politician in the Slovenian People’s Party. He studied theology in Maribor and was ordained a priest in 1895 and conferred the doctor’s degree in Vienna in 1905. He was elected to the Austrian Parliament as a representative of the general curia in the 1906 election, where he remained until the downfall of Austria-Hungary and was elected to the Styrian Provincial Assembly in 1909. In the same year he also became Vice-President of the Slovenian Parliamentary Club and in May 1914, president of the Croatian-Slovenian Community. In May 1917, he was elected president of the Yugoslavian Parliamentary Club, on behalf of which he read the May
severe internal crisis and re-established a unified political organization. Anton Bonaventura Jeglič, Ph.D., Bishop of Ljubljana, who played an important role in the party at the time of ideological split, supported the policy of Anton Korošec, contributed to the strengthening of his position in the party and also helped to facilitate the reestablishment of unity. The bishop of the newly founded country did not have as much power to influence the Slovenian People’s Party policy as he had had before the First World War. The party leadership was striving for the attainment of coexistence with the Orthodox Church but Anton Korošec only occasionally

Declaration on 30 May 1917, demanding unification of all Yugoslav countries within the Habsburg Monarchy in an independent state body under the authorities of the Habsburg Monarchy. In December 1917, he was elected president of the Slovenian People’s Party and in August 1918, president of the National Council for Slovenian Countries and Istria. In October 1918, he was elected president of the National Council in Zagreb, which on 29 October 1918 announced the founding of the Independent State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. He was the head of the National Council until 3 December 1918, when it ceased to function after the Yugoslav unification. In 1918 and 1919 he was the president of the Yugoslav Government, Minister of Supply and Renewal and Minister for the Economy and Mines. In 1920, he was the Minister of Transport, in 1924 the Minister of Education and Theology and in 1926 the Minister of Interior Affairs. From July 1928 to April 1929 he was the president of the Yugoslav Government. After the establishment of the dictatorship in 1929-1930, he was the Minister of Transport and after that the Minister of Forestry and Mines. Between 1935 and 1938 he was the Minister of Interior Affairs and in 1940 the Minister of Education. Beside his political functions, he was also a representative of the Temporary National Representative Body of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 1919-1920. In 1920 and 1921, he was a deputy of the Constituent Assembly and in 1921 and 1922 a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1923, 1925 and 1927, he was elected deputy of the National Assembly. In 1939 he was elected president of the Senate of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. From the formation of the Yugoslav Kingdom to his death in 1940, he was the head of the Slovenian People’s Party.

SBL, I. Volume, pp. 517-520.

Zečević, p. 88.

Anton Bonaventura Jeglič (1850-1937), the Bishop of Ljubljana. He graduated from secondary school in Ljubljana in 1869 and studied at the Theological College in Ljubljana until 1873. In 1876, he conferred the doctor’s degree in Vienna. Since May 1878, he was assistant dean at the Theological Seminary in Ljubljana. He was dean in Sarajevo from 1882-1898 and was appointed Bishop of Ljubljana in 1898. As bishop he was striving to reorganize the clerical service, he also served as the patron of education (in 1905, he established St. Stanislav’s Institution) and the protector of the Slovenian peoples’ rights (he was important for his support to the May Declaration in the so-called Ljubljana Statement.)

SBL, Volume I, p. 390; Enciklopedija Slovenije, Volume IV, p. 279.

Zečević, pp. 86-87.

At the meeting, shortly after the unification, Regent Aleksander and Anton Korošec managed to resolve the disagreements based on principals, which were a threat to the condition of the Slovenian People’s Party in relation to the Orthodox Church. This was important for close collaboration of the party with the Yugoslav leader in the future and also to approach the policy of Anton Korošec to the one of the National Radicals. The fundamental reasons for establishing contacts with the Serbian Radical Party were, primarily, the unsettled territory issue among The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Austria and Italy and secondly, the effort to preserve Slovenian autonomy in the new country. These were the fundamental political issues the Slovenian People’s Party was dealing with at the time, until the Temporary Representative Body was summoned. The leadership of the Slovenian People’s Party supported the National Radicals even though the National Radicals and the Serbian-Croatian Coalition, led by Svetozar Pribićević, ceased to cooperate at the end of April 1919 because the latter managed to reach an agreement with the members of the Serbian Opposition Alliance on amalgamation into a unified party on 11 April 1919.

Zečević, p. 192, 194, 213, 263 and 265.
notified the bishop of current national political events.\textsuperscript{16}

On 27 May 1918, the deputies of Slovenian political parties - the Slovenian People’s Party, the National Progressive Party and the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party - agreed to perform joint action in order to relieve economic and political difficulties at the end of the war.\textsuperscript{17} The idea of establishing the National Council for Slovenian countries and Istria, a representative body of the Yugoslav nation in Austria-Hungary, was carried out on 16 and 17 August 1918. The Slovenian People’s Party had the majority of 18 out of 47 deputies in the National Council and Anton Korošec took over the leadership.\textsuperscript{18} The deputies of the National Council began establishing contacts with the political parties of Croatia and Serbia in order to set

\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem, p. 189.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibidem, pp. 110-111.

up a central representative body for all Yugoslav organizations in Austria-Hungary. National Council in Zagreb, a newly founded representative body, was established at a conference on 5 and 6 October 1918. There were 8 out of 13 Slovenian deputies of the Slovenian People’s Party in the National Council and the function of the chairman was being performed by Anton Korošec.  

The National Council for Styria was established in the Printing house of St. Cyril in Maribor on 26 September 1918. Its deputies mostly discussed the issues related to the establishment of the country’s northern border, organized National Guards in Styria and were involved in the takeover of the authority in Styria on 1 November 1918.

The Printing house of St. Cyril in Maribor evolved from the first Slovenian Catholic Printing Society and was one of the principal economic and cultural factors for the Slovenes in Styria prior to the First World War. Some of the most important newspapers were being published in Styria such as *Slovenski Gospodar* (since 1885), *Straža* (since 1909; from 1925-1926, before it stopped being published, it was named *Naša straža*) and was the only Slovenian printing house in Maribor up to 1919. At the time of the May Declaration signature collecting in 1917, it became a Slovenian national centre in Styria. The supporters and activists of Catholic political, educational and economic organizations used to gather there. The Printing house of St. Cyril played an important part during the two wars by being a central connecting element of political Catholicism in Styria, because the majority of Catholic organizations were based there, including the Secretariat of the Slovenian People’s Party - for some time, also for the entire Styria, The Mežica Valley and Prekmurje region (north-eastern Slovenian region).

On 29 October 1918, when the Independent State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs was declared, the Slovenian People's Party demanded a republican form of government and a federal organization of the state. Meanwhile Anton Korošec, the leader of the Slovenian People's Party, managed to provoke disorder and resistance in most of the party’s leadership by striving for monarchy and opposing the federal system at negotiations with the Serbian government in Geneva. The Republican idea of unification developed in the Slovenian People’s Party mainly from fear that the Orthodox Church would disagree with the party’s policy and also from conviction that the idea of autonomy, as the basic postulate of party’s programme,
would be easier to implement under the Republican system.25 At the same time, Josip Hohnjec, the leading Styrian Catholic performer, was also in favour of the republican form of government.26 Due to the rapidly-occurring events concerning unification, the leadership did not form a unified position about the form of government, which is why the clash of opinions re-emerged between the Republicans and Monarchists in the Slovenian People’s Party in December 1920, after the Constituent Assembly election.

Due to the risk of the Italian invasion of the territory of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, on 16 November 1918, the Provincial Government of Dalmatia addressed the National Government in Ljubljana27, proposing the immediate unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro.28 Members of the Slovenian People’s Party executive committee were having difficulties reaching a unified position, which is why they established a special 23-member executive committee of the party on 21 November, dealing with political matters of national importance. The committee rejected the proposition and re-established the republican form of government.29 The National Government did not vote on the proposition. The voting was postponed for the National Council’s session in Zagreb on 23 November, where they elected a committee of seven in order to form a joint proposition of the National Council.30 Izidor Cankar, member of the Slovenian People’s Party, was the only Slovenian member of the committee and his appointment signified the beginning of the approach of the Slovenian People’s Party policy to the policy of the Serbian parties and pushed the indeterminate position on the republican form of government aside.31 The committee of seven elected a 28-member delegation, members of which were authorised to officially implement the unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro on behalf of the National Council and on the basis of elaborated “directives for the members.” As members of the Slovenian People’s Party, Anton Korošec (replaced by Janko Brejc) and Izidor Cankar were also the members of the delegation. However, the provisions of the committee of seven were approved by Lovro Pogačnik on behalf of the party.32

On 30 December, Janko Brejc and Izidor Cankar participated in the formation of the National Council’s memorandum which was read by Ante Pavelić, member of the Council, on 1 December 1918, at the meeting of the National Council’s delegation and Serbian leaders in Belgrade.33 Aleksander Karadordević announced the unification of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro with the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in the name of King Peter I. (hereafter referred to as: the Kingdom

26 Mikuž, p. 70.
27 Zečević, pp. 138, 165-166; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, p. 59.
28 Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, p. 136.
29 Zečević, pp. 168-169; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, p. 137.
30 Zečević, p. 171; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, pp. 139-140.
31 Zečević, p. 173.
32 Zečević, p. 173; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, p. 145.
33 Zečević, p. 178.
of SHS) and thereby constitutionally identified the Serbs as the holders of the Yugoslav unification.34 Anton Korošec was not involved in the act of unification, as he did not arrive in Ljubljana before 2 December 1918. After his arrival to the country, he approved the political decisions of the Slovenian People’s Party deputies which had been made at the time of his absence, although he disapproved of the party’s republican tendencies. He also approved the National Council’s memorandum for the Regent Aleksander, doubting that the unification had been hastened.35

The first concentration government of the Kingdom of SHS was formed on 20 December 1918 by Stojan Protić (the National Radical Party) and the post of vice-president was occupied by Anton Korošec.36 The measures regarding liquidation of the provincial governments37 were adopted by the government at the first session, however the new Provincial Government in Ljubljana (Janko Brejc, the chairman) was not appointed until 28 February 1919. There were only 4 commissariats instead of the previous 12 (interior, education, jurisdiction and agriculture), which provoked protests among the members against the Cabinet in Belgrade accompanied by the demands to establish the Provincial Assembly for Slovenia. This conflict is known in historiography as February provincial crisis.38 The demand for the formation of provincial assemblies, to whom the provincial government would be responsible, had already been contained in the memorandum of the National Council from 1 December 1918, which is why on 10 January 1919, the deputies of the Slovenian People’s Party and Yugoslav Social Democratic Party reached an agreement to elect 90 deputies to the Provincial Assembly for Slovenia. The leadership of the Slovenian People’s Party strived for broad competences of the Provincial Assembly, which caused a dispute with the Yugoslav Democratic Party leaders, who agreed only upon the assembly’s supervisory function. The demands met a severe resistance of the government, which urged the initiation of centralistic measures in the government at that time, which is why the formation of the assembly was not approved by the government. According to the Cabinet’s decision, the parties were permitted to have non-obligatory meetings and discussions about current political issues, whereas the decision to convene the Provincial Assembly was postponed until after the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.39 Demand for the formation of the provincial assembly was also made in the Styrian Catholic camp on 16 January 1919, when the Constituent Assembly representatives were elected in Celje by the party’s confidents. It was stated that the convening of the Provincial Assembly was an indispensable national and economic necessity due to the unsettled border issue in Carinthia, problems with food supply and road network maintenance.40

On 20 February 1919, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovenian People’s Party in Ljubljana, a decision on the necessary renovation of local organi-

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35 Zečević, pp. 177-178, 182, 190 and 193.
37 Ibidem, p. 204.
40 Zbor zaupnikov Jugoslovanske ljudske stranke v Celju, Straža, 17. 1. 1919, p. 1; Zahtevamo deželni
zations of the Slovenian Farmers'Alliance was made, as basic units of the leading Slovenian People's Party. Concerning the party's tendencies to spread its activity, there was talk about establishing the national Yugoslav Farmers' Association. Active renewal of the district and local organizations of the Slovenian People's Party took place in Styria in the first half of 1919. At the time, the most active adherents of the Catholic Camp were: Vladimir Pušenjak, Franjo Žebot, Josip Hohnjec, Ph.D., Ivan Vesenjak, Ivan Benkovič, Ph.D., and Mihael Brenčič. In January, political assemblies started to expand from the wider territory of Slovenske gorice across the Drava region, the Posavje region and the Savinja River Valley. The district organization in Maribor was renewed on 19 February 1919; Josip Leskovar, Ph.D., was elected head of the district organization of the right bank of the Drava river and Evald Vračko, a cleric, was elected head of the left bank of the Drava river. At the end of April 1919, the district organization of the Slovenian People's Party was founded in Celje, under the leadership of Anton Ogrizek, by which the district and
local organization of the Slovenian People's Party in Styria were entirely renewed.47
The development of the Slovenian People's Party district organizations lagged behind in the Posavje region, where the representative body of the newly founded Independent Rural Party developed its base in June 1919.48 The secretariat of the Slovenian People's Party in Celje was established in June and located in hotel 'Beli vol' and in Maribor it was located in the Printing house of St. Cyril in July 1919.49 At first, the secretariats were operating mainly as advisory service in tax, legal, military, insurance etc. matters and their establishment achieved the Styrian Catholic camp uniformity and stimulated its activity.50

The Slovenian People's Party deputies were pleased with the expansion of the Slovenian People's Party district organizations at the end of 1919, as the number of its members was increasing in spring 1919. There were about 183 district organizations of the Slovenian People's Party registered in Styria.51 Rapid development of the Catholic organization was also characteristic of other places in Slovenia.52 In June 1920, they were able to write in Slovenski gospodar: “Our party has now got a structured political organization to the very last mountain village.”53 In January 1919, a process of the democrat party unification54 began, which is why the Slovenian People's Party leadership began to seriously consider the organizational unification of the Catholic parties at national level. The idea was not new as such efforts had already been initiated in 1917, by Janez Evangelist Krek and Anton Korošec. The Slovenian Catholic circles favourably observed the attempts to reorganize the Slovenian People's Party into a pan-national party, mainly due to the feeling of terror of the Orthodox Church.55 On 16 January 1919, at the party's assemblies in Ljubljana and Celje, the party leadership adopted the decision to rename the party into the Yugoslav People's Party, however, the name was not widely accepted due to the subsequent poor results of the pan-Yugoslav Catholic action; Straža was the only newspaper of all Catholic newspapers using this name.56

47 Organizacija SKZ se lepo razvija, Straža, 28. 4. 1919, p. 2.
49 Naša politična organizacija, Slovenski gospodar, 3. 7. 1919, p. 3; Organizacija naše stranke, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 8. 1919.
50 Politično delo na Štajerskem, Slovenec, 17. 8. 1919, pp. 2-3; Somisljenikom Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenski gospodar, 11. 8. 1921, p. 2.
51 Politično delo na Štajerskem, Slovenec, 17. 8. 1919, pp. 2-3; SLS v Mariboru, Slovenec, 11. 10. 1919, p. 3; Naša stranka za potrebe ljudstva, Slovenski gospodar, 11. 3. 1920, p. 1-2; Pred glavno skupščino naše stranke, Straža, 2. 4. 1920, p. 2.
52 Zbor zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 8. 4. 1920, pp. 1-5.
53 Kmetska zveza, Slovenski gospodar, 13. 5. 1920, p. 3.
54 Koncentracija je bila zaključena maja 1919 z ustanovitvijo vsedržavne Jugoslovanske demokratske stranke pod vodstvom Ljubomirja Davidoviča.
55 Zečević, pp. 245 and 251-252.
Before the beginning of the Temporary National Representation sessions\(^57\) in Belgrade on 1 March 1919, the Provisional Constitution of the Kingdom of SHS was adopted under orders on 30 January 1919 by the Cabinet. Its wording was first published in _Službene novine_ on 8 February 1919, but was afterwards immediately cancelled. There was an attempt of the Serbian leading parties to expand the Serbian constitution on the territory of the entire country, which was sharply condemned by the Croatian parties' deputies.\(^58\) The Slovenian People's Party doubtedly accepted the government's provison because the Provisional Constitution anticipated centralistic organization of the state, but however one of the undersigned was also Anton Korošec, vice-president of the government. At a session on 20 February, the leadership declared its opposition to the constitution's wording and appealed against the establishment of democratic principles in adopting the legislation.\(^59\) Anton Ogrizek officially acknowledged the adopted position in the Styrian Catholic camp, but other Catholic leaders did not take sides regarding the Provisional Constitution.\(^60\)

With the appearance of the Croatian issue\(^61\) at the beginning of 1919, the leadership of The Slovenian People's Party was defending the Government's and the

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\(^57\) The Cabinet delayed the summons of the Temporary National Representative Body and solved the issues under its authority with regulations, which caused confusion in the government and economy. The Slovenian People's Party representatives formulated fundamental political demands, which were a part of the party policy until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The demands were as follows: solving currency issues, agrarian reform implementation, supply for the population with basic necessities of life and legal provisions in the area of educational system to establish Slovenian University. Soon after their arrival in Belgrade, the Slovenian People's Party deputies gathered the Catholic deputies from the other parts of the country, which meant the beginning of implementation of the decision on formation of the Yugoslav People's Party. Under the presidency of Anton Korošec, the representatives established a club of representatives of the Slovene People's Party and Croatian Popular Party in March 1919 (until 7 May 1919, they were still non-organized supporters of the newspaper _Narodna politika_), consisting of 19 representatives; later on the representatives of the Croatian Bunjevsko-Šokačka Party joined the club. On 16 January 1919, the Styrian confidants of the Slovenian People's Party elected the following representatives into the Temporary National Representative Body: Anton Korošec, Josip Hohnjec, Franc Jankovič, Franc Pišek, Ivan Roškar, Anton Turnšek and Ivan Vesenjak. Josip Hohnjec, Ivan Vesenjak and Franc Pišek were the most active Styrian representatives in the Temporary National Representative Body.

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\(^58\) Zečević, p. 234.

\(^59\) Zborovanje vodstva VLS, Slovenec, 21. 2. 1919, p. 1.

\(^60\) Ustanovni shod SKZ za Gomilški okoliš, Straza, 16. 5. 1919, p. 3.

\(^61\) The representatives of the Croatian Peasant People's Party lead by Stjepan Radić began demanding the revision of the act of unification, convocation of the Croatian Constituent Assembly and the
National Radical Party policy.\(^{62}\) However, in the following years it was rejecting the policy of abstention of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party in the National Assembly.\(^{63}\) Anton Korošec reproached Stjepan Radić for his separatist activity and for provoking the hatred toward the Serbs, whereas Stjepan Radić was rejecting the Slovenian People’s Party policy toward the Government. Since they were both defending the idea of autonomy in their programme, the parties were political rivals in the new country. At the beginning of 1919, disagreements between their leaders grew into a public dispute, gaining wider dimensions after the occupation of Prekmurje region by the Yugoslav Army. Despite the decision of the Minister of the Internal, Svetozar Pribićević, made on 2 September 1919, about the indivisibility of mutual territory until the Constitution’s adoption, the Croats began taking charge of the south-east part and the Slovenes of the west part.\(^{64}\) The Catholic Camp leadership in Styria severely rejected the Croatian interests in the occupied territory: “Now the Croats arrive and want to occupy our territory in the name of Croatia, a territory which is ours for the sake of our language, the nation’s desire, historical and geographical circumstances and owing to our continuous, hard work and the Croats are legally not entitled to it by any means.”\(^{65}\)

On 1 April 1919, the Slovenian People’s Party reinforced their position in the Government, since Josip Gostinčar took up the post of the Minister of Social Policy and Anton Korošec became the Minister of Food.\(^{66}\) The representatives of the Temporary National Representative Body submitted numerous interpellations against him, due to the Government’s plans on the repeated requisition of supplies.\(^{67}\) However, on 2 July, under the presidency of Anton Korošec, the Cabinet granted the proposition of the Minister of Education, Ljubomir Davidović, to establish the University of Ljubljana.\(^{68}\) Meanwhile, on 10 May 1919, the deputies of the Slovenian People’s Party, Yugoslav Democratic Party and Yugoslav Socio-Democratic Party signed an agreement for continuation of their mutual collaboration, which lasted...
only for a short period of time. Albin Prepeluh and Anton Kristan, the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party deputies, resigned at the Provincial Government meeting on 17 June 1919, causing the Provincial Government crisis and dispute between the deputies of the Slovenian People’s Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party.⁶⁹ On 2 July 1919, the Yugoslav Democratic Party leadership demanded a resignation of the entire Provincial Government, which contrary to the central organs, Janko Brejc, the party’s president, did not wish to execute.⁷⁰ All the commissioners of the Yugoslav Democratic Party and Yugoslav Social Democratic Party resigned on 5 November 1919, provoking the downfall of the Provincial Government. The new one was established just a day after by Gregor Žerjav, Ph.D., the leader of the Yugoslav Democratic Party, which resulted in the loss of the Slovenian People’s Party commanding position in Slovenia.⁷¹ Increasingly, the civil servants supporting the Slovenian People’s Party were removed from office and replaced by the supporters of the Yugoslav Democratic Party.⁷²

In August 1919, considerable relationship deterioration appeared between the Slovenian People’s Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party, also due to the draft law proposed by Pavel Marinković (Yugoslav Democratic Party), the Minister of Education, for reorganization of educational system in such manner that the separation of school and Catholic Church would be ensured, which was the reason for the beginning of the so-called cultural conflict.⁷³ In connection with democratic initiative to close down the Private female teachers’ colleges run by the School Sisters in Maribor, the Slovenian People’s Party deputies in Styria also gave attention to the cultural issues of the Government and refused the new law proposal.⁷⁴ In the proposal for the reform and improvement of educational system they demanded good and general school education, Christian education, the assurance of possibility for healthy physical development of school age youth and also the abolition of the whole-day school mainly for rural youth.⁷⁵

⁶⁹ Ibidem, p. 254 and 269.
⁷¹ Zečević, p. 286.
⁷² Ibidem, p. 288; Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva, pp. 139-140.
⁷³ Following the suspension of parliamentary procedures, the solving of uniformity of legislation in the field of cultural policy in the Kingdom of SHS many times reached level of mutual settlements of the accounts among parties and efforts to prevail over cultural and educational institutions, which is characterised as cultural conflict. Zečević, p. 282; Dolenc Ervin, Kulturni boj. Slovenska kulturna politika v Kraljevini SHS 1918-1929, Ljubljana 1996 (further reading: Dolenc, Kulturni boj), p. 363.
The dispute among the ministers of the National Radical and Yugoslav Democratic Party culminated at the proceedings of the Cabinet on 26 and 28 July 1919. The Prime Minister Stojan Protic demanded a resignation of the Interior Minister, Svetozar Pribicevic, who did not express his consent. Consequently, on 1 August 1919, the Government tendered its resignation.\footnote{Gligorijevic, p. 45.} During the crisis, Anton Korošec actively strived to smooth relations between the deputies of the clashing parties, for the formation of concentration government, for the regime change in Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia and also for the passing of the law on agrarian reform.\footnote{Zečević, p. 275; Gligorijevic, p. 46.} Regarding the solution of the agrarian reform issue, the Slovenian People’s Party strived for forest nationalization and distribution of landed property among the peasants, excluding the church property. Land distribution would be under the supervision of a special agrarian reform office in the Provincial Government in Ljubljana. Due to desire to restore the economic cooperative system, they were striving for the immediate realization of the agrarian reform.\footnote{Zečević, p. 277; Gligorijevic, p. 41.} The Styrian Catholic camp would emphasise the necessity of just and equitable realization of the agrarian reform for the peasants, the expropriates and the state.\footnote{Naš agrarni program, Straža, 28. 4. 1920, p. 1.}

On 7 August 1919, the regent Aleksander gave a term of office for Government formation to Ljubomir Davidovic, who formed a coalition government consisting of the Social Democratic Party deputies and several smaller political groups. Anton Korošec refused to participate in the Government on behalf of the Yugoslavian Club and demanded the formation of Concentration Cabinet on the basis of reconciliation between the deputies of the National Radical Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party. Additionally, he also re-established the demand for the Provincial Assembly formation, which Ljubomir Davidovic rejected as unacceptable in the respect of national interests.\footnote{Gligorijevic, p. 46 and 48.}

The Yugoslav club deputies decided to collaborate with the deputies of opposition parties in the so-called ‘tactical community’ which was established in order to concentrate the split parties in a strong oppositional body.\footnote{Zečević, p. 279.} In the public proclamation ‘Slovenskemu ljudstvu’ they demanded the solution of essential political and economic issues such as: agrarian reform and municipal election implementation, currency change, adoption of the War Profits Act and Election Act, solving of disabled persons’ status, introduction of the 8-hour workday etc.\footnote{Slovenskemu ljudstvu!, Slovenec, 26. 8. 1919, p. 1.} On 11 September 1919, the Styrian Catholic camp representatives ratified the Yugoslav Club policy and at the same time adopted the party’s fundamental course of action in the changed political relations. They strived for the convening of the Chamber of Agriculture; establishment of universal, equal and secret suffrage; municipal elec-
tion notice and Constituent Assembly election; currency change; agrarian reform implementation; national financial support for primary education; protection of agricultural land; streamflow regulation and completion of railway links in Styria and general availability of hunting and fishing.

Ljubomir Davidović resigned from his position of Prime Minister on 12 September 1919, due to difficulties which occurred at the signing of peace treaty with the Republic of Austria. However, it was re-established on 16 October, and practically unchanged. On 8 October, Anton Korošec and the Slovenian People’s Party deputies deserted Belgrade in protest, arguing that the long-term solution of the government crisis is achievable only by new election notice. On 9 November 1919, massive protest meetings were held in Ljubljana, Maribor and Celje by the Slovenian People’s Party leadership, where the votes of no confidence were passed against the Government of Ljubomir Davidović. Anton Korošec was the main spokesperson in Ljubljana, Karel Verstovšek in Maribor and Anton Ogrizek in Celje. The government of Ljubomir Davidović was not supported by the Temporary National Representative Body, which is why the government convened sessions only occasionally. Nevertheless, on 15 December 1919, it was suspended by the government until 15 February 1920. The opposition leaders, one of them was Anton Korošec, severely opposed that kind of government action. In the joint resolution ‘Razglas ljudstva’ from 4 December 1919, one of the demands was to ensure proper functioning of the Temporary National Representative Body until the summons of the Constituent

83 The Slovenian People’s Party leadership did not support the demand on municipality election notice in Slovenia in December 1919 anymore, since the party had lost its predominant position in the Provincial Government. At the beginning of 1920, they demanded universal suffrage and organized protest meetings, several of them also took place in Styria. Preparations for an election, during which Franjo Žebot was committed for trial due to an attempt of corruption of a state officer (in order to obtain copies of electoral registers) ran parallelly with the protest meetings. A campaign against Viljem Pfeifer, Ph.D., a government commissioner of the town of Maribor, was launched for the sake of which he resigned in the end, but the president of the Provincial Government, Gregor Žerjav, Ph.D., did not accept his resignation.

84 On 12 January 1920, the Government announced its decision to change crown for dinar at a ratio of 4 to 1, which the Catholic Camp - also in Styria - received with disapproval. At the end of 1919, the party reached the decision to change crown for dinar at a ration of 1 to 1, which had frequently been discussed in the temporary National Representative body by Josip Hohnjec. Pri zamenjavi denarja se ljudstvo ne sme oškodovati, Domoljub, 3. 3. 1920, pp. 98-99; Zečević, p. 291.


86 Zečević, pp. 284-285

Assembly or else the Government would be taken away its legitimacy.88

On 15 February 1920, the Cabinet of Ljubomir Davidović offered resignation, due to the rejected government proposition about the dissolution of the Temporary National Representation and issued writs for the Constituent Assembly election.89 On 19 February, three deputies of the Slovenian People’s Party entered the new government of Stojan Protić: Anton Korošec, Minister for Transport, Ivan Roškar90, Minister of Agriculture and Water and Franc Janković91, Minister of Religions.92 On 25 February 1920, the Slovenian People’s Party deputies also established a homogeneous Provincial Government for Slovenia whose president was Janko Brejc. The political predominance of the Slovenian People’s Party93 was re-established but the seizure of power caused severe confrontation of the Slovenian Democratic Party and Slovenian People’s Party deputies.94 The government’s position was of crucial importance at the time of the announced municipal and the anticipated Constituent Assembly election, which is why, at the beginning of March 1920, the Slovenian People’s Party leadership began emphasising its inclination for the governmental

89 Gligorijević, p. 53.
90 Ivan Roškar (1860-1933), a farmer and politician in the Slovenian People’s Party. After finishing local elementary school, he took over a farm and involved himself in local politics. In 1885, he became a mayor in Malna. In his youth, he was an adherent of political unity and under the influence of Franc Kovačič he connected with Anton Korošec and from 1902-1918, represented electoral district of Ljutomer - Lenart. From 1907-1918, he was a representative of the rural district of Maribor’s left river bank and was the founder and the first president of the Slovenian Farmers’ Alliance (1907). He was a Minister of Agriculture in the Cabinet of Stojan Protić in 1919. As a deputy of the National Assembly and representative of the proprietors of large farms, he was interested in expert farmers’ issues such as fire fighting, hunting, improvement of waters, cattle breeding, fruit growing and viticulture. In 1922, he withdrew from the party and confined himself to local politics and took up the post of mayor.
91 Franc Jankovič, Ph.D, (1871-1934), a medical doctor and politician in the Slovenian People’s Party. He attended grammar school in Celje and Novo mesto. He was nationally and culturally active already in his secondary school years and especially as an undergraduate. He studied medicine in Vienna and conferred the degree of doctor in 1898. He founded the Slovenian Academic Catholic Association Danica at the University of Vienna. After he completed his studies, he worked as a ward doctor in the provincial hospital in Ljubljana, afterwards in the mental hospital in Studenec and in the Vienna army hospital. He established his medical practice in Konjice in 1899, where he was confronted with severe national conflicts. In September 1900, he was appointed district physician in Kozje. As a candidate of the Slovenian Farmers’ Alliance, he was elected deputy in the Styrian Provincial Assembly, where he became a deputy governor- general of the province. On 13 June 1911, he entered the Vienna Parliament and was appointed member of the Parliament’s Committee for national debt. In 1913, he was the president of the fourth Catholic gathering in Ljubljana. After the coup, he moved to Maribor where he accepted a job as a physician in men’s prison. He was the Minister for Religions in the Government of Stojan Protić from 19 February to 17 May 1920, and due to his illness, afterwards withdrew himself from the politics and devoted himself to medical practice.
92 Zečević, p. 292.
94 Gloria tibi felix ‘Straža’, Mariborski delavec, 9. 3. 1920, p. 2; Dr. Leskovar čisti; ‘Črna repatica’, Mariborski delavec, 12. 3. 1920, p. 2; Maribor, Nova doba, 13. 3. 1920, p. 3; Novi mariborski komisar, Nova doba, 16. 3. 1920, p. 2; Ali se je kaj spremenilo?, Nova doba, 25. 5. 1920, p. 2; Mariborske novice. Komisar dr. Leskovar pri korith, Nova doba, 8. 7. 1920, p. 2; Novi vladni komisar, Naprej,
parties’ policy by rejecting the republican form of government; the provincial self-government was replaced by the autonomy demands.

Ivan Roškar (1860-1933) (PAM, phototeka, inv. 4173)

Ideological and political orientation of the Catholic camp did not vary from the official policy of the party. They turned down the republican form of government,

14. 3. 1920, p. 3; Zečević, p. 303.
95 Zečević, pp. 304-306.
96 Veliko zborovanje delegatov in zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Straža, 9. 4. 1920, pp. 1-2; Zbor zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 8. 4. 1920, pp. 1-5; Zečević, pp. 308-309 and 311.
acknowledged the existence of a unique nation, expressed a demand for the extensive provincial autonomy\(^{97}\) and formed their own point of view with regard to the solution of farmers’ economic situation. They demanded that the government deals with the occurrences of corruption, reselling and war profiting and distribution of confiscated property among farmers and workers; the food supply should be taken over by the economic cooperatives.\(^{98}\) On 22 March 1920, the propositions were submitted to the Slovenian people’s Party executive committee and it was requested that the central organization pays regard to their requests, advices and demands in the field of economy.\(^{99}\)

During the second half of April 1920, a general strike of the railway clerks broke out. The Provincial Government used force against the workers. The most vigorous engagements between the army and demonstrators occurred on 24 April, on Zaloška cesta in Ljubljana, causing bad relations of the Provincial Government with the Slovenian People’s Party policy and also with Anton Korošec as a member of the Cabinet. Appealing to difficult economic and political situation in the county, the deputies of the Yugoslav Democratic Party and Yugoslav Social Democratic Party caused mistrust in the party, especially because Anton Korošec was warning against the danger of the communist movement at the party’s meeting.\(^{100}\) The representatives of the Styrian Catholic camp also rejected the communist movement’s revolutionary methods for solving the social issue.\(^{101}\) An alternative offered instead was a system of cooperative economy on Christian social basis.\(^{102}\)

In view of the revolutionary movements, which accompanied the railway strike, Regent Aleksander gave a mandate to Milenko Vesnić (National Radical Party) for the formation of concentration government. The government, whose underlying goal was the acceptance of constitution, was established on 18 May 1920. Beside the National Radical Party deputies, there were also the Yugoslav Democrat Party deputies, Slovenian People’s Party deputies (Anton Korošec as the Minister of Transport) and National club of the Croatian deputies.\(^{103}\) After the formation of the government of Milenko Vesnić, the provincial government did not change at first, which provoked discontentment in the Yugoslav Democratic Party.\(^{104}\) However, it was renewed on 17 August 1920, when the Committees of Jurisdiction and Social Policy were occupied by the Yugoslav Democratic Party deputies, but the rest of

\(^{97}\) Edinstvena - ne centralistična vlada, Slovenec, 22. 2. 1920, p. 1; Republika, Straža, 1. 3. 1920, pp. 1-2; Za državni in narodno jedinstvo, Straža, 8. 3. 1920, pp. 1-2; Naš program, Straža, 21. 4. 1920, p. 1.

\(^{98}\) Seja izvršilnega odbora Slovenske Kmete Zveze, Straža, 8. 3. 1920, p. 2.

\(^{99}\) Seja izvršilnega odbora Kmete Zveze in Slovenske Ljudske stranke, Slovenski gospodar, 25. 3. 1920, p. 3; Shod zaupnikov VLS, Straža, 29. 3. 1920, p. 2; Somišljenikom Kmete Zveze!, Slovenski gospodar, 1. 4. 1920, p. 1; Pred glavno skupščino naše stranke, Straža, 2. 4. 1920, p. 2.

\(^{100}\) Zbor zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 8. 4. 1920, pp. 1-5; Zečević, p. 312.


\(^{102}\) Socializacija, Straža, 31. 3. 1920, pp. 1-2; Vera, duhovnik in politika, Slovenski gospodar, 15. 4. 1920, pp. 3-4.

\(^{103}\) Gligorijević, p. 57.

\(^{104}\) Zečević, pp. 315-317.
the seats were left for the deputies of the Slovenian People’s Party. The loss of a couple of departments within the Provincial Government was a heavy blow for the party prior to the Constituent Assembly election, which is why the leadership delayed the handling over of the departments. Meanwhile, Milenko Vesnič resigned on 20 July 1920 and formed a new government on the basis of the ‘Protocol Agreement’ between the National Radical Party, Yugoslav Democratic Party, Slovenian People’s Party and Croatian National Club on 16 August 1920. Anton Korošec delayed the signing of the agreement until the fate of the Provincial government in Ljubljana had been sealed. Although the party leadership was not seriously thinking about giving the notice to the government before the Constituent Assembly election, it began to withdraw from the ruling centralist circles upon the renewal of the Provincial and Central Governments.

On 17 October 1920, the government gave orders to the Yugoslav army and civil authorities to withdraw from the plebiscite zone A in Carinthia, but the Provincial government did not comply with orders. Consequently the relations between the central and provincial government were extremely weakened after the plebiscite on 10 October 1920. The inconvenient outcome of the Carinthian plebiscite launched a wave of protests and demonstrations demanding the revision of the plebiscite and the Yugoslav army occupation of zone A. The interference of the Yugoslav army in Carinthia was depreciated in the Styrian Catholic camp, but nevertheless they supported the demand for the revision of the plebiscite. They condemned the riots against Maribor Germans and denied being involved, although the democrats accused Franjo Žebot of active participation in the demonstrations. They were also warning that after the plebiscite Yugoslavian politics must focus on protection of Slovenian minority in Carinthia.

On 30 September 1920, Anton Korošec presented basic programme guidelines of the Slovenian People’s Party for the Constituent Assembly election at the trustees meeting in Maribor: political, economic and cultural equality of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and administrative autonomy of Slovenia, including the provincial

105 Ibidem, pp. 320, 323 and 325-326.
106 Ibidem, p. 318 and 325.
108 Zečević, pp. 320 and 322-324.
109 Ibidem, pp. 327-328 and 330-332; Gligorijević, p. 60.
110 Shodi Kmete Zvezde, Slovenski gospodar, 14. 10. 1920, p. 3; 21. 10. 1920, p. 2; 28. 10. 1920, pp. 3-4; 4. 11. 1920, pp. 2-3; 11. 11. 1920, p. 4; 18. 11. 1920, pp. 3-4; Sklep kmetov iz zelenega Pohorja, Slovenski gospodar, 28. 10. 1920, p. 2; Boj za našo severno državno mejo na Koroškem in Štajerskem, Straža, 10. 11. 1920, p. 1.
government and assembly. Appealing to the right for self-determination and sovereignty of nations, the Slovenian People’s Party leadership in Styria demanded the adoption of constitution with provisions on universal, secret and equal suffrage; equality before the law; religious freedom and freedom of speech, press, unification and gathering; furthermore they strived for the nationalization of large industrial plants and mines and for the agrarian reform implementation as soon as possible. The Slovenian People’s Party won 36.1 percent of votes at an election on 28 November 1920 and received 14 deputy mandates out of 38 Slovenian mandates; in Maribor constituency, consisting of Styria, Carinthia and Prekmurje region, the party won 35 percent of votes and 8 deputy mandates out of 21. The following deputies were elected: Ivan Roškar, Franc Pišek, Jožef Klekl, Davorin Kranjc, Vladimir Pušenjak, Jožef Škoberne, Anton Korošec and Josip Hohnjec. The National Radical Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party won the elections with a relative majority. Parties defending a republican form of government and federal organization of the state, mostly the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Croatian People’s Peasant Party (on 8 December 1920, renamed the Croatian Republican Peasant Party), consolidated.

The Slovenian People’s Party was not contented with the final outcome of the election and saw the improvement of situation in carrying out the extensive work to consolidate the party’s programme and organization. The Slovenian People’s Party leadership in Styria believed that “The stagnancy and recklessness that govern in several organizations of the KZ (Translator’s Note: Peasant Alliance), has to be eliminated.” The commentators there interpreted the outcome on the basis of changed internal political picture in the new country, light poll due to the remoteness of the polls, difficult social conditions and large numbers of the parties participating in the election. In a comment about the election in Maribor, a Styrian correspondent of the newspaper Slovenec publicly scolded the Slovenian People’s Party confidents: “We do not wish to reproach anyone with inaction, but the fact is that many a trustee has been idle during the election campaign in this worst liberal society, and were not concerned in the electoral preparations at all. Many honest and nationally conscious electors lament bitterly that there was no leadership or initiative at all in great many municipalities. The directives, which were sent by the party office, are still located in innumerable houses of those “major confidents” un-
touched and the leaflets piled without having been distributed."

At the beginning of December 1920, the Cabinet began discussing the proposal for constitutional plan, which anticipated a division of the country into 35 districts and abolition of regions and provincial governments. Anton Korošec was the only one who voted against the proposal, causing the government crisis and at the same time announced the policy change of the Slovenian People’s Party toward the government. The party leadership disapproved the approaching of the National Radical Party policy to the policy of the Yugoslav Democratic Party, the basic aim of which was to adopt the centralist constitution after the Constituent Assembly election. By the end of 1920, it was gradually isolated from its former political ally - the National Radical Party - and began establishing contacts with the members of parliamentary clubs with programmes for autonomy (the Yugoslav Muslim Organization and Croatian National Club). Anton Korošec met the party leadership on 9 December 1920 in Ljubljana, where his government won the vote of confidence. The leaders emphasised that after the stabilization of the foreign policy situation, the party does not have any reasons for appeasement regarding its legal demands for autonomy. The policy change was also noticeable in the Styrian Catholic camp already at the beginning of September 1920, whose representatives ceased using the phrase ‘unique Yugoslav nation.’

The approval of the policy of Anton Korošec was of great importance due to disagreements in the party, which were related to the formation of the Yugoslav Club constitutional proposal, after the Constituent Assembly election. The reinforced young wing of the Christian Socials gathered around Ljubljana newspaper Večerni list (Josip Gostinčar, Franc Kremžar, Franc Terseglav, Andrej Gosar, Ph.D., Fran Kulovec, Ph.D. and others) demanded that the position on republican form of government is included in the party’s political programme, which was vigorously rejected by Anton Korošec with the support of the Styrian Catholic camp. He

Slovenski gospodar, 1. 12. 1921, p. 1; Zakaj nas sovražijo?, Straža, 30. 11. 1921, p. 1; Balkovec, Parlamentarne volitve v Jugosloviji, p. 156.

124 Zečević, pp. 344-345, 349 and 353.
126 Fran Kulovec, Ph.D., (1884-1941), a priest and politician in the Slovenian People’s Party. He visited grammar school in Kočevje and Ljubljana from 1895-1903, studied theology in Ljubljana and in 1910, conferred the title of doctor in Vienna. In 1919, he founded the Yugoslav Farmers’ Association and drew up a programme and organizational statute; in 1928 it was transformed from political into professional organization. In 1919, he was appointed secretary general of the Slovenian People’s Party and became editor-in-chief of the newspaper Slovenec the following year. The implementation of organizational statute of the Slovenian People’s Party and party’s reorganization in 1922 was largely owing to him. At the assembly elections in 1923, 1925 and 1927, he was elected deputy to the National Assembly, where he was operating in several assembly committees - he was especially active in financial department. He was the Minister of Agriculture from July to November 1924 and from February to April 1927.

SBL, I. Volume, p. 582; Menaše, p. 536.
believed that the Ljubljana circle’s revolt was a result of conscious activity against Styrian adherents.\textsuperscript{128} He had already clearly expressed his loyalty to the monarchy before the elections at the trustees’ meeting on 30 September 1920, in Maribor.\textsuperscript{129} For the first time, the Styrian Catholic camp clearly expressed their unfavourable

\textsuperscript{128} Zečević, pp. 346-48.

\textsuperscript{129} Govor ministra dr. Korošca na sestanku zaupnikov SLS v Mariboru, Straža, 1. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Smernice ministra dr. Korošca za volitve, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 10. 1920, p. 1; Dr. Korošec o volitvah, Domoljub, 6. 10. 1920, pp. 373-374; Vodilne misli za volilni boj v konstituanto, Slovenec, 2. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2.
position on the republican organization of state in April 1919, characterising the republican idea as anti-national. By the end of 1920, Leopold Lenard in Franc Kovačič, distinguished Catholic intellectuals in Styria, rejected and condemned the requests of the Christian Socials gathered around Večerni list. The newspaper ceased being published at the beginning of 1921, which consequently made the Christian social labour movement politically impossible. At the time, the Catholic camp was the most united and homogeneous of all Slovenian political camps. Although some Styrian Catholic leaders expressed their loyalty to the republican idea in different places (i.e.: Josip Hohnjec, Ivan Vesenjak in Jožef Škoberne), the republican standpoint was not widely supported in the Styrian Catholic camp in the 1920s.

Because of the manner in which the rules of procedure had been adopted without participation of the Constituent Assembly, the Yugoslav Club deputies adopted a motion on resignation of the Minister of Transport, Anton Koročec, and proposed the resignation of the entire government on 11 December 1920. Only a day prior to the resignation of Milenko Vesnić on 14 December 1920, the Provincial Government in Ljubljana resigned.

Upon the decision of the Cabinet, Leonid Pitamic, a non-party candidate, took up the duties as president. On 1 January 1921, Nikola Pašić established a new coalition government with the deputies of the National Radical Party and Yugoslav Democrat Party and four posts within the ministry were held for the government negotiations with deputies of small political parties. The negotiations lasted until mid-March, by which the opposition parties were prevented from connecting by

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130 Organizacija Slovenske kmečke Zveze, Slovenski gospodar, 29. 4. 1919, p. 3; Slovensko ljudstvo na branik!, Slovenski gospodar, 10. 4. 1919, p. 1; Razne politične vesti. Socialni demokratje na Črešnjevcu, Slovenski gospodar, 20. 3. 1919, p. 2; Na delo!, Straža, 7. 4. 1919, p. 1; Politične vesti. Rdeča nevarnost, Slovenski gospodar, 17. 4. 1919, p. 3.


133 Kandidatu SLS, gospodu Skobernetu!, Kmetijski list, 17. 3. 1921, p. 1; Mikuž, p. 70; Zečević, p. 174.

134 The government announced a decree on Constituent Assembly’s Provisional Rules of Procedure on 10 December 1920. At the beginning of 1921, the representatives of the Yugoslav Club, National Club and Yugoslav Muslim Organization strived for the change of provisional rules of procedure in an item which defined deputies’ oath to the king in anticipation. However, they took an oath at the end of January in union with the deputies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, or else their participation in the Constituent Assembly would have to be abolished.

Z odprtim vezirjem, Straža, 17. 12. 1920, p. 1; Grda igra, Slovenski gospodar, 13. 1. 1921, p. 1; Sklepi Kmete’s zveze v Loki pri Zidanem mostu, Slovenski gospodar, 27. 1. 1921, p. 2; Zečević, pp. 345 and 356-357; Gligorijević, p. 91.

the Prime Minister.\(^{136}\) The Slovenian Party leadership demanded wide coalition government, provincial autonomy, the establishment of women's suffrage and the change of the Constituent Assembly’s Rules of Procedure by deleting the provision on deputies’ oath to the king. Upon unsuccessful discussion on the entry to the government on 12 January 1921, the Slovenian People’s Party leadership adopted a decision about prolonging the activity of the party in opposition, in order to resolve internal disputes and to strengthen the party’s position in the Slovenian political arena.\(^{137}\) After entering the opposition, the party deputies adopted a more determinate standpoint toward their political opponents, which caused tension in relations with all Slovenian parties in January 1921.\(^{138}\)

The Constituent Assembly deputies elected a 42-member committee on 31 January 1921, in order to investigate constitutional proposals which were submitted to the Constituent Assembly for discussion by the deputies in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure. The Constituent Committee began the discussion on 2 February and elected 3 deputies of the Yugoslav Club in the committee (the only deputy elected from the Slovenian People’s Party was Anton Sušnik). The Yugoslav Club deputies demanded the adoption of the constitution by a two-thirds majority and on the basis of self-determination of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.\(^{139}\)

On 12 February 1921, a new constitutional plan, which was framed within the constitutional provisions of the Yugoslav Club, was submitted to the committee. The plan anticipated the division of the Kingdom of SHS into 6 autonomous provinces (Serbia; Croatia and Slavonia; Bosnia and Herzegovina with Dalmatia; Montenegro; Vojvodina; Slovenia with Prekmurje region), each of which would have its own provincial assembly and the provincial government, responsible to the provincial assembly and the Central Government in Belgrade.\(^{140}\)

The difference in opinions occurred between Ljubljana and Maribor Slovenian People’s Party leadership regarding the formation of the Yugoslav Club constitutional plan. In October 1920, the Styrian Catholic camp did not approve the establishment of self-governing provinces nationally but rather economically and geographically. In order to avoid the development of Great Serbia, they strived for provincial self-government, therefore the self-government of provinces, municipalities and districts, which would result from the power of central authorities in the sense of: “Powerful and healthy administration, ample and intelligent self-government!”\(^{141}\)

In November 1920, the Slovenian People’s Party leadership in Ljubljana, defending the pure form of autonomy, formally opposed to the constitutional-legal

\(^{136}\) Zečevič, p. 352; Gligorijevič, p. 97.


\(^{138}\) Začetek kulturnega boja v Sloveniji, Straža, 4. 2. 1921, p. 1; Samostojneži in občinske volitve, Straža, 9. 2. 1921, pp. 1-2; Krinko z obraza!, Straža, 18. 2. 1921, p. 1; Zmešane glave, Straža, 18. 2. 1921, pp. 1-2; Zečevič, p. 358.

\(^{139}\) Zečevič, pp. 357-358 and 363; Gligorijevič, p. 104.

\(^{140}\) Zečevič, pp. 388-389.

\(^{141}\) Jeraj dr. Josip, Avtonomija ali centralizem, Straža, 20. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; 22. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Centralizem in samouprava, Straža, 27. 10. 1920, p. 1; Kmetska zveza, Slovenski gospodar, 10. 6. 1920, p. 3; 1. 7. 1920, p. 2; 15. 7. 1920, p. 2; 22. 7. 1920, p. 3; Razgovor z dr. Korošcem, Slovenec, 6. 10. 1920, p. 1; Klerikalci in plemenska avtonomija, Nova doba, 6. 11. 1920, p. 1; Del SLS proti plemenski avtonomiji, Jutro, 5. 11. 1920, p. 1; Tudi demagoštvo mora biti preračunjeno, Straža, 22. 11. 1920, p. 3.
concept which contained elements of centralism and self-government and was particularly defended by Josip Jeraj, Ph.D., member of the Styrian Catholic camp.\textsuperscript{142}

In the midst of February 1921, Leonid Pitamic, president of the provincial government, was replaced by Viljem Baltič, Ph.D., member of the Yugoslav Democratic Party. The Slovenian People’s Party understood the replacement as an assault to the party’s programme for autonomy, especially at the time the government had ratified the electoral law change for municipal elections only in the provision which anticipated a new electoral register and not the expansion of women’s suffrage.\textsuperscript{143}

In February 1921, the centralist measures of the government of Nikola Pašić and constitutional plan debates in the Constitutional Assembly stimulated 43 the most prominent Slovenian cultural and scientific workers to sign the Slovenia’s declaration of independence framed within the kingdom of SHS, which launched a massive independence movement in Slovenia.\textsuperscript{144} On 13 March, there was a large manifestation meeting of the Slovenian People’s Party in Ljubljana, which along with the effects of the declaration of independence finally managed to strengthen the idea of autonomy in the party’s programme.\textsuperscript{145} The position on autonomy was clearly adopted in the Styrian Catholic camp as well, and a journalist of the Straža newspaper wrote: “From now on we will talk differently. We shall always emphasise that we are Slovenes and only Slovenes.”\textsuperscript{146}

The Catholic camp election campaign for the municipal elections, which began in March 1921, contained a clear request for the establishment of provincial autonomy in historical boundaries and conclusion of a national agreement on the basis of democratically adopted constitution.\textsuperscript{147} The Slovenian People’s Party gained 61 percent of votes in the elections which took place in Ljubljana, Maribor, Celje and Ptuj on 26 April 1921,\textsuperscript{148} whereas in other Slovenian places the elections were

\textsuperscript{142} Zečević, p. 335.
\textsuperscript{143} Uredba o volitvi v občinska zastopstva v Sloveniji, Belgrade 15. 5. 1920, Uradni list deželne vlade za Slovenijo, volume 71/1920, 8. 6. 1920, pp. 321-324; Uredba o izpremembah in popolnitvah uredbe o volitvi v občinska zastopstva v Sloveniji z dne 15. 5. 1920, Belgrade 17. 2. 1921, Uradni list deželne vlade za Slovenijo, volume 20/1921, 26. 2. 1921, pp. 123-125.
\textsuperscript{144} Fran Erjavec, Avtonomistična izjava slovenskih kulturnih delavcev leta 1921 (Iz spominov), in: Zgodovinski zbornik 1958, Buenos Aires 1958, p. 2; Zečević, p. 362.
\textsuperscript{145} Zečević, p. 363.
\textsuperscript{146} Detomor, Straža, 23. 5. 1921, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{147} Avtonomija - sredstvo za sporazum v SHS kraljevini. Govor ministra na razpoloženju dr. Korošca v seji konstituante dne 15. aprila 1921, Straža, 25. 4. 1921, p. 1; 27. 4. 1921, p. 1; 29. 4. 1921, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{148} The Slovenian People’s Party gained 17,5 percent of votes and 7 town council members in Maribor (Josip Leskvar, Ph.D., Anton Krepek, Karel Verstovšek, Ph.D., Franc Veronik, Anton Jerovšek, Ph.D., Franjo Žebot and Vekoslav Filipič) and 12,5 percent of votes and 4 town council members in Celje (Anton Ogrizek, Ph.D., Makso Janič, Franc Kuret and Silvester Fohn). In collaboration with the National Party, a collective list of candidates was drawn up in Ptuj and they won 25 percent of votes and 6 town council members, who were not members of the Catholic Camp (Vinko Šerona, Ludovik Jenko, Ph.D., Ciril Tušeč, Simon Führer, Bernard Mikuletič and Anton Blažek).

Izid občinskih volitev v avtonomnih mestih Slovenije, Slovenski gospodar, 28. 4. 1921, p. 2; Poraz centralistov pri občinskih volitvah v slovenskih mestih, Straža, 27. 4. 1921, p. 2; Poraz klerikalcev v Mariboru; Izid volitev v štajerskih mestih, Slovenec, 27. 4. 1921, p. 1; Rezultati občinskih volitev, Tabor, 28. 4. 1921, p. 1; Klerikalni poraz v Mariboru; Volitve v Ptuju, Jutro, 27. 4. 1921, p. 1; Volitve v Mariboru; Volitve v Celju; Volitve v Ptuju, Slovenski narod, 28. 4. 1921, p. 1.
carried out until 13 May 1921. Out of all together 834 municipalities, the party attained an absolute majority in 587 Slovenian municipalities and a relative majority in all others. The major election victory was a result of opposition party’s position and precisely defined and well introduced programme for autonomy, expressing the majority’s opinion of the Slovene nation. The Slovenian People’s Party authority takeover in the organs of local administration was aggravated by the Yugoslav Democratic Party deputies in the Provincial Government.\(^{149}\) Relations between the Slovenian People’s Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party had already been weak prior to the municipal election, when on 10 April 1920 the Provincial Government of Viljem Baltič adopted a ‘Decree of the Provincial Government for Slovenia as regards the police punishment of demonstrative actions, which are dangerous to the state’;\(^{150}\) Anton Korošec appeared in the Constituent Assembly against the so-called Slovenian Obznana on behalf of the Yugoslav Club.\(^{151}\)

On 13 June 1920, the Yugoslav Club deputies left the discussion on constitutional plan of the government in the Constituent Assembly in protest, reasoning that a centralistic constitutional draft makes the establishment of constitutional parliamentary democracy on the basis of unity and equality in the joint state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes impossible. They rejected the ultimate voting on constitutional plan and thus also responsibility for the consequences of the centralistic constitution on national and state unity. They committed themselves to continue their efforts for constitutional revision immediately upon the constitution’s adoption, until the ultimate political, economic and cultural equality of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is achieved.\(^{152}\) On 28 June 1921, the remaining deputies of the Constituent Assembly adopted the Vidovdan Constitution with 223 votes for and 35 against, which established a rigorous centralist\(^{153}\) organization of the state.\(^{154}\)

\(^{149}\) Zečević, pp. 371-372 and 375-376.

\(^{150}\) The Decree of Provincial Government for Slovenia regarding the police punishment of demonstrative actions dangerous for the country, the decree was based on proposition of the government and resolution of the Constituent Assembly from 8 April 1921, about the establishment of more severe measures against the Yugoslavian Communist Party’s activity. The decree also stipulated that: “Every public mockery, insulting, belittlement of the state, constitution and laws, army and individual tribes of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, public authorities and regional decrees, as well as every indication of rebellion and instigation against it is prohibited.” Adoption of the decree was evaluated by the Slovenian People’s Party as the government’s means of engagement against all the opposing parties - it was named ‘Slovenian Obznana’. The Yugoslav Club members tabled a motion for the Minister of the Interior Milorad Drašković on 10 May, as though it was adopted in contradiction to the resolutions of the Constituent Assembly. Even though Minister Milorad Drašković sent the directions to the Provincial Government in Ljubljana in April 1921 to implement more severe measures against the supporters of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, he denied in his reply to the Yugoslavian club deputies the interference of the Cabinet in the decree of the Provincial Government.


\(^{153}\) Upon the adoption of the constitution, one of the first government measures was the abolishment of the Provincial Government of Slovenia and its autonomous offices on 9 July 1921. On 2 august 1921, with the help of others Ivan Hribar, regional deputy, established the Regional Administration of Slov-
Slovenian People's Party leadership granted the legitimacy of the constitution and the Yugoslav Club deputies returned to the National Assembly on 2 July 1921, to continue their political ambitions as the representatives of parliamentary parties. Styrian Catholic leader Josip Hohnjec characterized the Vidovdan Constitution as a great misfortune for the country and resolved: “We have accepted the present constitution with reservations regarding strong demand for revision of the constitution as soon as possible.” From July to September 1921, numerous protest meetings were held in Styria and elsewhere in Slovenia by The Slovenian People’s Party against the adoption of the constitution. The fundamental political demands of the party deputies in order to adopt the Vidovdan Constitution were as follows: administrative unity and autonomy of Slovenia, constitutional revision, tax equation, equal position of the government clerks regardless of citizenship and improvement of the

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position of Slovenian soldiers in the Yugoslav Army. In the area of foreign policy they mainly exposed the necessity of solving the issues of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia and Italy. Apart from that they also strived for the assistance of the Yugoslav diplomacy with Russians’ efforts to gain an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea and in this connection warned about the political interests of Bulgaria and their plans to join the Kingdom of SHS within a short period of time.160

Due to disagreements between coalition partners, the National Radical Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party, regarding the government legislative activity the government resigned on 4 December 1921.161 However, on 24 December 1921, Nikola Pašić managed to re-establish the government in collaboration with the deputies of the Yugoslav Democratic Party, Yugoslav Muslim Organization and Independent Peasant’s Party. At the time, the Slovenian People’s Party leadership did not consider the possibility of entering the government.162 On 21 July 1921, a communist assassination of Milorad Drašković, Minister of the Interior, was carried out in Delnice, Croatia. His successor, Svetozar Pribićević, submitted a law proposal for the State Protection Act on 1 August to the National Assembly. With the adoption of the law, the prohibition of the Yugoslav Communist Party’s activity was legalized and upon the proposal of verification board on 4 August, the National Assembly abolished the mandates of the communist deputies.163 The Yugoslav Club deputies decisively rejected the adoption of the law from fear of eventual broadening of the abovementioned legislative provisions onto the other political parties. The Slovenian People’s Party leadership and the Styrian Catholic camp members condemned its adoption and evaluate the law as “rough violation of the principles of parliamentarism.”164

In February 1922, the deputies began a discussion on enlistment of over 6.000
recruits to assist on the Hungarian border in winter 1921, 1,000 of which were taken ill and 299 died due to the poor supply. The Minister of Army and Navy, Milivoj Zečević, stated that the reason for the emergency call-up was needed to increase military preparedness due to the visit of Karl of Habsburg to Hungary in the second half of October 1921. The Government assumed absolute responsibility for the incident that is why the criminal proceeding for extradition of the responsible to the Court, despite the efforts of the opposition deputies, was not instituted. On 12 November 1921, at a political discussion in Maribor, Anton Korošec condemned the emergency military mobilization. Franjo Žebot, the Slovenian People's Party deputy in Styria, appeared sharply against the inefficiency of the National Assembly at a discussion on the soldiers' deaths in April 1922. The one thing that the opposition deputies achieved was the appointment of a special parliamentary committee for the examination of the incident on 24 April 1921.

At the end of February 1922, conflicts between the Maribor and Ljubljana Circle, which originated in different opinions on the form of government, began to show in the Slovenian People's Party. The renewed appearance of the republican idea in the Slovenian People's Party was related to the political activity of Anton Novičan, Ph.D., who founded the Slovenian Republican Party with the support of Stjepan Radič. The party also appealed to peasants’ electoral body. The death of Mihael Napotnik, Ph.D., Bishop of the Lavantin diocese, on 28 March 1922, was interpreted by the democrats as a sign of the forthcoming changes due to the appearance of young republican orientated clergy, in the sense of prevalence of the republican idea in the Slovenian People's Party. On 9 April 1922, Anton Korošec gave a speech on disagreements in the party at a meeting in Jesenice, where the fundamental aim of the activity of party supporters was the implementation of the adopted religious, social and political programme and preservation of the Slovenian People's Party unity. On 9 May 1922, he accepted the legitimacy of the republican view in the party and announced its realization in a long-term vision.

167 Čulinović II., pp. 396-397.
169 Kdo je kriv trpljenja naših rekrutov?, Slovenski gospodar, 6. 4. 1922, p. 2.
170 Mikuž, p. 223.
171 Vsestranski Petrič, Straža, 24. 4. 1922, p. 2.
172 Ljudstvo odklanja dr. Novačanove fraze, Slovenec, 30. 5. 1922, p. 3; Republiko?, Slovenski gospodar, 1. 6. 1922, p. 1; Ljudstvo odklanja Novačanovo demagogijo, Slovenski gospodar, 1. 6. 1922, p. 2; Krivi prerok; Kako zaupa Radič republikancu Novačanu, Slovenski gospodar, 8. 6. 1922, p. 1; Dr. Novačan v Mariboru, Straža, 12. 6. 1922, p. 3; Položaj na Slovenskem Štajerskem, Slovenec, 17. 6. 1922, pp. 1-2.
173 Lavantinski knez održal dr. Mihael Napotnik, Slovenski gospodar, 30. 3. 1922, p. 3.
175 Dr. Korošec o stranki, Slovenec, 11. 4. 1922, p. 1; Dnevne novice. Dr. Korošec o enotnosti naše stranke, Straža, 12. 4. 1922, p. 2.
176 Shod SLS v Slovenj Gradcu, Straža, 12. 5. 1922, p. 3; Seja vodstva SLS, Straža, 15. 5. 1922, p. 2; Naše
of the development of the Kingdom of SHS, but however on 21 May, once again decisively rejected the discussion on the form of government at a meeting of the Slovenian People’s Party leadership. He pointed out the fight for the independence and integrity of Slovenia177 as the most important issue in the Slovenian People’s Party policy. The risk of the party unity was also presented in a leaflet of Ivan Šušteršič entitled ‘My Response,’ which was issued in April 1922.178 The former leader of the Slovenian People’s Party severely accused the party leadership in Ljubljana and Maribor and in 1917, broke up legal continuity with the pre-war Catholic political organization.179 The contents of the leaflet caused irritation also in the Styrian Catholic camp, as Ivan Šušteršič accused the newspapers Slovenec and Straža of "the sordidness of the public opinion."180

Regardless of the internal frictions, Anton Korošec expressed his satisfaction over the development of autonomist tendencies of the Slovenian People’s Party since spring 1922. The leadership entered into relations with the deputies of the Agricultural Party of Serbia and individual autonomy-orientated groups in the otherwise governmental Yugoslav Muslim Organization and thus expanded the base for the autonomists in the National Assembly.181 Anton Korošec characterised the situation of the Catholic Church in the country as favourable prior to the election to the Constituent Assembly in November 1920.182 However, he did not have the same opinion in August 1922, which was the result of the long-lasting internal disagreements among Slovenian parties due to the governmental cultural policy.183 At the end of April 1922, the Yugoslav Bishops submitted a memorandum to King Aleksander and Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, in which they severely condemned the governmental cultural policy and reproached its hostility toward the Catholic Church.184

On 23 June 1922, the National Assembly deputies began a discussion about passing the budget for 1922/1923,185 which was the first parliamentary discussion

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177 Mikuž, p. 226.
178 Šušteršič dr. Ivan, Moj odgovor, Samozaložba 1922 (further reading: Šušteršič).
179 Šušteršič, p. 23 and 25.
180 Šuštercijanci na delu, Slovenski gospodar, 30. 3. 1922, p. 2; Šušteršičev gnoj; Edinost v stranki in dr. Šušteršič, Straža, 14. 4. 1922, p. 1; Odpadniki, Slovenski gospodar, 20. 4. 1922, p. 1; Dnevne novice. Obsodba dr. Šušteršiča, Straža, 19. 4. 1922, p. 2; Šušteršič, p. 158.
181 Mikuž, p. 226.
182 Govor ministra dr. Korošca na sestanku zaupnikov SLS v Mariboru, Straža, 1. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Smernice ministra dr. Korošca za volitve, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 10. 1920, p. 1; Dr. Korošec o volitvah, Domoljub, 6. 10. 1920, pp. 373-374; Vodilne misli za volilni boj v konstituento, Slovenec, 2. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2.
183 Katoliški shodi. Maribor, Naš dom, (1922) volume 5, unpaged; Katoliški shod v Mariboru; Za katoliški shod v Mariboru; Znaki katoliškega shoda v Mariboru, Slovenski gospodar, 3. 8. 1922, p. 3; Dr. Anton Korošec, Straža, 11. 8. 1922, p. 3; Veličasten katoliški shod v Mariboru, Straža, 21. 8. 1922, p. 3; Katoliški shod v Mariboru, Slovenki gospodar, 24. 8. 1922, pp. 1-2; Dr. Korošec, Slovenec, 19. 8. 1922, p. 3; Katoliški shod v Mariboru, Slovenec, 22. 8. 1922, p. 2; Klerikalci med seboj, Jutro, 20. 7. 1922, p. 2.
184 Spomenica jugoslovanskih škofov, Straža, 8. 5. 1922, p. 1; Slovenec, 5. 5. 1922, p. 1; Naši škofje govorijo, Slovenski gospodar, 11. 5. 1922, p. 1.
185 Mikuž, p. 233.
on annual estimates.\textsuperscript{186} The adoption of budget was rejected by the Yugoslav Club, which expressed the need for thorough restoration of the fiscal system. The greatest attention was intended for the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and expenses of the general administration.\textsuperscript{187} It was estimated that the budgetary resources, which

\textsuperscript{186} Kakoršna vlada, takšen proračun, Straža, 30. 6. 1922, p. 1; Ekspoze finančnega ministra, Straža, 7. julij 1922, p. 1; Principi državnega proračuna, Straža, 10. 7. 1922, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{187} Kakoršna vlada, takšen proračun, Straža, 30. 6. 1922, p. 1; Proračun poljedelskega ministrstva, Slovenski gospodar, 20. 7. 1922, pp. 2-3.
were earmarked for the Ministry of Justice and Army and Navy, were too high. Because it was adopted without annual accounts for the previous year, which meant that the ‘Public Accountancy Act’ was broken, Vladimir Pušenjak, Styrian deputy, reproached that the budget was unconstitutional.

On 23 November, the government adjourned the sessions of the National Assembly for an indefinite period. The reason for this were the efforts of Ljubomir Davidović, leader of the government party (the Yugoslav Democratic Party) for the arrival of Croatian deputies in the National Assembly in autumn 1922, which would undermine the government’s status. Josip Hohnjec made a comment on this measure saying: “The degradation of our parliament will certainly last as long as the current governmental coalition.” On 4 December, Nikola Pašić wrote his letter of resignation reasoning that the deputies who were a part of governmental coalition, the supporters of Ljubomir Davidović, discontinued the policy on which the coalition collaboration was based. On 16 December, he set up a homogeneous minority government which was characterized by the Catholic Camp as “the last station on the way of Great Serbian chauvinism and hegemony.” King Aleksander made use of his constitutional powers and due to the enforcement of the autonomist bloc after the first half of the mandatory period he dissolved the National Assembly and called an election for 18 March 1923.

The Yugoslav Club parties issued a joint proclamation to the voters, demanding the implementation of the programme for autonomy and the Vidovdan constitution revision. The Slovenian People's Party introduced the programme for election to National Assembly in a leaflet “Sodite po delih.” On the basis of the right for self-determination of the Slovenian people, they demanded constitutional revision

189 Ekspoze finančnega ministra. Iz govora narodnega poslanca Vl. Pušenjaka na seji Narodne skupščine z dne 27. m. m., Straža, 7. 7. 1922, p. 1.
190 Državni proračun proti zakonu, Straža, 12. 7. 1922, p. 1; Državni dolgovi - izmenjava denarja, Slovenski gospodar, 13. 7. 1922, pp. 1-2.
191 Gligorijević, p. 125 and 127.
193 Gligorijević, p. 127.
194 Na zadnji postaji, Straža, 22. 12. 1922, p. 1; Gligorijević, p. 128.
196 The programme anticipated the Federative State of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians with joint foreign and defence policies and partly financial policy. Central Parliament would manage joint public affairs and in each of the autonomous provinces the provincial assemblies would be established and governments subordinate to the assemblies. Administration and judicature organization would fall within the legislative powers of the provincial assemblies; the determination of relations between the Catholic Church and the state by defining the church’s rights and duties and also the school leg-
and reorganization of the country on the basis of wide political, economic and cultural autonomy, which was an important upgrade of the party’s constitutional plan from 1921.197 “The first and the main concern in politics is integrity,” was a slogan made prior to an election, rejecting a discussion on the form of government as an issue of secondary importance and endorsing an absolute internal unity of the party.198 Anton Korošec raised expectations for success of the Slovenian People’s Party at an election on 21 February in Maribor, due to its autonomy, social and Christian programme.199 The main priority, however, was to condemn the assault of ORJUNA (Yugoslav Nationalist Organization) on the printing house of St. Cyril in Maribor.200

In the framework of Catholic organizations’ action for agitation of Catholic papers, which took place from 10 to 25 December 1922, a pamphlet was issued by the Slovenian People’s party secretariat in Maribor, critically evaluating the articles of the opposing political newspapers and indirectly also the government’s activity. The secretariat collaborators were delivered to the Public Prosecutor’s office in Maribor due to the infringement of the “Protection of Public Order and Security Act of the State.” The pamphlet, however, contained political programme of the Slovenian People’s Party in Styria for the sake of an approaching election. Its wording was as follows: “These papers (Translator’s note: Catholic) vigorously protect the Catholic religion and St. Church against the religious enemies, whereas the independent, liberals and social democrats are assaulting and offending it. These papers strive for Christian school and children’s education against the intents of freemason, Pribićević, democrats and the independent, who desire a non-religious school. For these reasons these papers battle against the falconry and falcons, non-religious teachers. These papers strive for the independence or autonomy of the Slovenes and demand that the decisions about their own matters are made by the SLOVENES THEMSELVES AND NOT BY THE SERBIAN PARTIES. However, the independent voted for centralism and therefore subjected the Slovenes to the hegemony of the Serbian parties. These papers vigorously oppose the tax increase, whereas the independent
and democrats voted in favour of all new taxes. These papers urge for help to the people who suffered from drought, flood and hail. These papers speak for all suffering classes: for farmers and workers, clerks, railwaymen, roadmen, constables and soldiers - which are therefore their true friends. These papers are against armies and demand peace. Consequently, they are also against all expenses for new weapons. The independent, however, voted in favour of 800 million dinars to purchase the rifles and canons for the Minister of War. These papers demand that our fellows do their military service at home in Slovenia, that the number of the soldiers is diminished by half and that the military service is reduced to 6 months. The independent and democrats were against it. These papers scourged badly the ill-treatments of our soldiers and demanded good food and clothes for them. However, the independent declared that our soldiers in Serbia are well treated and do not lack anything. These papers decisively took sides with our recruits who were taken to Serbia in the worst winter last year and about 600 of them died. The independent did nothing at all for the recruits. These papers wrote fearlessly against Zečević, the War Minister, who was guilty of deaths of innocent recruits and brought to the dock. The independent and democrats, however, voted against the punishment of the War Minister.201

On 18 March 1923, the Slovenian People’s Party won 6.4 % of votes at the Assembly election country-wide and 60 percent in Slovenia - this meant 21 mandates in the National Assembly out of 26 Slovenian mandates.202 With approximately 70 % participation in the election in Styria, the Slovenian People’s Party gained an absolute victory in all the Styrian electoral districts203 - 58.1 % and 12 deputy mandates,204 which compared with last year’s election showed an improvement of the party’s condition in Styria for 27.000 votes or 23 %.205 Improved and restored inner structure, a strong network of cooperative organizations in the countryside and above all the mass voters’ support to the autonomy programme and also clear position of the
majority of the Slovenian electoral body against the state centralism and unitarism were the reasons for the victory of the Slovenian People’s Party.206

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The Slovenian People’s Party achieved its prevalent political position in Slovenia in 1918-1923 on the basis of clearly formatted and excellent autonomy programme, the purpose of which was to achieve the sovereign position of Slovenian people in the State of Yugoslavia. In ideological field the concept of the Catholic reform and closely linked system of total Christianity were emphasised - Christianity on all levels of social and private lives. On the basis of socioeconomic programme of the Christian Socials it defended the idea of socially and justly organized state under strong social control of the capitalist economy.207 In accordance with the above-mentioned limited programme starting-points, the Catholic Camp in Styria was also developing in 1918-1923, although it was still tied to the pre-war political organization of the Slovenian Farmer’s Alliance and had divided opinions regarding the key issues of the Slovenian ideological, social and political development several times. Its deputies presented their views on economy, on the formation of the Yugoslav Club constitutional proposal and with reference to the solution of the northern border issue, defending a more conciliatory position towards the resolutions of the plebiscite committee after the Carinthian Plebiscite. During the reconciliation of viewpoints on the form of government in the party, the Styrian Catholic camp supported Anton Korošec, who rejected the republican model as inappropriate for the level of maturity of the Yugoslav State.

206 Gligorijević, p. 252.
Mateja Ratej

RAZVOJ POLITIČNEGA KATOLICIZMA NA ŠTAJERSKEM V LETIH 1918-1923

POVZETEK

Hungarian National Politics and the Status Law

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Abstract:
This article analyses the Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries in the framework of Hungarian national politics. The origin of the question is the gellnerian incongruence of the boundaries of the Hungarian state and the Hungarian nation. Hungary, as a state concerned with the fate of Hungarians living abroad, considers it a political and moral duty to help Hungarians, especially those who live in the bordering countries. Until recently, the Hungarian state supported principally the institutions of the national minorities, now it supports also the co-national individuals. The main debate was around the definition of the person who is entitled to obtain the Hungarian card, basically on the definition of who is Hungarian. Basically two conceptions on the nation characterized the debate. The ethnocultural (ethno-territorial) conception, promoted by the conservative government, emphasizes the unity of all the Hungarians. The civic conception, promoted by the socialist and liberals, concentrates on the Hungarian citizens. Beside the domestic debates, the law became in the center of attention of the international organizations such as the Venice Commission, the High Commissioner for National Minorities, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Key words:
Kin-state, kin-minority, political and cultural nation, Hungary, Hungarians living in the neighboring states.

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Introduction

This paper analyses the Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries, which came to be known as the status law, in the framework of Hungarian national politics. First, I will offer a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the status law, and then I will analyze the process of framing the law, especially the political and theoretical questions raised by the status law, and finally, the domestic and international consequences of the law.

If we simplify the question, its origin is the gellnerian incongruence of the boundaries of the Hungarian state and the Hungarian nation. As it is well known, Hungary lost a part of its territory, and around 3 millions of Hungarians became national minorities in the bordering states after the First World War. The situation of the Hungarian minorities abroad is a permanent concern for the Hungarian governments. Hungarian national politics, as basically every national politics in Europe, is based on the assumption that the Hungarian state is responsible for the Hungarians living abroad. Between the two world wars, the shock of the Trianon Peace Treaty deeply influenced Hungarian domestic and foreign policy. Hungarian foreign politics was characterized by a strong support for the Hungarian minorities abroad, and irredentism. Parts of an already formed nation, which had been involved in the process of Hungarian nation-building, suddenly became a national minority. Up to 1918, the Hungarians considered themselves the rightful masters of Transylvania, and acted on the basis of this idea. Consequently, after 1918, while being backed ideologically by the revisionist politics of the Hungarian state, the leaders of the Hungarian national minority parties in the neighboring states organized their political and cultural organizations on an ethnocultural basis and promoted a policy of self-defense in regard to the nationalizing thrust of the enlarged neighboring states. The essential point is that the ethnocultural basis of organization, which increasingly characterized the Hungarian politics of nation-building after the Compromise of 1867, prevailed after a part of that nation became a national minority. Obviously, the framework had changed dramatically, but the politics based on the ethnocultural conception of the community remained dominant. Besides striving for different forms of autonomy and self-government, the political elite, with the help of the intelligentsia, had been engaged in the establishment of separate Hungarian institutions. The idea behind this practice is that without such institutions Hungarian culture cannot be preserved and promoted. The nationalization process of the national minority has been influenced both by the ‘nationalizing state’ and by the ‘external national homeland.’ The second Vienna Decision/Award grant to Hunga-
ry the Northern part of Transylvania, however, at the end of the Second World War the borders of Hungary had been redrawn almost as they were before 1938. The Soviet system, after 1945, was based on the assumption that socialism will resolve the problems of national minorities. During the communist period, official politics was characterized by the fiction of the ethnoculturally neutral state, and it was often asserted that questions regarding nationality belonged to the internal affairs of the respective country. Until the mid-1980s, Hungary did not show official interest in Hungarians living in other states. In the late 1980s, the problem of Hungarians living abroad, especially in Transylvania, was brought into the center of attention. The breakdown of the socialist/communist system brought to the surface the old tensions between the titular nation and the national minorities, and, similarly, this led to tensions between neighboring states. That was also the case of Hungarian minorities and the titular nations in the neighboring states. The internal national tensions are reflected also in the relationship between Hungary and its neighbors. Obviously, the reverse argumentation may also be valid. The essence is that the relationship between a kin-state and its neighbors is strongly correlated with the (perception of) situation of its minorities and the titular nation.

Following the revolution of 1989, the relationship between Hungary and the Hungarians living in neighboring countries entered a new phase. After the breakdown of the communist regimes, the situation changed even more radically. Finally, the concern for Hungarians living in the neighboring countries was materialized in legislation and governmental politics. In the Hungarian constitution a paragraph was introduced, stating Hungary’s responsibility regarding the Hungarians living abroad. On the basis of this constitutional and ‘ethnocultural’ responsibility, the Hungarian governments established several governmental institutions and foundations to support Hungarian institutions in the neighboring countries. A certain part of the Hungarian budget was allocated to finance Hungarian political, educational, and cultural institutions. Important financial assistance was given to students, pedagogues, and artists studying in Hungary, with the aim of bringing up the future Hungarian intelligentsia. Naturally, it has been expected that these people would return to their home country.

Although a detailed analysis suggests that there are important differences among the three post-communist Hungarian governments in the politics towards Hungarians abroad, my paper does not focus on these discrepancies. However, I must note

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6 Határon Túli Magyarak Hivatala (Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad - GOHMA). The Hungarian government also allocated important sums to several foundations that distributed the resources: Illyés Foundation, Segítő Jobb Foundation, ÚjKézfogás Foundation, Apáczai Foundation, etc.

7 Several studies show that only a minor part of those who studied in Hungary returned or intend to return to their home countries.
that the first\textsuperscript{8} and the third\textsuperscript{9} government, both right-winged, gave more emphasis to their concern with the Hungarians living in neighboring countries than the second one.\textsuperscript{10} While the right-wing governments (and parties) asserted the ethnocultural unity of all Hungarians, the left-wing government framed its political discourse in view of the community of ‘Hungarian citizens’.

In 1997 Hungary became a NATO member, and it is expected that it will soon become a member of the European Union (EU). In this case, Hungary will also join the Schengen agreement, which means that it will have to introduce visa requirements for non-EU citizens. At present, it is obvious that Romania, Croatia, Yugoslavia, and the Ukraine will join the EU at a considerably latter stage.\textsuperscript{11} As a consequence, many Hungarians living in these states will find it hard to travel to Hungary. This poses the fear that a new Iron Curtain will separate the Hungarians from the above-mentioned countries and their homeland.

A crucial turn happened after 1998, during the FIDESZ-MDF-FKGP\textsuperscript{12} government. In the electoral campaign of 1998, FIDESZ raised the question of according double citizenship for the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries. After internal debates, in 1999 the governing parties decided to find a solution for the question. Given the international setting (EU accession), granting double citizenship was impossible. Similarly, it is hard to imagine, that the Hungarian parties would have consent to grant double citizenship for around 2-2,5 millions of ‘foreign’ Hungarians. In order to handle the situation, the Hungarian government raised the issue of according a special status to the Hungarians living in the neighboring states: “If Hungary is admitted and its neighbors are not, Hungary will find its sovereignty weakened and its larger national project threatened. The government will lose its authority over traditional means of ‘caring’ for Hungarians abroad. It will have to accept the EU’s common immigration policy, and it will lose the power to negotiate bilateral treaties with its neighbors. The Hungarian government is therefore looking for ways to virtually integrate Hungarians from neighboring countries into the EU, even if the state where they live remains outside the union. Dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians provides one option, but this idea has no support among political parties in Hungary since it would mean representation without taxation. The preferred solution is special status for ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary - allowing, for example, the

\textsuperscript{8}The government was formed in 1990 by the coalition led by the Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum), with József Antall as Prime Minister.

\textsuperscript{9}The government was formed in 1998 by the coalition led by the FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats), with Viktor Orbán as Prime Minister.

\textsuperscript{10}The government was formed in 1994 by the coalition led by the Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party), with Gyula Horn as Prime Minister.

\textsuperscript{11}Slovakia and Slovenia will probably join the EU almost simultaneously with Hungary. Even if not, the citizens of these countries will not need a visa to travel to the EU states. It is also probable that the visa requirement for Romanian citizens will be waived.

\textsuperscript{12}FIDESZ - Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats), MDF - Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum), FKGP - Független Kisgazda Párt (Independent Smallholders Party)

\textsuperscript{13}Zsuzsa Csergő and James M. Goldgeier, Virtual Nationalism, Foreign Policy, July-August 2001., p. 76.
possibility of legal employment in Hungary for short periods."

Related to the issue of citizenship, George Schöpflin states: “The status law, by offering options for the cultural reproduction of all Hungarians, is a significant contribution towards that strategy and can take its place in other, similar attempts to regulate ethnicity within a civic and ethnic framework. In effect, by separating citizenship from ethnic identity and constructing a clear definition of citizen of the Hungarian state and citizens of other states but ethnically Hungarian individuals, the Hungarian status law is enhancing and enriching the concept of citizenship.”

As a response to this new situation, some representatives of the Hungarian national minorities advanced the idea of giving double citizenship to Hungarians living in neighboring states. The idea was dropped after the 1998 elections, but, in order to (partially) keep its promise, the government included the framing of the ‘Status Law’ into its agenda.

**The Hungarian State and its ‘External Homeland Politics’**

Hungary, as a state concerned with the fate of Hungarians living abroad, considers it a political and moral duty to help Hungarians, especially those who live in the bordering countries. Until recently, the Hungarian state principally supported the institutions of the national minorities, now it supports also the co-national individuals. The government considers that the existence of such a law, and the facilities offered, encourages the Hungarians to refrain from emigration, and could moderate the process of assimilation.

The newly formed government expressed the following goals regarding national policy: “The Government’s policy on ethnic Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries aims to build and develop political, cultural, and economic ties between Hungary and Hungarian communities abroad as part of the general process of European unification, as well as to help Hungarians living in neighboring countries to live and prosper in their own homeland. In order to achieve this, the bonds between ethnic Hungarian minorities and Hungary must be settled within a framework of legislation and government, so as to preserve the organic ties of Hungarian communities to Hungary, even after its accession to the European Union.”

This program reinforces Hungary’s special relationship with the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, but emphasizes the importance of settling this relationship within the legislative framework. In addition, for the first time it is expressed that the organic ties of the Hungarian communities abroad and Hungary are of primary importance. George Schöpflin describes the arguments for such a law as follows: “In broader terms, the status law can be said to have two dimensions. One of these is the aim to regulate Hungary’s relations with the Hungarian communities in the neighboring states, a problem that was not created by Hungary but

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14 The debate on this issue was published in Magyar Kisebbség 1 (1999), and 2-3 (1999).

by the victorious powers after 1918. The hard reality is that the very existence of the Hungarian state generates tension between Hungary and the minorities living in the neighboring states, given the intimacies of the shared culture. /…/ Second, the broader context of the law is the historic drive to establish a new narrative for the Hungarian nation in its cultural dimension as a modern community. The loss of empire in 1918 was a catastrophe for the Hungarian model of modernity and ever since, Hungary has been struggling to find a new narrative that would reestablish the model in the new context. Indeed, this model is essential for Hungary’s return to Europe and for Hungary’s membership of the European Union. The law, therefore, is intended to reflect the requirements of democracy, of the European environment and the needs of the Hungarian state. “17

The official argument for framing the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries was: “The main aim of this Law is to ensure special relations of the Hungarians living in neighboring countries to their kin state, the promotion and preservation of their national identity and well-being within their home country; therefore to contribute to the political and economic stability of the region, and through this to contribute to the Euro-Atlantic integration process of Hungary in particular and the Central and Eastern European region in general. In this context the Law promotes the preservation of the cultural and social cohesion as well as the economic consolidation of Hungarian communities abroad.”18

The central scope of the law is to ensure the special relations of the Hungarians living in the region, despite their state-allegiances, and to convince the Hungarians living in neighboring countries to remain in their home country. Besides the initial idea that the ‘Status Law’ will serve as a basis for according preferential national visas to the possessors of the ‘Hungarian Identification Document,’ the public debate focused on the effect of this law on the emigration of the Hungarians from the neighboring countries. The expressed goal of the law is explained as follows: “While promoting the national identity of Hungarians living in neighboring countries, the Law obviously ensures prosperity and staying within the home country. According to the scope of the Law, the codifier applies different provisions to encourage living within the home country and does not support resettling to Hungary. Most forms of assistance will be applied within the home countries of Hungarians living in neighboring countries; the institutional structure needed for any assistance for the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries is established through this legal norm.”19

However, other aspects cannot be disregarded: “The Law meets the interest of the Hungarian citizens, since it is protecting and supervising the labor market. This is of a great importance both for foreign companies investing in Hungary and thus, indirectly for the EU. Actually, Hungarians living in neighboring countries are often employed in Hungary - illegally. Should we legalize employing them in Hungary - their contribution to the health insurance system and taxes will increase the amount

18 Information on the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries (Act T/4070).
19 Ibidem.
of the central state budget. The contribution of Hungarians living in neighboring countries to the development of economic relations between Hungary and the neighboring countries may be regarded as an economic investment being refunded in the near future.”

While in the early stages of framing the law this second argument was not employed, it later became of central importance, as a partial response to the critics who emphasize that the implementation of the law will cost the Hungarian state a lot.

However, the most salient question is whether the law, once it became operational, will increase or decrease ethnic Hungarian immigration to Hungary. Hungary’s official position is that Hungarians from neighboring countries should remain in their home country. The government’s argument was that, when the law enters into force, Hungarians from the neighboring countries will prefer to remain in their home country, while being able to work legally in Hungary. The opposition (the left-wing MSZP and the liberal SZDSZ) challenged this view and argued that this law, since it offers the possibility to work legally, will increase emigration to Hungary. According to this argument, those who work for several months in Hungary will have the possibility to find out how to settle in Hungary. A further disagreement concerned the legalization of illegal work. The critiques of the law asserted that cheap illegal work will be preferred both by employees and employers, and, as a consequence, nothing will change. However, both arguments are speculative. Even if public opinion polls support one or another option, from a sociological perspective none of these positions can be confirmed or disproved.

Two further questions were also central to the debate. The first concerns Hungary’s forthcoming integration into the EU, which is often perceived as a threat to Hungarians living in neighboring countries. Because the law has no provisions for the period after Hungary’s accession to the EU, the Hungarian population in neighboring countries is afraid that traveling to or settling in Hungary will be very difficult. Such a perception influences much more the decisions regarding emigration. Needless to say, the existence or inexistence of the ‘Status Law’ will have a minor influence on individual decisions regarding emigration. The second question concerns Hungary’s increasing demand of skilled workers. The former Prime Minister of Hungary also resorted to this argument: “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 31 May [2001] told a Budapest conference entitled ‘The Hungarian Model’ that Hungary will have to attract labor from neighboring countries to fuel its soaring economy. He pointed out that without foreign labor, the country’s supply of quality labor will be unsatisfactory within four to five years.”

Many European states face similar problems. The case of Hungary is different only in the sense that there are a large number of people who, culturally and

20 Ibidem.
linguistically, can be easily integrated into Hungarian society. On the one hand, there is a preference to keep Hungarians from neighboring countries in their home country; on the other hand, economic reasons may force Hungary to increase the number of immigrants. It is probable that Hungary will prefer Hungarians from neighboring countries to non-Hungarian potential immigrants.

Even if politicians avoid discussing this issue, it is absolutely clear that the practical decisions concerning the implementation of the law pose the question: *Who is Hungarian in the neighboring countries?* The legislators' intention is to include every Hungarian living in neighboring countries, but only Hungarians. However, achieving this goal is not just impractical, but also theoretically impossible. In public debates, this question was formulated as a dichotomy between the freedom of choice in defining one's own national identity and the requirement of proving one's Hungarianness. Theoretically, this dispute can be translated as a debate between the *objective* and *subjective* definitions of the nation.

The law enounces the scope as follows:

1. This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian nationality who are not Hungarian citizens and who have their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine, and who
   a) have lost their Hungarian citizenship for reasons other than voluntary renunciation, and
   b) are not in possession of a permit for permanent stay in Hungary.
2. This Act shall also apply to the spouse living together with the person identified in paragraph (1) and to the children of minor age being raised in their common household even if these persons are not of Hungarian nationality.

One can observe that only the ‘neighboring countries’ are included. For this, the following explanation has been provided: “The Act will cover those persons of Hungarian national identity who are not Hungarian citizens and reside in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Austria, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine. Therefore the Law exclusively affects individuals of Hungarian national identity in the neighboring countries, and not members of the Hungarian Diaspora (emigration) living in Western Europe, and overseas. However, this Law does not have any negative effect on the established rights of the Diaspora (emigration). Therefore, persons of Hungarian national identity, who have already obtained Hungarian citizenship or are in possession of a permanent residence permit in Hungary are not entitled to become subjects of the law: The definition of the subjects of this law is primarily based on the basic human rights principle on the free choice of identity.”

23 Information on the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries (Act T/4070).
The debate over the objective and subjective criteria of belonging to the Hungarian nation brought into light an old, and irresolvable, dispute about the definition of the nation. While the opposition accepted only self-definition as a basis of stating somebody’s Hungarianness, the government parties argued that it is necessary to include also ‘objective criteria.’ They argued that, in the case of self-definition, many non-Hungarians would declare themselves Hungarian in order to benefit from the privileges accorded by the law, and this exceeds the present economic capacity of Hungary. To avoid the perils of self-definition, the Hungarian Standing Conference (HSC) recommended the following criteria: “In order for the recommendation to be issued, written identification with the Hungarian nation, application for the recommendation and knowledge of the Hungarian language are required. Under special appraisalment, the recommending organization may grant an exemption from the Hungarian language requirement if the applicant meets one of the criteria below:

a. he or she is considered Hungarian by the country of citizenship,
b. one of his or her parents is of Hungarian nationality,
c. his or her spouse possesses a Hungarian Card,
d. he or she is a member of a registered Hungarian organization,
e. he or she is treated as Hungarian by a church registry,
f. he or she has attended, at least, for four years a public educational institution where the language of tuition was Hungarian, or his or her child or children attend(s) such an institution.

Should the applicants be capable of providing evidence of meeting the above-listed criteria, the recommendation has to be issued irrespective of his or her origin, religion or political affiliation.”

Finally these recommendations were framed in the law:

“§ 21 (1) The evaluating authority will issue the ID if:
a. the applicant has a recommendation issued by an organization representing the Hungarian communities in that particular neighboring state and being recognized by the Government of the Republic of Hungary as a recommending organization,
b. the recommendation certifies that the applicant is of Hungarian nationality and includes the followings,
   ba. application of the individual,
   bb. name, place and date of birth, permanent residence, and maiden name of the mother of applicant,
   bc. the name, the print of the official seal of the recommending organization, and the signature of the person acting on behalf of this organization,
   bd. the place and date of issue of the recommendation.

(2) Recommendation issued for the spouse of non-Hungarian nationality

and for the child of minor age of the person under this Act, only certifies the family relationship between the applicant and a Hungarian person living outside the borders."

The Hungarian government, together with the political representatives of the Hungarian national minorities, established organizations that collect the applications for the Hungarian Identity Card. The Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Hungary issues the card. The evaluating organizations are selected in accordance with the following principles:

“(3) The Government of the Republic of Hungary will recognize an organization representing the Hungarian communities in a given country as a recommending organization, which is able to
a. represent the Hungarian community in its entirety living in a given country,
b. provide for organizational and human resources for receiving and evaluating applications for recommendations.”

Besides the principle of the free choice of identity, the law includes several ‘objective’ criteria for the definition of the Hungarian nation (at least regarding those who live in the neighboring countries).

One can draw the conclusion that ultimately the Hungarian state (with the assistance and contribution of the HSC) vindicates the right to decide who is Hungarian in the neighboring countries, advancing an ‘objective’ definition of the Hungarian nation, based on ethnocultural principles. The process of framing the law and the future application of the law can be perceived as a new institutionalization of the Hungarian nation. Even if it does not affect Hungarian citizens, it presumably will have effects - at least on a theoretical level - on the status of the non-ethnocultural-Hungarians within Hungary as well. The law establishes a new relationship between the Hungarian state and Hungarian individuals. The procedure of issuing the cards also suggests the unity of the ethnocultural nation. The cooperation of the evaluating organizations and the Hungarian state reinforces this institutionalization.

Constantin Iordachi offers the following explanation on the scope of the law: “The scope of the law combines thus an ethnic principle (persons of Hungarian nationality) with a ‘statist’ principle (former Hungarian citizens who have involuntarily lost their citizenship), and with a territorial principle (regards only ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries, and not the Hungarian Diaspora all over the world). It was this combination of territorial and statist elements, as well as the historical reference to the involuntary loss of citizenship, which occasioned allegation of a hidden Hungarian irredenta agenda directed at symbolically reconstructing Greater Hungary. In addition, the territorial applicability of the Statute Law’ law was also seen as controversial. It is stipulated that the recipients will benefit from the facilities granted by the Law ‘on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, as well as on their permanent place of residence in their home countries.‘ This extraterritorial character of the Law conflicted with the prevailing concepts of state and territorial sovereignty that characterize national legislations in the neighboring countries. Another controversial aspect is the introduction of a photoed ID entitled the ‘Hungarian Identification Document,’ which certifies that ‘the applicant is of
Hungarian nationality. This ID functions as an official personal card, since it has to be periodically renewed, and can be withdrawn in case the bearer commits legal offences or changes his relation to the Hungarian state. In regard to the assistance given to ethnic Hungarians abroad, the recipient of the law receives certain preferences and certain kinds of assistance that fall under the following main headings: education and culture, science, social security and health provisions, traveling benefits, and employment.\textsuperscript{25}

Consequences of the Status Law

Several East-Central European states have already adopted, or are planning to adopt, similar laws. However, the Hungarian ‘Status Law’ was broadly criticized and attacked. Especially the Slovakian and the Romanian governments expressed their concerns regarding the law. They stated that, by implementing the law, Hungary discriminates on an ethnocultural basis among citizens of the neighboring states, it seeks to establish state institutions (the so-called evaluating commissions) on the territory of other states, and that some provisions of the law, especially those regarding the support of profit-oriented enterprises, contradict the principles of a market economy. These governments also resented that Hungary did not inform them about the project of the law. One can debate whether these arguments are valid, but it is highly probable that, given the historical tensions between Hungary and most of its neighbors, the law will have some negative effects on Hungary’s relationship with neighboring states. However, this particular law does not create new tensions, it only reinforces old ones.

From another angle, it is obvious that this law creates tensions among different Hungarian organizations in the neighboring countries as well. There were internal debates on the composition of the future evaluating commissions. Since Hungary finances these organizations and important financial resources are distributed, those who control this process can easily become dominant in a particular Hungarian political sphere. Furthermore, the acquired information is another important source of power.

In summary, the idea of such a law is, on the one hand, to express the (ethnocultural) unity of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin, and, on the other hand, to enhance the nationalizing process of the Hungarian national minorities. On a theoretical level, two aspects are important. The first is that this law establishes a relationship between the Hungarian individual and the Hungarian state. The second one is that it redefines, and re-institutionalizes the Hungarian conception of the nation.

After 1990, the Hungarian state has been financing the political, cultural, and educational institutions of Hungarians living abroad. The ‘Status Law’ adds another aspect, by creating a relationship between the Hungarian state and individuals belonging to the ethnoculturally defined Hungarian nation, which is similar to the

relationship between Hungarian citizens and the Hungarian state. However, Hungarians from neighboring countries - on the basis of the status law - will not acquire Hungarian citizenship. By defining the subjects of the law, one implicitly defines who is Hungarian. The debate focused on the conflicting conceptualizations of Hungarianness. An ‘objectivist’ definition prevailed, and the aspirants have to prove their Hungarianness with documents. The law refers only to Hungarians living in the bordering countries; therefore one may say that there is a process of institutionalization of the Hungarian nation on an ethno-territorial basis.

Starting from this ethnocultural redefinition of the nation, Hungary also plays an important role in the redefinition of the Hungarian national minorities. Hungarian national minorities in the neighboring countries are involved in nationalizing processes within the framework of their respective states. The ‘Status Law’ strengthens the symbolic boundaries of Hungary and the national minorities living in neighboring countries. The theoretical question is whether there are several parallel processes of Hungarian nation-building, or only one. The situation existing prior to the ‘Status Law’ suggests the former, while the post-‘Status Law’ situation the latter. The ‘Status Law’ binds all the members of the Hungarian ethnocultural nation (living in the neighboring states) together. In this respect, it has a decisive influence on the politics of the national minorities.

Throughout the last decade, Hungary has been supporting most of the important cultural institutions. In the future, however, it will have also a decisive role in the life-strategies of the Hungarian individuals living in the neighboring countries. Hungarian political elites and intellectuals will be even more dependent on Hungary, and Budapest is meant to become the focal point for every member of the Hungarian ethnocultural community. However, this connection is mediated by Hungarian organizations from neighboring countries, and by this mediation, that is using Hungarian financial resources, they can realize their nation-building project.26

The ‘Status Law’ cannot be understood if one does not analyze the ethnocultural definition of the Hungarian nation, and does not take into account the underlying assumptions of the Hungarian government, regarding the national minorities as nationalizing minorities. However, it is still a question whether Hungary’s politics, as an external national homeland, leads to a general Hungarian nation-building, or to separate minority nation-buildings in the neighboring states.

Romania and Slovakia expressed their concerns on the status law. Immediately after passing the law, on 21 June 2001, Romania’s Prime Minister, Adrian Nastase, requested the Venice Commission to examine the compatibility of the Act on Hungarians living in neighboring countries with the European standards and the norms and principles of contemporary public international law. As a response on 2 July 2001, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janos Martonyi, requested the Venice Commission to carry out a comparative study of the recent tendencies of the legislations in Europe concerning the preferential treatment of persons belonging to national minorities living outside the borders of their country of citizenship. At

26 The nationalizing politics of the national minority is implemented by the ethnic party that has a dual role, that is, it functions as a political party and also as a social organization. The ethnic party and the ethno-civil society is led and influenced by the minority political elite and by the intellectuals who set the goals of a particular national minority, and act as its representatives.
its plenary session of 6-7 July 2001, the Venice Commission decided to undertake a study, based on the legislation and practice of certain member States of the Council of Europe, on the preferential treatment by a State of its kin-minorities abroad.

The Venice Commission presented its report on the 22 October, 2001. The most important conclusions are:

- A State may issue acts concerning foreign citizens inasmuch as the effects of these acts are to take place within its borders.
- No quasi-official function may be assigned by a State to non-governmental associations registered in another State. Any form of certification in situ should be obtained through the consular authorities within the limits of their commonly accepted attributions. The laws or regulations in question should preferably list the exact criteria for falling within their scope of application. Associations could provide information concerning these criteria in the absence of formal supporting documents.
- An administrative document issued by the kin-State may only certify the entitlement of its bearer to the benefits provided for under the applicable laws and regulations.
- Preferential treatment may be granted to persons belonging to kin-minorities in the fields of education and culture, insofar as it pursues the legitimate aim of fostering cultural links and is proportionate to that aim.
- Preferential treatment can not be granted in fields other than education and culture, save in exceptional cases and if it is shown to pursue a legitimate aim and to be proportionate to that aim.27

The Venice Commission recognized the right of the kin-states to support its co-nationals living in other states. This is a novelty in international minority protection. However, this statement is contested, but now there is an international recommendation on this issue. It is also important that the Venice Commission stated that the kin-state may support its minorities in the field of education and culture, but prohibited other types of support, as preferential treatment in according work permits. The third important statement is that only the authorities of the kin-state may issue acts that certify the entitlement of somebody.

Rolf Ekeus, High Commissioner for National Minorities, made a statement a week after the report issued by the Venice Commission. The statement - formulated in general terms - concerns the Hungarian status law. The text of the statement highlights the divergence between the boundaries of the state and that of the nation, and recognizes the “interest in persons of the same ethnicity living abroad”:

“National and State boundaries seldom overlap; in fact there are few pure ‘nation-States’. National groups are therefore often divided by borders. It is a basic principle of international law that the State can act only within its jurisdiction which extends to its territory and citizenry. Although a State with a titular majority population may have an interest in persons of the same ethnicity living abroad, this does not

27 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), REPORT ON THE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF NATIONAL MINORITIES BY THEIR KIN-STATE adopted by the Venice Commission at its 48th Plenary Meeting, (Venice, 19-20 October 2001)
entitle or imply, in any way, a right under international law to exercise jurisdiction over these persons. At the same time it does not preclude a State from granting certain preferences within its jurisdiction, on a non-discriminatory basis. Nor does it preclude persons belonging to a national minority from maintaining unimpeded contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States with whom they share common ethnic or national origins.”

One week after the report of the Venice Commission, the Hungarian Standing Conference - taking into account the recommendations of the Venice Commission - decided on the criteria who is eligible for obtaining the Hungarian card: “Hungarian ID may be issued to persons declaring themselves Hungarian and mastering the Hungarian language respectively:

1. he/she is a member of any of the registered Hungarian organizations,
2. he/she is treated as Hungarian by any of the church registries,
3. he/she is treated as Hungarian by the country of citizenship.”

The report of the Venice Commission was interpreted differently by Romania and Hungary: both parts considered that the Venice Commission supported their point of view. Hungary’s debate has continued until December 2001, when Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán Victor and Romania’s Prime Minister Adrian Nastase signed the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries and issues of bilateral co-operation. The memorandum states:

2. All Romanian citizens, notwithstanding their ethnic origin, will enjoy the same conditions and treatment in the field of employment on the basis of a work permit on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. Work permits shall be issued under the general provisions on the authorization of employment of foreign citizens in Hungary.
3. The Romanian citizens of non-Hungarian ethnic identity shall not be granted any certificate and shall not be entitled to any benefits set forth by the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries.
4. The entire procedure of granting the certificate (receiving of applications, issue, forwarding) shall primarily take place on the territory of the Republic of Hungary in the county public administration established by the Hungarian authorities and respectively at the Office of the Ministry of Interior, and at the Hungarian diplomatic missions.
5. The Hungarian representative organizations or other entity on the territory of Romania shall not issue any recommendations concerning the ethnic origin or other criteria.

The organizations or other entities on the territory of Romania can provide with information with a legally non-binding character in the absence of for-

28 Statement by Rolf Ekeus: OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, in the Hague, 26 October 2001: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and National Minorities
mal supporting documents.

6. The administrative document that entitles to benefits, issued by the Hungarian authorities, shall be named ‘Hungarian Certificate’.

7. The certificate shall contain only the strictly necessary personal data and the entitlement to benefits (name, forename, citizenship, country of residence etc.) and shall include no reference to the ethnic origin/identity.

8. The compulsory criteria on which certificates are granted shall be the following:
   - Relevant application,
   - Free declaration of the person of belonging to the Hungarian minority in the State of citizenship, founding on his/her Hungarian ethnic identity,
   - Knowledge of the Hungarian language, or
   - The person should have declared himself/herself in the State of citizenship to have Hungarian ethnic identity, or
   - Optionally, the person should either belong to a Hungarian representative organization (notably membership of the DAHR), or be registered as ethnic Hungarian in a church.

11. On the basis of common experiences of the Parties, the Government of the Republic of Hungary shall initiate the review and the necessary amendments of the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries in six months after the signature of this Memorandum of Understanding. By the 1st of January 2002, the authorities of the Republic of Hungary shall take the necessary measures in order to implement the provisions of the present Agreement by means of norms of application and shall further on take also into account the recommendations of the Committee on national minorities which shall further on examine the questions concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries.”

The European Parliament appointed Eric Jürgens as the reporter on the Hungarian status law and other similar laws in Europe. Eric Jürgens presented the draft report on the status law in 11 June 2002. His report concludes that the status law is discriminatory, has extraterritorial implications, and recommends that Hungary should rescind the law. The Hungarian side responded by saying that Eric Jürgens did not fulfill his assignment, since he was asked to compare similar laws in Europe and not focus only on the Hungarian law. At the same time, the Hungarian side argued that Jürgens used a very one-sided approach to the concept of the nation, interpreting it only in the sense of the political nation. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe accepted Eric Jürgens’ rapport on 25 June 2003. The endorsement procedure, with respect to the report, again highlighted the issue of the nation. In the explanatory memorandum Jürgens states: “The definition of the concept ‘nation’ in the preamble to the law is too broad and could be interpreted as


non-acceptance of the state borders which divide the members of the “nation”.

Since the report fundamentally rests on the political conception of the nation, it came up with an astonishing distinction between the Hungarians and the Magyars. In the conception of the report, Hungarians are the citizens of Hungary, while the Magyars are Hungarians living abroad. All Hungarians, in Hungary as well as in the neighboring states, refer to themselves as ‘Magyar’. In the Hungarian language there is no other word to designate those who belong to the Hungarian nation. Hungarian is the term used in English. Romanians use both words: Hungarians (unguri) and Magyars (maghiari), but there is no systematic distinction between Hungarians living in Hungary and Hungarians living in Romania. In the same logic, German citizens would be Germans, while Germans living in other states, i.e. Belgium, Hungary, Romania, etc. would be Deutsch. Romanians in Romania would be Romanians and Romanians living in Hungary would be Români. Consequently, this is an absurd outcome of using - correctly, but unilaterally - the concept of political nation. An analytical approach to the issue including also the competing concept of ethnocultural nation could lead to a deeper understanding of the problem and probably could provide a solution easier.

During the debate surrounding the status law, Günter Verheugen, has written a letter to the Prime-Minister of Hungary, Péter Medgyessy, in which he also focuses on the issue of the nation: “[T]here is a feeling that the definition of the concept ‘nation’ in the preamble of the law could under certain circumstances be interpreted - thought this interpretation is not correct - as non-acceptance of the state borders which divide the members of the ‘nation’, notwithstanding the fact that Hungary ratified several multi-and bilateral instruments containing the principle of respect for territorial integrity state, in particular the basic treatise entered into force between Hungary and Romania and Slovakia.”

The letter of Günter Verheugen states that the “Hungarian nation as a whole” can be understood in such way that Hungary is striving for establishing special political links with the minorities in a neighboring state. Therefore, Verheugen recommends that the mentioned term should be replaced with more culturally oriented ones.

The electoral victory of the socialist and the liberals in Hungary in April 2002 placed the question into new light: the new government - especially because of the international critiques - decided to modify the status law. This was done in June 2003. Out of the major changes made - from the perspective of this paper - two are relevant. The first regards the usage of the nation concept. The original law defines its goals as follows: “In order to ensure that Hungarians living in neighboring countries form part of the Hungarian nation as a whole” (underlined by Z.K.) and to promote and preserve their well-being and awareness of national identity within their home country.” The modification of the law defines the goal as: “In order to ensure the well being of Hungarians living in neighboring states in their

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32 Magyars = People of Hungarian identity (i.e. citizens of the countries concerned who considers themselves as persons belonging to the Hungarian ‘national’ cultural and linguistic community)
34 ‘unitary Hungarian nation’ would have been a more proper translation.
home-state, to promote their ties to Hungary, to support their Hungarian identity and their links to the Hungarian cultural heritage as expression of their belonging to the Hungarian nation (underlined by Z.K.). The modified law refrained from using the 'Hungarian nation as a whole' terminology, and formulated it in terms of belonging to the Hungarian cultural heritage. The other modifications of the law entail entitlements. The modified law puts the emphasis on Hungarian culture, and not on Hungarian individuals. Moreover, it supports Hungarian culture specifically, and not - as intended by the framers - Hungarian individuals living in the neighboring states. However, in practice, virtually the same individuals will benefit from the law, but the underlying philosophy has changed.

Conclusion

The Hungarian status law has both domestic and international aspects. As we have seen, beside the technical and political issue, the definition of the person who is entitled to obtain the Hungarian card, the debate is on the definition of who is Hungarian. Basically two conceptions on the nation characterized the debate. The ethnocultural (ethno-territorial) conception, promoted by the conservative government, emphasizes the unity of all the Hungarians. The civic conception, promoted by the socialist and liberals, concentrates on the Hungarian citizens. The neighboring states, that also have similar preferential laws regarding their co-nationals, strongly oppose the Hungarian law. The international organizations partially accept the principle of supporting the co-nationals living in neighboring states, and implicitly accept the ethnocultural conception of the nation, while others conceive as acceptable only the political conception on the nation.

While the framers of the law conceived the law based on the ethnocultural definition of the nation, the domestic opposition and, to some extent, international organizations (represented in particular by Günther Verheugen and Eric Jürgens) emphasized the political conception of the nation. The modified law shifted from an ethnocultural to a political conception of the nation.

The Hungarian status law brought into the center of attention the politics of a number of states with regard to their national minorities and has shown that the attention accorded to kin-minorities is not unique in Europe.

Hungary’s recent proposal with regard to the inclusion of the protection of national minorities in the European constitution, hopefully, will again compel politicians to clarify concepts, as well as refrain them from employing unilateral definitions just because these serve their political interests better.
POVZETEK


Medtem kot so tvorci zakona zakon postavili na etnokulturalni definiciji naroda, podpira domača opozicija in do neke mere tudi mednarodne organizacije (ki jih predvsem predstavljata Günther Verheuger in Eric Jürgens) politični koncept naroda. Prilagojen zakon se je od etnokulturalnega premaknil do političnega koncepta naroda.

Madžarski statusni zakon je v središče pozornosti prinesel politiko številnih držav in njihov odnos do njihovih narodnih manjšin in pokazal, da pozornost do sorodnih manjšin ni edina v Evropi.

Nedaven madžarski predlog, ki se nanaša na vključevanje zaščite narodnih manjšin v evropsko ustavo, bo morda spet prisilil politike, da razčistijo koncepte, kot tudi, da jim bo pomagal opustiti vpeljevanje enostranskih definicij le zato, ker te bolje služijo njihovih političnim interesom.

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Abstract:
In the treatise history of Federal republic of Yugoslavia, one of five successor states of the former SFRY is described. Author described all the turning points in the short ten-year history of this state: its formation in 1992, all the crises during the wars in the process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, process of democratization and process of its inclusion into international community. Author also described very picturesque ethnic structure of FRY, as well as very complicated Albanian-Serbian relation, which already in the past many time determined the destiny of former Yugoslavia. Also the problem of Sandžak is described which in connection with unsolved Serb-Montenegrin relations could become a new focal point of ethnic disputes in the Balkans.

Key words:

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Introduction

In 1992, when the international community officially recognized the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia it meant the end of the former Yugoslavia. However, this was not the end of the Yugoslav crisis and drama. The tragic wars that followed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, marked the world’s history in the last decade of the 20th century. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be formally reorganized to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro based on the 14th of March 2002 agreement (however the constitutional arrangements of this Union are still to be decided), was another successor state of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that played a key role in the tragic developments of the 1990s. This country, internationally isolated during the regime of Slobodan Milošević, was welcomed into the international community again at the end of 2000 when democratic changes took place there.

After Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared independence, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) once and for all felt apart. In addition to the above-mentioned new states on the ruins of the SFRY, another new state came into being: Savezna republika Jugoslavija (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - FRY). The former Socialist Republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves the FRY in April 1992.

The FRY proclaimed itself the legal successor of the SFRY - a status similar to that of the Russian Federation after 1990. The difference was, however, that this status was not recognized by the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia as the successor states of the former Soviet Union recognized the Russian Federation.

The FRY was divided into two administrative units, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro. We have to remind the reader that, because of a complicated ethnic structure and in order to give certain rights to ethnic minorities, until the end of the 1980s there were two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo), which had to give up their autonomy during the period of 1988 and 1989 to the alter of Milošević’s Great Serbian interests.

This article briefly presents the survey of the history of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the last decade of twentieth century and at the beginning of the third millennium. The article is written on the basis of secondary sources (mostly contemporary newspapers reports), however the author believes that also when in fifty-years the archival records will be open for research the picture of the events shall not change significantly. Also American and British historians and political scientists have written dozens of books and hundreds of articles on the basis of available sources. The author used the results of the most relevant of them to write this article. Also Memoirs, especially those written by key personalities are important.

Ethnic Composition of the Territories of FRY before the Dissolution of SFRY

The territory of FRY is around 39,451.4 square miles (102,173 square kilometers; 40% of the territory of the former SFRY). According to the Census of 1991, 10.4 million people lived in this territory. There were two constitutive nations living in the

FRY: Serbs, who, with 62.3%, comprised an absolute majority of all the people of the FRY, and Montenegrins, with only 5% of all the people of the FRY. Minorities comprised a substantial part of all inhabitants, most notably Albanians, at 16.6%; Hungarians, 3.3%; and Muslims, 3.1%.¹

The vast majority of ethnic minorities lived in the territories of the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Both of them were formally inside Serbia; after 1974 they had, in accordance with the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, quite substantial responsibilities inside the Yugoslav Federation. Therefore their development differed considerably from the development of so-called Serbia Proper. Thus we are going to deal separately with the ethnic composition of the populations of Serbia Proper, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro.

When we deal with the ethnic make-up of Yugoslavia, we have to remind the reader that the exact numbers of each of the ethnic groups within the federation could not be ascertained, first, due to the different criteria established for the Muslim population, and second, because of the introduction in 1961 of the census categories 'Yugoslavs' and 'other, nationality undefined'. We cannot help but put a question mark on the reality of the ethnic statistics in the Yugoslav census. Substantial differences exist in numbers and percentages between the censuses, especially for specific ethnic groups like Muslims, Vlachs, or Romans. Those differences could be explained by falsification of census data for certain (usually political) needs.²

SERBIA PROPER

For the region of Serbia Proper (Republic of Serbia without Vojvodina and Kosovo), we have to note a substantial decrease in the percentage of the majority Serb population, mostly on account of the fast rise in numbers and percentages of Muslims, Albanians, Gypsies and (after 1961) 'Yugoslavs'.

**Table 1:** Changes in the ethnic composition of Serbia Proper during 1961-1991.

<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srbija</td>
<td>4,459,953</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>4,699,415</td>
<td>89.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>83,811</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>124,482</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>32,853</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>57,289</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>19,956</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>25,100</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hrvati</td>
<td>43,817</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>38,088</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>51,173</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>65,907</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciparci</td>
<td>3,312</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>27,541</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarci</td>
<td>54,391</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>49,791</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlachs</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14,653</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostali</td>
<td>58,538</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>42,006</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jugoslavci</td>
<td>11,699</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>75,976</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neznanje</td>
<td>2,911</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>30,517</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,823,274</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5,250,365</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:** 1) In the earlier censuses this category was named in different ways. In 1948: Undecided Muslims; in 1953: Yugoslavs undecided; in 1961: Muslims as an ethnic group; in 1971, 1981 and 1991: Muslims as a people. 2) This includes the census categories: "Did not declare themselves under Article 170 of the Constitution of the SFRY," "Declared a regional identity;" "Declared no nationality" and "Unknown."


The reasons for that development are threefold. First, we have to mention the questionability of Yugoslav statistics, especially when dealing with Muslims, Gypsies and Vlachs. A second reason is the low natural increase of the Serbian population, in contrast with the high natural increase of some minority groups, like Albanians, Muslims, Gypsies and Vlachs. The third reason for the changes in the

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3 Petričević, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije ..., pp. 145-149.
nationality structure of Serbia Proper is mass migrations in and out. Serbia Proper represented a magnet for immigration of Serbs from the other regions of the former Yugoslavia; on the other hand, numerous Serbs emigrated for economic reasons or because they found employment in the administration and army in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.5

All the above-mentioned reasons affected the specific ethnic composition in the central and eastern Serbia Proper regions, where an ethnically homogeneous Serb population prevailed, as well as the southern and eastern regions of Serbia Proper, where there was an ethnically mixed population. Significantly ethnically mixed regions in Serbia Proper were Sandžak (a border region of Montenegro), with many Muslims, and the region on the border with Kosovo (Bujanovac, Medvedja, Kreševac), with a large number of Albanians.

Since World War II ethnic relations in Serbia Proper showed numerous problems (unsettled relations with Albanians of Kosovo and Muslims from Sandžak), which the authorities did not deal with promptly or dealt with ineffectively. Thus, interethnic conflicts developed within Serbia Proper; from the 1980s onward, differences provoked many armed conflicts and at the end led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

**VOJVODINA**

In the past, and still today Vojvodina represented, one of the ethnically most mixed regions in Europe. Because of low natural increase, the main role in changes of ethnic composition of the population has been played by migrations. Censuses show that the ethnic structure of Vojvodina after World War II changed slowly but surely, with decreases in the number of Hungarians, Croats and most of the other ethnic minorities; while at the same time the number of Montenegrins, Serbs, ‘Yugoslavs’ and Gypsies significantly increased.6

Individual minorities mostly concentrated in certain narrow regions. Most of the Hungarians live in northern Bačka; Romanians, in southern Banat; Slovaks, in some smaller regions in central Banat and Bačka; Ruthenians, in a smaller region in central Bačka. Croats live in the northern region of Bačka (since the 17th century) and some regions of Srijem. Large Croatian communities live also in Novi Sad and in central Bačka (near Kula and Vrbas).

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Table 2: Changes in the ethnic composition of Vojvodina during 1961-1991.

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<thead>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERBS</td>
<td>1,017,717</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>1,089,132</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>1,107,378</td>
<td>54.4</td>
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<td>HUNGARIANS</td>
<td>442,561</td>
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<td>423,866</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>385,556</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>340,945</td>
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<td>CROATS</td>
<td>145,541</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>138,561</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>109,203</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>74,226</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>SLOVAKS</td>
<td>73,830</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>72,795</td>
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<td>69,540</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>65,941</td>
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<td>ROMANIANS</td>
<td>57,259</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>52,987</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>57,289</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>38,832</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTENEGRINS</td>
<td>34,782</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>36,416</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>43,504</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>44,721</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GYPSIES</td>
<td>3,312</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7,790</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>19,693</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>24,895</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUTHENIANS</td>
<td>24,548</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>20,109</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>19,305</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>17,887</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>MACEDONIANS</td>
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<td>16,527</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18,897</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>16,641</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>34,811</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>34,811</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>39,592</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>35,020</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘YUGOSLAVS’</td>
<td>3,174</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>46,928</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>167,215</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>168,859</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>12,621</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>8,191</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5,197</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,854,965</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,952,533</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,054,772</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,012,517</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS: 1) This includes the census categories “Did not declare themselves under Article 170 of the Constitution of the SFRY,” “Declared a regional identity,” “Declared no nationality” and “Unknown.”


This development in ethnic populations had already provoked the development of two blocs of ethnic groups in the 1970s. One consisted of Serbs, Montenegrins and ‘Yugoslavs’; the other, Hungarians, Croats and members of the other numerous minorities. It is interesting to note that until the mid-1980s both groups demanded from Belgrade as wide autonomy as possible.7 The situation changed significantly from the mid-1980s onward, when Serbs, Montenegrins and ‘Yugoslavs’ of Vojvodina became among the main speakers in favor of Great Serbian nationalism. Vojvodina attracted immigrants from wealthy strata of the Serbian population of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. All these new immigrants deepened the gap between old settlers (mostly non-Serbs) and immigrants.8

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7 Petričević, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije ..., p. 130.
**KOSOVO**

The main characteristics of the demographic development of Kosovo during the past decades were the high natural increase of Albanians, which was, with 28.3%, the highest in Europe, and the mass emigrations of Serbs and Montenegrins as well as Albanians. The migration balance of Kosovo was negative to all Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces with the exception of Montenegro, where most of the Serbs in Kosovo went. Many Albanians from Kosovo left for Macedonia, where they settled in larger Macedonian towns. Albanians from Montenegro migrated also into Kosovo. More Albanians from Montenegro emigrated into Kosovo than Montenegrins from Kosovo migrated into Montenegro. Those migrations would be insignificant if they had not helped decrease the number and percentage of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo.9

We should also mention the increase in number and percentage of Muslims and Gypsies and the decrease in number and percentage of Turks,10 which is due to the above-mentioned problems of the Yugoslav census.

*Table 3: Changes in the ethnic composition of Kosovo during 1961-1991.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALBANIANS</strong></td>
<td>646,05</td>
<td>916,168</td>
<td>1,226,716</td>
<td>1,607,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SERBS</strong></td>
<td>227,016</td>
<td>228,264</td>
<td>209,490</td>
<td>195,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MUSLIMS</strong> 1)</td>
<td>8,026</td>
<td>26,557</td>
<td>58,502</td>
<td>57,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GYPSIES</strong></td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>14,593</td>
<td>34,126</td>
<td>42,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MONTENEGRINS</strong></td>
<td>37,588</td>
<td>31,555</td>
<td>27,028</td>
<td>20,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TURKS</strong></td>
<td>25,763</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>12,513</td>
<td>10,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHERS</strong></td>
<td>10,298</td>
<td>11,561</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>8,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“YUGOSLAVS”</strong></td>
<td>5,206</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>2,676</td>
<td>3,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNKNOWN</strong> 2)</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>2,031</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>9,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>963,988</td>
<td>1,243,693</td>
<td>1,584,441</td>
<td>1,954,747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS:** 1) In the earlier censuses this category was named in different ways. In 1948: *Undecided Muslims*; in 1953: *Yugoslavs undecided*; in 1961: *Muslims* as an ethnic group; in 1971, 1981 and 1991: *Muslims* as a people. 2) This includes the census categories “Did not declare themselves under Article 170 of the Constitution of the SFRY,” “Declared a regional identity,” “Declared no nationality.”

9 Žuljić, Narodnosna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena ..., pp. 100-102; Petričević, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije ..., pp. 164-166.

and "Unknown."


Due to the fast decrease in number and percentage of the Serb and Montenegrin populations of Kosovo, and, as mentioned above, due to the high natural increase of Albanians, the percentage of Albanians increased by 15% (from 67.2% in 1961 to 82.2% in 1991). By 1991 Albanians had an absolute majority in all the regions, with the exception of those in the most northern parts of Kosovo (formerly Leposavić commune). The Serb population had been living in smaller or larger groups in all the communes until the crisis of 1998. The larger groups of Montenegrins lived in Peć, Priština, Djakovica and Istok, while in the region of Lipljan and Vitina a few thousand Croats lived.11

This was the situation until 1998, when the crisis in Kosovo led to new migrations and changes in ethnic composition, for which the data are not available yet. In spite of the efforts of the international community, the number of the Serbs and Montenegrins continue to decrease into the 2000s.

MONTENEGRO

This smallest Yugoslav republic was a region where all the problems of ‘national politics’ of the former Yugoslavia were demonstrated. Montenegro had only one-third the population of Kosovo. Montenegrins as South Slavs had their own republic, while Kosovo remained an autonomous province inside of Serbia. In spite of their population size, the Albanians remained a national minority in status.12

With regard to Muslims in Montenegro, there were officially only 387 Muslims in Montenegro in 1948. Of course it was a question of census manipulations, similar to what was done in Sandžak. The number of Muslims in Montenegro ‘increased’ significantly after 1961 and that mostly on the account of Montenegrins, i.e., former Montenegrins declared themselves Muslims. During the mentioned period the number of Albanians also increased, especially in the bordering regions with Albania and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. It is interesting to note also the decrease in the Croatian and Serbian population, which mostly was due to the large increase of ‘Yugoslavs’.13

In 1991 Montenegrins represented less then two-thirds of the population in their own republic. If a referendum is organized on independence of Montenegro in the future, it will be minorities who decide on the destiny of this republic.

11 Žuljić, Narodnosna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena ..., pp. 102-104.
12 Petričević, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije ..., p. 136.
### Table 4: Changes in the ethnic composition of Montenegro during 1961-1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961 Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1971 Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1981 Count</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1991 Count</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>383,988</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>355,632</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>400,488</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>380,484</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>30,665</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>70,256</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>78,880</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>89,932</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>25,803</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>35,671</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>37,735</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>40,880</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>14,087</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>39,512</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>19,407</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>57,176</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>10,664</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>9,192</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6,904</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6,249</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4,953</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3,508</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4,212</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>10,943</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>31,243</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>25,854</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4,910</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>6,241</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>14,692</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>471,893</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>529,604</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>584,310</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>615,267</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The changes in number and percentage of individual nations in the ethnic composition of Montenegro were influenced by large immigration from the different regions of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. At the same time Montenegrins kept emigrating from this republic. Because of the above-mentioned changes in the population of Montenegro, the question of the minority rights of Albanians and even Croats surfaced very early.

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14 Žuljić, Narodnosna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena ..., pp. 56-60.
Map 2: **Population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia** (settlements according to the regions of majority or plurality ethno-nations)


Key: 
- International boundaries after 1991/92
- Yugoslav-Montenegrin republic boundaries
- Boundaries of the former autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina
- Communal boundaries

*Legend:* 
- Serbs
- Croats
- Macedonians
- Montenegrins
- Albanians
- Hungarians
- Yugoslavs
- Romanians
- Ruthenians
- Bulgarians
- Slovaks
- Gypsies/Roma
- Slovenes

On June 28th, 1989, when Slobodan Milošević at Gazimestan, on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, for the first time mentioned “a possibility of armed battle in the near future,” he did not speak without reason. He was aware of the fact that it would be extremely difficult to realize a Yugoslavia in which Serbia and Serbs would have a leading role, at least in part because Albanians, Slovenes and Croats were against it. That the vision of ‘Serboslavia’ would be difficult to realize could be predicted also by the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which occurred during the 14th Congress of the LCY (January 20th-26th, 1990) after the Slovene and Croat delegates left the congress.

In spite of the debacle of his ideas at the party congress, Milošević did not give up his plans, and continued to strengthen his own position in Serbia. In the middle of July 1990 he changed the name of League of Communists of Serbia to Socialist Party of Serbia [Socialistička partija Srbije - SPS]. He retained for himself both the presidency of the Republic of Serbia and the presidency of SPS. He gathered even more power in his hands when the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was passed in the Serbian parliament on September 28, 1990. This new constitution considered Milošević as president of the Republic of Serbia and as supreme commander of its armed forces and gave him the right to name the president of the Serbian government.

The new constitution still defined the relations between Serbia and the federation; it was written, however, for Great Serbia. Among other things, it proclaimed the right of the Republic of Serbia to take care of the interests of the Serbs who were living outside Serbia. In other words, Serbia would claim its historic and ethnic regions if the Yugoslav federation changed its nature into a confederation or dissolved. The Serbs were interested in protecting their own ethnic minorities outside Serbia, but at the same time would not give the same rights to their own minorities within the Republic of Serbia. The new Serbian constitution did not give any protection to the Albanians of Kosovo. Their already unsecured position worsened after mid-May 1990, after Serbia took over direct control over Kosovo. It worsened further after July 5th, when the parliament of Kosovo and the provincial government of Kosovo dissolved themselves under pressure of the Serbs, and printing in the Albanian language was prohibited. At the same time 15,000 ethnic Albanians lost their jobs, as they had to give up all the leading positions in politics, culture, science, education and the state-run economy; the Serbian government
gave those jobs to the ethnic Serbs, which again provoked mass protests of the Albanian population.19

Fired delegates to the Albanian parliament met secretly in Kačanik on September 7, 1990, and proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation. With the so-called Kačanik Constitution, they proclaimed independence of the Republic of Kosovo as “a democratic state of Albanian people and of members of other nations and national minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats, Turks, Romanians and others living in Kosovo.”20 Of course Serbs did not recognize the Kačanik Constitution and reacted with arrests of members of the provincial parliament, who were accused of sapping state unity. The authorities also fired another 45,000 ethnic Albanians from their jobs in state-run enterprises.21 This time Albanians did not react with mass demonstrations; a period of ‘passive resistance’ [pasivni otpor] began. It lasted through 1997.

Observing the principle of Great Serbia, elections were held. Milošević still left open the question of whether this New Yugoslavia would be formed within or outside of the SFRY. In two election rounds on the 9th and 23rd of December, 1990, the population of Serbia voted unconditionally for SPS; while in Montenegro the Communist Party won. Slobodan Milošević and Momir Bulatović were elected president of Serbia and Montenegro respectively.22 These election results did not surprise because most of the Serbs in reality supported Milošević’s policy, and he also tried to convince the rest of the people of Serbia. At the last moment - after third parties threatened to boycott the elections - he allowed the opposition to introduce their candidates in the media and to participate in the counting of the election votes. He also gave the people of Serbia a raise in their salaries and pensions. The money was not available for that, however, so, without letting the federal authorities know, he ordered the printing of 18 billion dinars ($1.8 billion US). The result was hyperinflation in the whole of then Yugoslavia. With the help of these measures and an election law that also helped gain deputies for SPS,23 Milošević succeeded in winning 194 of the 250 seats in the Serbian parliament and the presidency of Serbia. He received 65% of the presidential votes.24

The 1990 elections in Serbia brought a severe defeat for the opposition parties, especially for Vuk Drašković’s Serbian Movement for Renewal [Srpski pokret obnove - SPO] and Šešelj’s Serb Radical Party [Srpska radikalna stranka - SRS], which at the beginning of the election campaign were almost equal to Milošević’s SPS.25 The Albanians of Kosovo boycotted the elections. Yugoslav Minister of Defense Veljko

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19 Kosovski kalendar [The Time Table of Kosovo], Vreme International 6, May 1, 1995, pp. 5-9.
25 Lampe, Yugoslavia as Histoy. Twice there was a country ..., pp. 353-354.
Kadijević welcomed the results of the elections, because JNA had its own plans. According to these plans, Yugoslavia would be saved by the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (Savez komunista-Pokret za Jugoslaviju as the LC inside JNA was named in November 1990). In spite of the fact that this organization, which had plans to become a leading force in the Republic, got only a few percent of the votes, its influence in the political life of Serbia was very large nevertheless because of the support that Mira Marković, the wife of Slobodan Milošević, gave to it.26

In spite of all this, not everyone was happy with Milošević's adventuristic and radical policy of “protector of the Serb nation.” Under the leadership of Vuk Drašković, at the beginning of March 1991 the opposition parties organized mass demonstrations in Belgrade against the 'red mafia'. The demonstrators, joined by students, were attacked by police forces; two students and one policeman were killed. Approximately 90 people were wounded. Because the authorities were not able to calm down the demonstrators, the army with its tanks was sent into the streets.27 The army officers even tried to introduce extraordinary measures for the whole of Yugoslavia, because they to thought that these would result in calming down and taking control over Slovenia and Croatia also. They did not succeed in proclaiming extraordinary measures in Yugoslavia, because they did not get enough votes for that in the presidency of Yugoslavia.28

After the March students’ demonstrations and strikes in Serbian textile and metallurgical industries, Milošević went on to fire up nationalist passions among Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the first armed clashes took place, in which JNA was also involved. In Belgrade during that period, Milošević, together with Šešelj and Drašković, loudly proclaimed hatred. His followers were singing: “Slobodane, pripremi salate, bit će mesa, klat čemo Hrvate.” [Slobodan, get the salad ready, there shall be meat, we are going to slaughter Croats].29

The chaos in which SFRY found itself started to clear. After the ‘ten-day war’ for Slovenia, it became clear that the SFRY was dead; and the Serbs started to create Great Serbia. This led to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia became independent states, while Serbia and Montenegro were united in the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.


The first ideas on unification of Serbia and Montenegro into a new federal state came to fruition after Slovenia and Croatia became independent states. Already during the winter of 1991–92, federal bodies of what remained from rump Yugoslavia began to create documents for the establishment of the third Yugoslavia, which was

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26 Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., p. 159.
28 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 141.
set up by the end of April 1992. It came into being under the name of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{30}

This state became a country where Slobodan Milošević and Serbia had a leading role. The FRY experienced severe economic and social problems from the very beginning. Its formal legal international status was questionable after it did not ask for international recognition until December 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1991, as demanded by the European Union. The FRY declared itself a legal successor to the SFRY. The newly established states and the international community opposed this status. Because the FRY was involved in the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community took the legal position, expressed in decisions of the Badinter Commission, that all successor states that came into being in the territories of the former SFRY were equal successors of SFRY. Because of involvement of the FRY in the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the question of succession of the former Yugoslavia came to the fore again. The international community did not succeed in reaching an agreement with Slobodan Milošević on a cease-fire, which should have been a condition for a search for a solution to other open questions. The UN introduced economic sanctions against the FRY with Resolution no. 757/1992, which isolated the FRY from the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{31}

The 'third Yugoslavia' soon got new political leadership. During the period when the whole world was accusing Milošević of being guilty of carrying on the war in the region of the former Yugoslavia, he did not want to provoke the international community any further. Instead he installed his people in the highest positions. The first president of the FRY was the "spiritual father of the Serbs," Dobrica Ćosić; while an American businessman of Serb descent, Milan Panić, became the new president of the federal government. Panić was a surprise for everyone. Milošević had chosen him because he thought he would be the right man to help to fight the international isolation of FRY, and the U.S. Government counted on Panić to find a solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. So the State Department gave permission for Panić to head the government of the FRY, although it had not given a similar permission for the former governor of Minnesota, Rudolph G. Perpich, to become foreign minister of Croatia. A similar destiny as for Panić, who did not finish his term in office, followed in summer 1993 for the president of the FRY, Dobrica Ćosić. Zoran Lilić, who followed him, obeyed Milošević's orders until the end of his term in office.\textsuperscript{32}

In spite of the fact that legally the decision-makers in FRY were federal office-holders (like the president of FRY, president of the federal government and the federal parliament), in reality the greatest role in decision making was played by the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. Milošević kept denying this role in his defense in front of The Hague tribunal (in February 2002). He kept saying that he only executed what these organs were ordering him to do. In spite of this, he played a major role in the peace making process, because international peace makers on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (like Richard Holbrooke, former Secretary of

\textsuperscript{30} Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., p. 165.
\textsuperscript{31} Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., pp. 251, 289-294.
\textsuperscript{32} Silber and Little, Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation ..., pp. 258-263.
State Cyrus Vance, and former British Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington) were aware of the fact of his great influence. All the above-mentioned put pressure on Milošević, who, on the other hand, still followed the plans of the Serbian people for Greater Serbia.

The international sanctions, which were destroying the economy of the FRY and were bringing the Serbian people in the FRY to the lowest level of poverty that these people had ever experienced during the 20th century, started to threaten the position of Milošević. During the parliamentary elections in Serbia, many prominent intellectuals who at first had supported his Serbian national program began to criticize Milošević. Later he was deserted even by the Serbian Orthodox Church, which during the course of history as a rule has supported Serb national leaders. Now it supported the idea of the return of the Karadjordjević dynasty to the throne of Serbia, urging that Aleksandar, the son of the last king of Yugoslavia, Peter II Karadjordjević, should become King of Yugoslavia.

Milan Panić, the greatest opponent of Slobodan Milošević, became president of the federal government. He supported the attempts of the international community to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis at the Conference in London held in the second half of 1992. This especially angered the followers of Slobodan Milošević’s SPS and Vojislav Šešelj’s Serb Radical Party, who tried to get rid of Panić as soon as possible, before he and the united opposition [Demokratski pokret Srbije - DEPOS] could play an important role in the nearing elections.

The elections for federal and both republican parliaments and election for president of Serbia on December 20th, 1992, showed the strength of Milošević’s regime, which was based on control of the media. With the help of manipulating the elections, Milošević won a second term as president of Serbia with 56 % of the votes; while his opponent, Milan Panić, received 34 % of the popular vote. Milošević’s SPS became the largest party in the federal and Serbian parliaments. Milan Panić had to resign as president of the federal government only a few days after the elections. Radoje Kontić from Montenegro became the new Yugoslav prime minister. Although Milan Panić declared that he would continue to fight for democracy after he lost the vote of confidence in the federal parliament, he returned to the USA in March 1993 to continue his business career.

Although Milošević’s SPS won an absolute majority in the Serb parliamentary elections, other Serb nationalistic and democratic parties were emerging. While during the first Serb elections it was possible to suppress opposition with a blockade of the media, they could not do the same during the second election because of the bad social and economic position of Yugoslavia caused by the economic sanctions, which had started to work.

FRY paid a high price for its involvement in the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The value of industrial output in Yugoslavia one year after economic sanctions were introduced fell to 20% of that of the year before. At the same time the unemployment rate increased to 50% in 1993. The leadership of FRY tried to

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33 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 361.
34 Slobodan Dukić and Branko Jokić, Popolna zmaga komunistov [Complete victory for communists], Delo, December 28, 1992, p. 5.
35 Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., p. 171.
pay for the expenses of the war by printing money without backing. In doing so, FRY set a world record with an inflation rate that reached 13 million percent a year. The inflation rate in FRY then even exceeded that in Weimar Germany during the years before World War II. The breakdown of the Yugoslav economy brought many people to poverty and, of course, made a new elite of war profiteers. While the society criminalized, tens of thousands of intellectuals left the country. They fled mobilization or they were looking for better economic life conditions.\textsuperscript{36}

Under these circumstances Milošević did not have any other choice but to support a peace plan as proposed by a Contact Group of high representatives of the U.K., Russia, France, Germany and the USA. He hoped that the international community would cease sanctions because of his support of the Contact Group’s plan. In August 1994 Milošević finally stopped his direct support of Radovan Karadžić and agreed to participate in the negotiations at Dayton, which put a stop to the first phase of the bloody battles in the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{37} After many unsuccessful attempts to find a durable solution for peace in the region of former Yugoslavia, Milošević’s cooperation became, in the eyes of the West, the most promising hope to reach peace and stability in this region. After the Dayton Agreement was signed, the idea of Great Serbia became history. In Serbian history the leaders under whom such ideas emerged had lost power, but Milošević stayed in power for another six years.

Kosovo - the Durable Serb Problem

After the Dayton Agreement was signed, it became clear that Milošević would try sooner or later to finally solve the question of Kosovo by introducing Serb rule there. Kosovo, which was part of the first Serbian state, Raška, and was considered to be a ‘holy place’ for the Serbian people because of the battle that took place there in 1389, ought to become Serbian again, he declared. Thus, the Serbian government tried to direct the flow of Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kosovo. In January 1995, the Serbian government even proclaimed an edict on settlement of 100,000 Serbs in Kosovo, which caused new tensions in this uneasy province.\textsuperscript{38} In spite of the fact that the Albanians of Kosovo did not react to Serb pressures with mass demonstrations, they continued with their so-called passive resistance, and the army even took the tanks off the streets.

Very few people believed in the possibility of a peaceful solution of the question of Kosovo. The greatest optimist was Ibrahim Rugova, the president of the largest party of Kosovo Albanians, the Democratic League of Kosovo [\textit{Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës} - LDK]. There was a great gap between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo; especially because soon after Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, Kosovo Albanians started to construct a parallel state there. As early as September 22, 1991, the Kosovo Albanian leadership introduced a \textit{Declaration on Independ-
ence and Sovereignty of Kosovo. During September 26-30, 1991, a secret referendum took place in which more than 87% of the eligible voters of Kosovo participated; 99.87% of them chose sovereignty and independence for Kosovo. Only 164 voters were against, and 933 ballots were declared invalid.

On the basis of the results of this referendum and the amended Kačanik Constitution, the Kosovo parliament (that is, the Albanian members of the provincial parliament that was dissolved in July 1990) declared the independence of the ‘Republic of Kosovo’ on October 19th, 1991, and named Dr. Bujari Bukoshi as president of the government. The Serbian state did not recognize the results of the referendum. Kosovo Albanians held parliamentary and presidential elections on May 24th, 1992. LDK got 76.4% of the votes and had an absolute majority in the 130-member parliament, with 96 deputies. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova got 99.5% of the votes for president of Kosovo. Therefore Kosovo Albanians in mid-1992 organized a parallel state that operated relatively successfully in education at all levels and a private economy - this in spite of the fact that in all vital segments (the economy, financial structure, etc.) it did not have anything to do with the official FRY. It all deepened the differences between the Serbs and Albanians.

Because the Serbs and the Albanians were aware of how serious the situation was, they made some attempts to find a peaceful solution. In May 1992 the then president of the Serbian government, Radovan Božović, invited all the political parties of Kosovo to talks about a solution to all the problems. From this period three versions of some proposals to divide Kosovo into Serbian and Albanian parts are known. Let us remind the reader that 1.7 million Albanians, 190,000 Serbs and 110,000 people of other ethnic groups lived in Kosovo. President of the FRY Dobrica Ćosić proposed a solution, according to which 40% of Kosovo’s territory would become part of Serbia. Also, Priština and Kosovska Mitrovica, the two largest cities of Kosovo, and all the mines including Trepča (zinc, lead, silver and gold) would become part of Serbia. Eight hundred thousand Albanians living in the ‘Serbian’ part would have to emigrate in a ‘peaceful’ ethnic cleansing.

The second proposed solution was the Albanian version, which suggested that 10% of Kosovo’s territory would be ceded to Serbia, while the communes of Preševo and Bujanovac, which were part of Serbia Proper from 1945, would again became part of Kosovo. Those communes are 70% Albanian. Albanians offered ethnic minority rights to 150,000 Serbs who live in major cities of Kosovo (Priština, Mitrovica and Gnjilane). Albanians also promised Serbs nationality rights in the Kačanik Constitution of September 1990, according to which the Serbs of Kosovo were a ‘nation’ and not only a national minority with which Albanization of Kosovo could have been prevented. Serbia would receive territories in northern Kosovo.

The third version offered to the Serbs 20% of Kosovo’s territory. Serbia would get mines in the north (Trepča), Serb monasteries and the electricity plant of Obilić and the Patriarchy in Peć in the west. The main towns, Priština, Mitrovica, Gnjilane

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39 Ibid., pp. 251-252.
41 Kosovski kalendar [The Time Table of Kosovo], Vreme International vol. 6, no. 236 (May 1, 1995), pp. 5-9.
and Peć, were on the border of this new Kosovo.

According to the statement of German Ambassador to FRY Gerth Aarens, who at the Geneva Convention on Yugoslavia presided over a group responsible for national minorities, Slobodan Milošević also agreed to the proposal in the third version.42

Later they continued to deal with Kosovo at numerous meetings, and suggestions of a solution to the Kosovo problem came from the FRY as well as from outside the country.43 These interested parties suggested different solutions: autonomy (which would not be less than that already gained in the constitutional arrangements of 1974), independence of Kosovo, Kosovo as part of Albania, division of Kosovo (the above-mentioned versions), an international protectorate, etc.44 The most sensible solution would be to give the Albanians of Kosovo the right to govern Kosovo, which would remain part of Serbia. It appeared that both extremes (Albanian independence of Kosovo and Serbian dictatorship in Kosovo) had been defeated,45 especially after Milošević and Rugova signed an agreement on September 2, 1996, to normalize the education system in Kosovo, so that the Albanian educational system in Kosovo would become a part of the state system of Serbia.

In spite of all these initiatives, the gap between Albanians and Serbs became deeper and deeper, and more and more it became impossible to find a solution to the problem. Albanians patronized their own school system at all levels of education in spite of the above-mentioned Milošević-Rugova agreement. Albanians also maintained their own parallel administration in a province. Serbs, who lived in real ‘ghettos’, felt even more compelled to emigrate. The Serb authorities in Belgrade prohibited any real estate commerce between members of Serb and Albanian ethnic groups. If an Albanian bought any real estate from a Serb, he would be convicted and imprisoned for sixty days, even if the Serb would sell his property voluntarily. Kosovo, which was under special administration, was facing brutal police repression. On the other hand, numerous murders and bomb attacks for which the Liberation Army of Kosovo [Ushtira Clirimtare e Kosovës - UCK] took responsibility also occurred.46

During the sharpening of tensions in Kosovo, important political changes also took place in the FRY. In spite of the fact that the United List of the leftist parties - SPS of Slobodan Milošević, Yugoslav Left [Jugoslavenska levica - JUL] of Milošević’s wife, Mira Marković, and New Democracy [Nova Demokratija] - won 46% of the popular vote;47 a coalition of opposition parties - 'Together' [Zajedno] was the winner of the local elections, achieving majorities in the thirteen largest Serbian cities. Slobodan Milošević wanted to prevent a member of the opposition from becoming

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42 Blerim Shala, Risanje zemljevidov [Painting of the Maps], Mladina 3 (January 26, 1993), p. 32.
44 Zoran Lutovac, Sve kosovske opcije [All the Options for Kosovo], Vreme, May 10, 1997, pp. 18-21.
45 Dragan Veslinov, Poraz dve ekstremne politike [Defeat of the two extreme politics], Nedeljna Naša borba, September 21-22, 1996, p. IV.
the new mayor of the capital city of Belgrade; and with the help of the judges of the Belgrade municipal court, who were faithful to him, he nullified the results of these elections in the city of Belgrade, which caused demonstrations of the followers of the opposition. After three months of mass protests, at which, according to some reports, from 300,000 to a million people gathered in daily demonstrations, Milošević recognized the results of the elections and the victory of the opposition in February 1997. For the first time in the post-World War II history of Yugoslavia, Belgrade got a non-communist mayor, Zoran Djindjić. The victory of the Zajedno coalition at the local elections and the mass demonstrations that followed did not prevent Milošević from gaining even more power. Since he could not be reelected president of Serbia (the Serbian constitution allowed only two consecutive mandates), he got himself elected president of the FRY by the federal parliament.48 The election of Milošević as president of the FRY and mass arrests of Albanians for membership in UCK already were predicting the next developments in Kosovo...

The international situation exacerbated the problems in Kosovo. Internal difficulties in Albania, which experienced financial collapse, did not help to pacify conditions in Kosovo. That was the situation in the minds of Kosovo Serbs and Albanians when the Kosovo crisis started to erupt.

Kosovo Crisis

Due to extremely bad economic conditions in the FRY as a whole, the relations among the Serbs of Kosovo, Serb authorities in Kosovo and the Serb state on the one hand and the Albanian population in Kosovo on the other started to deteriorate even further. Ibrahim Rugova could not find a common language with the Serb authorities. Young Albanians (70% of the Albanians of Kosovo were younger than 30 years of age) were unhappy with Rugova’s willingness to search for compromise. Younger people, who did not have any opportunity for employment or any other perspective, were willing to follow the leaders, who demanded actions against Serbian violence. Adem Demaçi, who spent over 27 years in Yugoslav jails and was named “the Kosovo Mandela,” gained popularity. The main opponent of Rugova’s search for a peaceful solution, Demaçi demanded that OVK act, which soon led to the first fights. In the Klina and Drenica region these developed into a real war at the beginning of 1998.49

Escalating of armed conflicts in Kosovo caused new headaches to the international community, because the international leaders were afraid that widening of the conflict could endanger the process of fulfillment of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the Contact Group accepted a special plan on March 9th, 1998, in London, in which they demanded from Milošević the retreat of special forces from Kosovo, international research on the causes of the bloody events and the beginning of dialogue with the Kosovo Albanians. The EU also got actively involved in negotiations between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders}

48 Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., pp. 175-175.
and wanted to open an EU diplomatic mission in Priština to observe the events in the province.50

In spite of all the attempts, the international community did not succeed in opening a dialogue between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leadership. The fights continued, and Milošević opposed all the attempts of the international community to observe the events in Kosovo. In April 23rd, 1998, he even organized a referendum in which 75% of the eligible voters participated; and 94.73% voted against allowing foreign observers to come to Kosovo.51

Six days later, the international community agreed to new sanctions against the FRY. In July, Kosovo Albanians formed a secret parliament; during the summer of 1998, Serb forces were cleansing Kosovo of UCK troops. On September 24th, NATO gave Milošević an ultimatum, to stop the violence in Kosovo or face air strikes. In October, Richard Holbrooke suggested giving Milošević some time to stop the offensive against the Kosovo Albanians. The UN Security Council demanded that observers be allowed to go to Kosovo to stop the violence. At the same time Serbian troops started to retreat.52

After many months of attempts, the Contact Group finally gathered both sides in Rambouillet Castle near Paris. The Contact Group wanted ‘extensive autonomy’ for Kosovo short of outright independence, free movement for all international personell under the auspices of the UNHCR, the suspension of federal authority in matters injurious or discriminatory to the Kosovo Albanians, and the stationing of NATO troops in the province. After days of negotiations, on February 23rd, 1999, representatives of the Kosovo Albanians conditionally accepted a draft of the Rambouillet Agreement on the future status of Kosovo; Serbian representatives however did not accept it and labeled it as an attack on the sovereignty of their state.53 The Rambouillet Agreement offered a plan for wide autonomy for Kosovo and demanded an immediate ceasefire. The sides in the conflict were offered an agreement under which Kosovo would become an international protectorate. For the security of the members of all the ethnic groups, an international peacekeeping force would be stationed in Kosovo. Three years later, a new referendum on the future status of Kosovo was foreseen.

During the negotiations in Rambouillet, on February 16th and 17th, 1999, American diplomat Christopher Hill went to visit Milošević and threatened him with air strikes. Milošević was against deployment of NATO peacekeepers. Two day later Milošević said: “We are not going to give up Kosovo, even if they bomb us,”54 and Western diplomats started to leave FRY. At the end of February, Serbian forces occupied the entire province; on March 1st, Milošević refused all the international negotiators for Kosovo. A day later, Adem Demaci resigned as political leader of UCK, which withdrew the signature from the Albanian side on the Rambouillet Agreement. On March 18th, Kosovo Albanians signed the agreement, while Serbs

50 Dragoslav Grujić, Kosovska hronika [Kosovo Chronicle], Vreme, March 14, 1998, pp. 4-5.
52 Kronologija kosovskega zapleta [The Chronology of Kosovo plot], Delo, March 25, 1999, p. 5.
53 Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., p. 176.
54 Kronologija kosovskega zapleta [The Chronology of Kosovo plot] ..., p. 5.
boycotted the event. International observers left Kosovo on March 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1999. Richard Holbrooke for the last time tried to convince Milošević to sign. On March 23\textsuperscript{rd}, the Serb parliament voted against stationing NATO troops in Kosovo; and on March 24\textsuperscript{th}, NATO started air strikes on the FRY.

At the same time as the air strikes on Yugoslavia, a mass exodus, i.e., forced emigration, of Albanians from Kosovo began also. This caused a new international refugee crisis. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 831,000 were forced to leave, including more than 400,000 during the first days of the NATO air strikes. The majority of refugees were ethnic Albanians who escaped to Albania (270,000), Macedonia (130,000), Montenegro (35,700) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (around 8,000). Because the level of pressure of refugees on Albania and Macedonia was too high, other countries also received some refugees from Kosovo. Most refugees immigrated to Turkey and the USA (each 20,000), Spain (more than 7,000), Romania, Norway, Denmark (6,000 each) and Greece, Sweden and Austria; 5,000 each.\textsuperscript{55}

Soon after the air strikes began, the attempts to find a solution for the Kosovo crisis continued also. On May 6\textsuperscript{th}, 1999, representatives of the Western European countries and Russia met in Bonn, where they discussed strategies to end the crisis. A few days later, the Western European countries named President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari special envoy for Kosovo. The G-8 Group (the most developed countries

\textsuperscript{55} Kam bodo šli deportiranci? [Where those who were deported will go?], Delo, April 10, 1999, p. 7.
of the West and Russia) wrote a draft of the UN resolution that would end the war. In spite of air strikes, the Yugoslav authorities were still not ready to withdraw their units from Kosovo. By the end of May, the Yugoslav authorities even started to send new troops to Kosovo. After the air strikes intensified, the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, on June 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1999, accepted a peace proposal that was brought to him by Ahtisaari and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Černomerdin. The plan foresaw the complete withdrawal of the Yugoslav armed forces from Kosovo and setting up of international troops under UN command. On June 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1999, representatives of the Yugoslav Army and NATO signed a technical plan on withdrawal of the Yugoslav troops in Kumanovo (Macedonia), and NATO stopped attacks on the FRY the next day.\textsuperscript{56}

On June 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1999, the UN Security Council also accepted the resolution on Kosovo, with which they adopted conditions to solve the conflict and also established legal grounds for peacekeeping forces to be stationed in Kosovo. UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244 also determined that the FRY had to immediately stop the violence and repression in Kosovo and withdraw from it with all army troops, police and paramilitary units. International forces, in which civilians as well as soldiers were to serve, would be stationed there for a period of twelve months, with extension of the mandate subject to Security Council approval. The UN Security Council Resolution also allowed for armed interventions by international forces. This resolution also foresaw a temporary civil administration of Kosovo in which its inhabitants would have wide autonomy and develop their own democratic institutions. Albanian refugees are able to return to Kosovo under the control of UNHCR. Members of UCK and other armed Albanian groups must stop fighting and give up their weapons. Negotiations on the future of Kosovo must begin among Serbs and the Yugoslav state and the Albanians of Kosovo. The resolution also guaranteed the territorial integrity of the FRY and neighboring countries. This resolution also demanded that all parties concerned in the conflict cooperate with The Hague Tribunal.\textsuperscript{57}

While the Western powers were getting ready to divide Kosovo into five sectors, a small unit of Russian soldiers from Bosnia and Herzegovina quickly ran into Kosovo and occupied the airport in Priština. This event is important because it showed the interest of Russia in serving as the special protector of the Serbs of Kosovo. The Russians simply stayed at the airport ...

Kosovo was, nevertheless, divided into five sectors, where representatives of French, English, Italian, German and U.S. military and civilian authorities started to renew administration. Peace in Kosovo meant, according to some media, “the beginning of the end of the Serbian myth about Kosovo and the myth of the nation from heaven.”\textsuperscript{58}

After the peace agreement was signed, most of the Albanians returned to their homes; and mass emigration of the Serbs and Montenegrins began. Kosovo experienced ethnic cleansing again. The Serb population remained only in the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, some cities and villages north of Kosovska Mitrovica

\textsuperscript{56} Bitka za Kosovo v 80. dneh [Fight for Kosovo in 80 days], Mladina, July 14, 1999, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{57} Resolucija VS o Kosovu [Security Council Resolution on Kosovo], Delo, July 12, 1999, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{58} Konec mita [The End of the Myth], Mladina, June 14, 1999, pp. 37-38.
and some enclaves in the Priština surroundings. Under the circumstances, there were many within both ethnic groups who did not like peace. Bloody unrest began in Kosovska Mitrovica at the beginning of February 2001.59 In March, fights also began in Preševo Valley, in the regions of southeastern Serbia (near the administrative border between Kosovo and Serbia), where the Albanian population prevails. Part of this territory was a demilitarized zone, which came under the complete sovereignty of the FRY again. After some days of fighting, under international peacekeeping forces' surveillance, both sides signed a cease-fire;60 then fighting erupted in neighboring communes in Macedonia. The Balkan tragedy continued …

In spite of resistance of Albanians of Kosovo Hans Haekkerup, the civilian administrator for Kosovo, signed with the representatives of FRY a document of cooperation, which ought to mean "a beginning of return of Serbia and Yugoslavia to its territory," as official Yugoslavia commented the event. Albanians, who at the time already were getting ready for elections to the provincial parliament, accepted the decision with discontent.61 All the opinion polls were predicting that LDK and Ibrahim Rugova would be absolute winners of the elections. Rugova's LDK got absolute majority in 120-member Kosovo provincial parliament. In spite of this Rugova did not get a demanded qualified majority (two third of all members of provincial parliament) when he ran for the presidency of Kosovo since deputies of Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) Hasan Taqui, and Union of Future of Kosovo were boycotting the elections. Similarly it also happened on January 10th, 2002, during the second and third circle of elections. After new civil administrator Michael Steiner intervened Kosovo parliament with 88 votes (three deputies voted against, fifteen deputies abstained) finally elected Rugova as president of the province. At the same time Bajram Rexhepi was elected president of ten member Kosovo government.62

In spite of the fact that Kosovo since Rugova and Rexhepi were named to their positions has all the administrative bodies, which are needed for the functioning of the state of Kosovo, most of the bodies had limited competencies. The real master in the province is still civil administrator who administrates province in the name of the international community. He has a veto power over any decision, which would be against UN Resolution no. 1244 on the mission of UNMIK and KFOR. The status shall not change for some years to come but again no one knows what the future shall bring …

60 Srbi in Albanci podpisali premirje [Serbs and Albanians signed a cease-fire Agreement], Delo, March 13, 2001, p. 1.
61 Za tri leta odložena neodvisnost Kosova? [Independence of Kosovo postponed for three years?], Delo November 7, 2001, p. 4.
62 Rugova predsednik, Rexhepi premier [Rugova President, Rexhepi Prime Minister], Delo, March 5, 2002, p. 24.
The Political 'Death' of Slobodan Milošević - Serbia on Its Way to 'Reconnect' to the World

After he had to admit defeat in Kosovo, Slobodan Milošević started to lose popularity very quickly. Milošević did not make too much fuss about it. At the beginning of 2000, he even changed the federal constitution, which enabled him to retain the position of president of the FRY. He organized elections in October 2000. The people of Serbia were unsatisfied because of worsened economic conditions as well as because Milošević’s policy did not serve the interests of the Serb nation, especially in Kosovo. Opposition was still divided, but they succeeded in uniting into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia [Demokratska opozicija Srbije - DOS]. They also agreed to a common platform for the elections against Milošević and his regime. Dr. Vojislav Koštunica, who was a Serb nationalist and legitimist and an ardent negotiator, became the candidate of the united opposition.

Koštunica won the elections of September 22nd, 2000. He got 48.2% of the popular vote, while Milošević received 40.23%. A DOS representative claimed in a statement to the independent radio station B2-92 that the election commission had stolen 400,000 of Koštunica’s votes, while they added 200,000 votes to Milošević’s total. Milošević was getting ready for the second round of elections. Koštunica had been receiving his first congratulations from foreign dignitaries and representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church. People reacted to the stealing of the votes with a general strike and protests. After all of Serbia protested, Milošević admitted that he lost the elections. The election commission ‘admitted its mistake’ and the Yugoslav Constitutional Court accepted Vojislav Koštunica as the new president.

The victory of Koštunica was happily accepted in foreign lands; they were happy about it also in Kosovo, although Kosovo Albanians were skeptical, especially because Koštunica was a Serb nationalist after all. There were reservations towards Koštunica also in Montenegro, where only followers of the Socialist National Party of Momir Bulatović participated in the elections, while all the others boycotted elections for the president and for the federal parliament.

Milošević’s defeat meant normalization of political life in the FRY; visits of foreign heads of state followed after the federal and Serbian governments were formed. Carla del Ponte, General Prosecutor of The Hague International Tribunal, visited Belgrade in the second half of January of 2001. Milošević was arrested on April 1st, 2001, allegedly for financial fraud and killings of his opponents while he

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63 Branko Jokić, Vstajenje ali padec srbske opozicije [Resurrection or Downfall of Serbian Opposition], Delo, January 12, 2000, p. 3.
64 Trmasti nacionalist [Stubborn Nationalist], Dnevnik, Ocotober 7, 2000, p. 3.
65 Peter Potočnik, Režim vsiljuje pat položaj [Regime is imposing a pat position], Delo, September 19, 2000, p. 3.
66 Peter Potočnik, Zmaga Koštunice potrjena [Koštunica’s Victory confirmed], Delo, October 7, 2000, p. 5.
67 Branko Jokić, Zadržani in skeptični Črnogorci in Albanci [Montenegrins and Albanians restrained and skeptical], Delo, October 9, 2000/b, p. 4.
68 Peter Potočnik, Celo košava nemočna pred trdoživo politiko [Even strong winds of košava powerless in front of stubborn politics], Delo, January 27, 2001, p. 4.
was in office. On June 28th, 2001, another St. Vitus Day, the Yugoslav authorities handed Milošević over to The Hague Tribunal. In protest, Milošević’s followers in Belgrade and other towns in Serbia held demonstrations, but they soon ended. It also caused a crisis within the government coalition because President Koštunica declared that surrendering Milošević to The Hague International Tribunal “was still illegal and unconstitutional, and as such threatened the existence of the FRY.”

In spite of all the problems inside the governmental coalition, FRY still tried to strengthen the ties of Yugoslavia with the rest of the world. Its representatives also soon signed an agreement on inheritance among the successor states of the former SFRY. Negotiations on division of the wealth of the former common federation began.

Until February of 2002, theories and discussion on how to solve the economic crisis in Yugoslavia were the main topic of interest in Serbia. In February 2002, a Milošević trial before The Hague Tribunal began; and every one in Serbia watched the trial …

Montenegro

The destiny of Montenegro was not yet quite clear when Yugoslavia started to collapse in 1991. In November 1991, when negotiations took place in The Hague under the presidency of Lord Peter Carrington about the future destiny of Yugoslavia, Montenegro was one of the republics of Yugoslavia. Lord Carrington foresaw the same level of independence for it as for the other Yugoslav republics. President of Montenegro Momir Bulatović even accepted his proposal. Later he had to withdraw from this decision under pressure and accept Milošević’s proposal to create the FRY as a union between Montenegro and Serbia. Bulatović was under pressure especially from Milošević because Milošević would not be able to claim the rights of the only successor of former Yugoslavia (SFRY). Also the people of Montenegro were still supportive of Milošević’s policy.

Montenegro remained part of the ‘third’ Yugoslavia, FRY, which was proclaimed with acceptance of the Constitution at Žabljak in Montenegro on April 27th, 1992. In accordance with this Constitution, Montenegro retained an equal position with Serbia and was also fairly well represented in federal institutions; in reality it had as much autonomy as Milošević permitted. Montenegro shared the destiny of the rest of the FRY when the economic sanctions of the international community were imposed on Yugoslavia. For Montenegro, whose economy lagged behind even before 1991, it meant even greater poverty. At this time a majority of Montenegrins were...

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69 Peter Potočnik, Slobodan Milošević vendarle v priporu [In spite of all Slobodan Milošević in Custody], Delo, April 2, 2001, p. 1.
71 Mojca Drčar-Murko, Sukcesija sklenjena [Succession agreed upon], Delo, July 30, 2001, p. 1.
72 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation ..., pp. 194-196.
73 Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History ..., p. 165.
74 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., pp. 386-389.
still supporting Milošević.

In the second half of the 1990s, a deepening of the economic crisis, widening of social gaps and political instability in the FRY also brought changes in Montenegrin politics. Within the leading Socialist Party of Montenegro, a group of politicians demanded more rights and equality for Montenegro inside the Yugoslav federation. The future president of Montenegro and then president of the Montenegrin government, Milo Đukanović, said, “Montenegro was not forced to enter Yugoslavia. /.../ It did not enter Yugoslavia to be threatened by the state, nor to flee Yugoslavia.” The president of the Montenegrin parliament, Svetozar Marović, was even more direct, when he declared that “the Montenegrin president will not be chosen any more by staffs of some hired Montenegrins in Belgrade, nor the dukes, nor the wives, nor Politika Express [the Belgrade regime’s newspaper] /.../ Montenegro wishes to have its own president and not a deputy installed by decree at a secret dinner in Dedinje [the government villa quarter in Belgrade] ...”

Bulatović did not care too much about dissatisfaction among Montenegrins. He paid, however, for his unconditional following of Milošević’s policy by election defeat. Đukanović won the election for president of Montenegro in September 1997 with a margin of 5,488 votes. Bulatović admitted defeat at first; later, at Milošević’s request, he accused Đukanović of stealing the votes. In January 1998 he even tried to come to power by force. General demonstrations and unrest were organized by followers of Bulatović (and Milošević); 13 demonstrators were arrested, and 100 people were wounded. In spite of uncertain conditions, Đukanović succeeded in retaining power. For the first time in the FRY, a party won that supported reforms and an opening to the world. Also for the first time, Slobodan Milošević got a political opponent worthy of that name.

The change of power in Montenegro took place under very tense circumstances, since the rise of radicalism in neighboring Serbia brought new violence in Kosovo. Because of different points of view towards this life and death issue for Yugoslavia and Milošević, Montenegro and Serbia found themselves at a very crucial crossroads. The new Montenegrin leadership demanded opening towards the world, especially in regard to the economy, with participation in the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions. At the same time, they demanded a quick solution to the Kosovo problem. The Montenegrin leadership demanded development of an open multinational and democratic society, which was more and more confined by Milošević’s policy of deepening the conflict with the international community - which even provoked an attack by NATO against the FRY.

This brought a change in the formerly positive public opinion towards Yugoslavia in Montenegro, which was not ready to lose time while waiting for democratic change in Serbia. Montenegrin politicians even offered Serbia some suggestions

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75 Svetlana Vasović, Očesi gledata v različni smeri [The Eyes looking into different Directions], Mladina, October 28, 1997, pp. 34-35.
76 Branko Jokić, Pod žarometom: Momir Bulatović [Under the Headlight: Momir Bulatović], Delo February 1, 2001, p. 5.
77 Vasović, Očesi gledata v različni smeri ..., pp. 34-35.
78 Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History ..., p. 177.
on how to change relations in the federation. If Belgrade had given Montenegro enough freedom and independence to enable Montenegro to continue its democratic reforms, even if Serbia was not willing to change its society, Montenegro would have stayed in the federation with Serbia. Since the regime of Slobodan Milošević continued its policy of stifling the development of Montenegro, Montenegrin leaders started openly to demand independence. The governments of the EU countries and the U.S. Administration were against it because they were afraid of the eruption of a new armed conflict. Montenegrin president Djukanović did not succumb to their pressures. He warned the EU and the United States that Montenegro, which was affected by the NATO bombardment and international sanctions, would leave the FRY if Milošević did not resign.

Montenegro already had been executing its plan in secret. By the summer of 1999, the federal institutions had already lost control over Montenegro. The Montenegrin police, who were faithful to the Djukanović administration, controlled the borders with Albania and Croatia and its Adriatic coast. Montenegro had its own unofficial representatives in Western European capitals, it issued its own visas and had its own foreign minister. Only the inflated dinar and the Yugoslav army, which was still faithful to Milošević, connected Montenegro with Serbia.

Although Milošević had to leave the presidency of FRY after the September elections of 2000, the Montenegrin leadership did not change their position towards independence of Montenegro. Incidentally, Djukanović and his followers almost helped Milošević to stay in power because they boycotted the September 2000 elections.

The right of Montenegro to be an independent state was explained with different arguments by the Montenegrin leadership. They pointed to the fact that Montenegro was an internationally recognized state before 1918 and that Montenegro was one of the Yugoslav republics recognized by the Badinter Commission at the beginning of the 1990s as having a right to independence. They also called attention to the experiences after 1990, which showed that it was impossible to secure development of Montenegro inside Yugoslavia. At the end of 2000, Djukanović even announced a referendum on independence of Montenegro because he was convinced that more than 60% of the inhabitants of Montenegro would vote for independence. It should have been held by the first half of 2001 but wasn’t because of the election described below. The Serbian authorities were very skeptical about the Montenegrin proposal on Serbia and Montenegro as internationally recognized states. Zoran Đinđić, later the Serbian prime minister, foresaw the possibility of negotiations, while president of the FRY Vojislav Koštunica still insisted on an FRY that was against the Montenegrin position.

Parliamentary elections followed on April 22nd, 2001. It was the first test of Djukanović’s aspirations towards independence. His coalition, ‘Victory of Montene-

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80 Ne tako hitro, Djukanović [Not so fast Djukanovic], Mladina, July 19, 1999, pp. 32-33.
81 Branko Jokić, Črna gora in volitve v ZRJ. Bulatović je odpovedal [Montenegro and Elections in FRY, Bulatović gave up], Delo, October 26, 2000, p. 1.
grog' [Pobjeda Crne gore], got a little bit more than 50% of the votes. At the same time, the coalition 'United for Yugoslavia' [Zajedno za Jugoslaviju] received a little less than 50% of the votes. The latter were celebrating because this narrow result meant that a referendum on Montenegrin independence would be postponed. Djukanović’s coalition got only two deputies more in the Montenegrin parliament. Holding a referendum on independence of Montenegro would have meant that the pro-Yugoslav half of the population would boycott the vote, or under the worst scenario it could even mean a civil war. An important explanation of why the Socialist National Party of Momir Bulatović was so successful is that it deserted Slobodan Milošević and entered the federal government of Dragiša Pešić of DOS. Also, the international community's pressure against Montenegrin independence played a role, since the Montenegrin state could not survive without external help.

It became clear that all misunderstandings would have to be solved with negotiations, in spite of the fact that those in favor of Montenegrin independence were still convinced that the conflict on the future destiny of the FRY could be solved only with a referendum. At the end of 2001, experts began to negotiate on how to change the FRY, and they continued in January 2002. The European Union (EU) joined the negotiations in February 2002. In Brussels, Montenegrin and Serbian experts in economic, monetary and social issues met and discussed integrating the FRY into the European structure, especially on perspectives for the Stabilization Association agreement between the FRY and the EU, which is the first phase of cooperation between the EU and nonmember states. The EU intended to sign this agreement with all the states of Southeastern Europe except Slovenia, which is on its way to full membership.

The EU wanted the Yugoslav Federation to remain in existence, changing its name, however, to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Javier Solana, EU representative, proposed that a new state would have a president elected by the parliament; instead of a federal government it could have a coordinative body. Montenegro would even retain the Euro as its official monetary instrument. Montenegrins would serve in the army on Montenegro’s own territory after five years (EU proposal) or one year (Montenegrin proposal), Serbia and Montenegro would have the right to decide on their future status by referendum.

Djukanović now found himself in a bad situation, since his coalition partners (the Social Democratic Party and Liberal Union) do not intend for any price to resign following a referendum on independence of Montenegro. If Djukanović accepts the EU proposal, they would enter the opposition, which would bring new parliamentary elections. This would divide Montenegrins even more, which would

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83 Jokić, Zadržani in skeptični Čmogorci in Albanci ..., p. 4.
84 Peter Potočnik, Beograd slavi Pirovo zmago [Belgrade celebrates Phyrus’ Victory], Delo, April 24, 2001, p. 4.
86 Branko Jokić, Poglabljanje spora med očesoma [Widening of the Conflict between Eyes], Delo, December 29, 2001, p. 3.
87 Božo Mašanović, EU vztraja pri Jugoslaviji [EU insist on Yugoslavia], Delo, February 5, 2002, p. 4.
not bring peace to the Balkans. As we write these lines in March 2002, we still do not know what the future will bring …

**Sandžak: Another Potential Theater of Balkan Wars?**

During the search for a solution for Serb-Montenegrin relations, the question of Sandžak is surfacing again. Sandžak encompasses the mountainous region of northern Montenegro (communes of Rožaj, Plav, Ivangrad, Bijelo Polje, Plevlja) and southwestern Serbia (communes of Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica, Prijeponje, Priboj) settled by Muslims. Today they think of themselves as Boshniaks i.e. Bosnian Muslims. The region lies between the regions of settlement of Serbs in the north and Montenegrins in the south. During the period of Turkish rule it represented a special administrative-political unit (Yeni Pazar Sanjak). After the Turks had to leave the Balkan Peninsula in 1912 it was divided between Montenegro and Serbia. The border has remained unchanged until today.

The Muslims of Sandžak did not gain a special status either during the period of Karadjordjević’s Yugoslavia or during Tito’s Yugoslavia. Until the Muslims in Tito’s Yugoslavia were denied the status of a constitutive nation, the Muslims of Sandžak did not demand any type of autonomy or a special status inside the Yugoslav society. Demands for change of status became louder only after the Yugoslav crisis sharpened, and they began demanding cultural autonomy even more loudly. The SDA for Sandžak was also involved in those demands.

Serbian politicians reacted strongly against these attempts by the Boshniaks of Sandžak. The regime accused the leaders of SDA for Sandžak, Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin and his collaborators, of an attempt of armed resistance. Under these circumstances, the Serbian and Muslim sides ceased contact and all cooperation on the political level. The Yugoslav army occupied all strategic points. Because of the violence, many even started to consider independence for Sandžak, while others were considering annexation of Sandžak to Bosnia-Herzegovina; still others immigrated to Turkey because they were afraid of violence.

In spite of all the violence, Muslims have not abstained from their demands for autonomy. During October 25th-27th, 1991, they even held a referendum in which the people of Sandžak voted for its autonomy; on January 11th, 1992, they successfully organized a referendum on special status for Sandžak. The Muslims of Sandžak even established their own parliament a few months later to represent all the Muslims in Serbia.

**Milošević did not want to negotiate the demands of the Boshniaks of Sandžak.**

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90 Peter Potočnik, Sandžak kot klin med Srbijo in Črno goro [Sandžak as a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro], Delo, January 29, 2001, p. 4.
91 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 216.
93 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 143.
For him it was Serbia. Any autonomy would mean a hindrance for Serbia’s entry to the Adriatic. Serbs were already afraid because of the high increase in the Muslim population in both the Serbian and Montenegrin parts of Sandžak.94

**Table 5**: Changes in the ethnic composition of Sandžak during 1961-1991.

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<td>Count</td>
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<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUslIMS</td>
<td>107,265</td>
<td>29.17</td>
<td>160,712</td>
<td>40.77</td>
<td>192,525</td>
<td>46.28</td>
<td>215,291</td>
<td>51.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERBS</td>
<td>119,885</td>
<td>32.67</td>
<td>125,259</td>
<td>31.77</td>
<td>105,915</td>
<td>25.46</td>
<td>112,807</td>
<td>26.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTENEGRINS</td>
<td>119,029</td>
<td>32.27</td>
<td>95,247</td>
<td>24.16</td>
<td>105,903</td>
<td>24.98</td>
<td>81,215</td>
<td>19.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKS</td>
<td>15,444</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>4,614</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>6,514</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>8,507</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>15,582</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>11,503</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDŽAK - Total</td>
<td>367,633</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>394,119</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>415,925</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>420,862</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first attempts at peaceful cooperation between the Muslims of Sandžak and the Serbian authorities came after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the first half of 1995.95 SDA even entered the race for the federal parliament in November 1996. The names of many voters of this party were not to be found in the election lists of those eligible to vote, and they were not allowed to vote.96

After the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milošević, cooperation between the Serbian state and the Muslims of Sandžak improved. A member of the Coalition for Sandžak, Rasim Ljajić, even became the member of the Yugoslav federal government responsible for minorities. Sandžak still represents a potential danger for future interethnic conflict. Quite often in Serb-Montenegrin disputes, the question arises as to what would happen to Sandžak if Montenegro should really become independent.97

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97 Peter Potočnik, Sandžak kot klin med Srbijo in Črno goro [Sandžak as a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro], Delo, January 29, 2001, p. 4.
Conclusion

This article presents the survey of the history of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from its birth, after Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia felt apart in the beginning of 1990s and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established from the two republics i.e. Serbia and Montenegro, until a proposal on new relations between Serbia and Montenegro was signed in February 2002. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at first wanted to play a role Russia played when Soviet Union felt apart as the only successor of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The decisions of Badinter Commission however declared all successor states, successors of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Unsolved Albanian question and repression of Albanian ethnic group provoked intervention of international community led by NATO and Kosovo, a cradle of Serbdom, became international protectorate. This meant the beginning of the end of regime of Slobodan Milošević, who lost elections for the presidency of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Vojislav Koštunica, a candidate of opposition. In Montenegro already before the fall of Milošević Milo Djukanović won elections for the presidency and started in movement for the independence of Montenegro. International community however did not support Montenegrin endeavors and EU Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, negotiated a proposal for new confederation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Matjaž Klemenčič

ZVEZNA REPUBLIKA JUGOSLAVIJA, 1992-2002

POVZETEK


Tako imenovana 'okrnjena' ali 'tretja' Jugoslavija je merila 102.173 km2 (okrog 40 % ozemlja nekdanje SFRJ) in štela okrog 10,4 milijona prebivalcev. Kljub temu, da so Srbi tvorili absolutno večino prebivalstva (62,3%), je bila ZRJ država s pestro nacionalno strukturo pre-
bivalstva, saj so manjšine sestavljale skoraj tretjino vsega prebivalstva (od tega Albanci 16,6%, Madžari 3,3%, Muslimani 3,1% itd.).


Miloševića izvolitev in nove množične aretacije Albancev so že napovedovala nadaljnji burni razvoj dogodkov na Kosovu, kjer so se zaradi skrajno zaostrenih mednarodnih razmer slabo izdružile iz dneva v dan. Tako so oboroženi spopadi med Osvojeno vojsko Kosova ter jugoslovansko vojsko in policijo v začetku leta 1998 prenašali v pravo vojno. Stoperjevne spopadov je podobno izizvajalo nove srbske mednarodni skupnosti, ki nikakor ni uspela vzpostaviti dialoga med Beogradom in kosovskimi Albanci. K obožani je však v začetku leta 1999 pričela s vseh atak na zvezo NATO, katerega je v času zaostrovanja napetosti na Kosovu. Tako je bilo po prihodu sil KFOR razdeljeno na več sektorjev (frančaško, angleško, nemško, italijansko, neniški ter ameriško) in spremenjeno v mednarodni protektorat. Kot so zapisali v nekaterih medijih, naj bi to bil "začetek konca srbskega mita o Kosovu in mita o nebeškem narodu.


S padcem Miloševićeva režima se je začelo "normalizirati" tudi politično življenje v ZRJ. Prvi rezultat normalizacije je bila ponovna vzpostavljanje političnih strukov z evropskimi državami in aretacija Miloševića (1. aprila 2001), katerega so nove jugoslovanske oblasti na Vidov dan (28. junija) predale bazaškemu mednarodnemu sodišču za vojne zločine na območju nekdanje Jugoslovije. Vse do februarja 2002 so bile v jugoslovanski javnosti v središču pozornosti težke gospodarske in življenjske razmere, nato pa je bila pozornost znova
Preusmerjena k Miloševiču. Začelo se je namreč zadnje dejanje njegove razburljive politične politike - sojenje za vojne zločine pred sodiščem v Haagu.

Spričo zgrešene Miloševičeve politike so se kmalu začeli krbati tudi odnosi med Srbijo in Črno goro. Še posebej, ko je na volitvah oktobra 1997 Milo Đukanović premagal zvestega zagovornika Miloševičeve politike, Momirja Bulatoviča. To je bil prvi primer v ZRJ, da so volitve spremenile oblast, in da je zmagala reformistična usmeritev, ki je podpirala odpiranje v svet.

Bilo pa je tudi prvič, da je Slobodan Milošević tudi doma dobil pravega političnega tekmeca. Zaradi nevzdržnih razmer v ZRJ je novo črnogorsko vodstvo pričelo odkrito razmišljati o neodvisnosti Črne gore. Sčasoma se je razkorak med obema federalnima enoto v ZRJ, da sta ju povezovali le še razvrednotena valuta (dinar) in vojska.


Sporazum je predvideval tudi preimenovanje ZRJ, ki naj bi se po novem imenovala Srbija in Črna gora. Tako je slabih enajst let potem, ko je začela razpadati SFRJ, izginil še zadnji ostanek - Zvezna republika Jugoslavija - ki pa z jugoslovansko idejo ni imel nikakršne zveze, razen simbolne povezave z imenom Jugoslavija.

Vsaj začetek oblikovanja nove države - Srbije in Črne gore - na srečo ni primerljiv z dogajanjem v zadnjem desetletju, ko je bilo v imenu takšne ali drugačne Jugoslavije po nepotrebnom pretli veliko krvi. Kljub temu pa je potrebno pri reševanju ali pa morebitnem zapletenju srbsko-črnogorskih odnosov opozoriti tudi uprašanje Sandžaka, ki je bil že v času turskega cesarstva posebna upravno-politična enota (Novopazarski sandžak). To poselitveno območje muslimanskega prebivalstva, ki se kot klin zajeda med poselitvena prostora Srbov na severu in Črnogorcev na jugu, velja še zmeraj za potencialno žarišče novih mednacionalnih sporov. Pogosto se omenja v povezavi s srbsko-črnogorskimi nesoglasji, še posebej če bo prišlo do ločitve Srbije in Črne gore in poskusila dejanske razmejitve Sandžaka med dve državi. Kakšne težave predstavlja postavljanje mejnih kamnov pa je znano že od začetkov osamosvajanja na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije ...
Avtorski izvlečki
Authors’ Abstracts
**Studia Historica Slovenica,**
Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / *Humanities and Social Studies Review*
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 9-28, 74 cit., 2 slike

*Kategorija:* 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

*Jezik:* angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

*Ključne besede:* cerkvena zgodovina, benediktinci, Gornji Grad, posestna zgodovina

**Izvleček:** Avtor predstavlja benediktinski samostan v Gornjem Gradu v prvi polovici 14. stoletja, ko je ta preživljal eno svojih najbolj burnih obdobij. S pritegnitvijo nekaterih novih virov ter z novo analizo že znanih avtor predstavlja eno najpomembnejših cerkvenih institucij, ki je imela svoj sedež na tleh današnje države Slovenije.

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**UDK 930.85(497.5)*15*"**

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**Podnaslov:** Krizni čas v zgodovini samostana

**Study Historica Slovenica,**
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Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 9-28, 74 cit., 2 slike

*Kategorija:* 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

*Jezik:* nemški (izvleček nemški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

*Ključne besede:* mestna kultura, sistem odnosov, Zagreb, Varaždin, oligarhija, dvorno-humanistična kultura, kultura cerkve

**Izvleček:** Avtor se ukvarja s vprašanjem, ali se je v severozahodnih mestih Hrvaške - Zagrebu in Varaždinstvu v 16. stoletju oblikovala kakšna oblika mestne kulture ali pa so njuni meščani zgolj sledili kulturni plemstveni in cerkveni. Pride do zaključka, da se je meščanstvo, ki je bilo pod pritiskom dvorno-humanistične kulturo z ene ter cerkve z druge strani, z obema identificiralo in tako prevzelo ideologijo vodilnih fevdalnih slojev, namesto da bi oblikovalo svojo.

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Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 29-40, 51 cit.

*Kategorija:* 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

*Jezik:* nemški (izvleček nemški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

*Ključne besede:* mestna kultura, sistem odnosov, Zagreb, Varaždin, oligarhija, dvorno-humanistična kultura, kultura cerkve

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**Naslov:** HABSBURŽANI IN KONEC OGLEJSKEGA PATRIARHATA

**Podnaslov:** Argumenti in polemike

**Studia Historica Slovenica,**
Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / Humanities and Social Studies Review
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 41-60, 75 cit.

**Kategorija:** 1.01 Izvimi znanstveni članek

**Jezik:** nemški (izvleček namški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

**Ključne besede:** Habsburžani, oglejski patriarhat, Beneška republika

**Izvleček:** Oglejski patriarhat, v srednjem veku ena najpomembnejših krščanskih cerkvenih institucij, je v času oblikovanja modernih držav novega veka postal zastarela tvorba. Najpozneje od časa razsvetljenstva naprej so moderne države stremele za tem, da so se njihove državne in cerkvene meje ujemale. Cerkev, ki je še vedno imela pravico do fevdalnih posesti, je namreč bilo moč zlorabiti za politične namene. To tudi pojasni, zakaj so se Beneška republika in Habsburžani tako zagrizeno borili za prevlado nad oglejskim patriarhatom ter skušali svoja stališča utemeljiti s historičnimi argumenti. Razpustitev oglejskega patriarhata je bil politični kompromis, kajti nazadnje sta se obe strani odrekli svojim, na srednjem veku temeljčim, zahtevam. Zato lahko razpustitev patriarhata označimo kot racionalno potezo na poti k oblikovanju modernega evropskega sistema držav.

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**Naslov:** TIRNBERGER, JEZUITSKI ZNANSTVENIK IZ PTUJA

**Studia Historica Slovenica,**
Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / Humanities and Social Studies Review
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 61-70, 20 cit., 3 slike

**Kategorija:** 1.02 Pregledni znanstveni članek

**Jezik:** angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

**Ključne besede:** Ptuj, Gradec, Banská Štiavnica, Tirnberger, zgodovina jezuitskih matematičnih znanosti

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Naslov: SAMOVLADA SLOVENCEV NOVEMBRA 1918

Studia Historica Slovenica,
Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / Humanities and Social Studies Review
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 71-84, 37 cit., 3 slike

Kategorija: 1.01 Izvimi znanstveni članek
Jezik: angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: Slovenska državnost, Država Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov, november 1918


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Naslov: RAZVOJ POLITIČNEGA KATOLICIZMA NA ŠTAJERSKEM V LETIH 1918-1923

Studia Historica Slovenica,
Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / Humanities and Social Studies Review
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 85-120, 207 cit., 4 slike

Kategorija: 1.01 Izvimi znanstveni članek
Jezik: angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: slovenska politična zgodovina, politične stranke na Štajerskem, politični katoličizem, Tiskarna sv. Cirila

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**Naslov:** MADŽARSKA NACIONALNA POLITIKA IN ZAKON O MADŽARIH, KI ŽIVIJO V SOSEDNIH DRŽAVAH

**Studia Historica Slovenica,**  
Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / Humanities and Social Studies Review  

**Kategorija:** 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek  
**Jezik:** angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

**Izvleček:** Članek analizira Zakon o Madžarih, živečih v sosednjih državah, v okviru madžarske narodne politike. To vprašanje izvira iz neskladnosti mej madžarske države in madžarskega naroda. Do pred kratkim je Madžarska v glavnem podpirala institucije narodnih manjšin, sedaj pa podpira tudi posameznike so-narodnjake. Glavna diskusija se ukvarja z definicijo oseb, ki so upravičene do posedovanja madžarskih izkaznic, v principu pa gre za definicijo, kdo je Madžar. Diskusijo sta zaznamovala dva koncepta o narodu. Etnokulturalni (etno-teritorialni) koncept, ki ga podpira konzervativna vlada in poudarja enotnost vseh Madžarov. Državljanski koncept, ki ga podpirajo socialisti in liberalci, pa se osredotoča na madžarske državljane.

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**Naslov:** ZVEZNA REPUBLIKA JUGOSLAVIJA, 1992-2002

**Studia Historica Slovenica,**  
Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / Humanities and Social Studies Review  
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 139-172, 97 cit., 5 pregled., 2 zemljev., 1 slika

**Kategorija:** 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek  
**Jezik:** angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

**Izvleček:** V prispevku je orisana zgodovina Federativne republike Jugoslavije, ene od petih naslednic nekdanje SFRJ. Avtor je v prispevku predstavil vse ključne trenutke v kratki desetletni zgodovini te države: nastanek leta 1992, vsa krizna obdobja v času vojn ob razpadanju SFRJ, proces demokratizacije in ponovno vključevanje v mednarodno skupnost. Posebej je predstavil pestro nacionalno strukturo, še zlasti pa zapletene albansko-srbske odnose, ki so že v preteklosti marsikdaj usodno krojili dogodke v nekdanji SFRJ. Na koncu je predstavil tudi problem Sandžaka, ki v povezavi s srbsko-črnogorskimi nesoglasji velja za novo potencialno žarišče novih mednacionalnih sporov na Balkanu.
TONI RAVNIKAR. The Gorica Grad Monastery since the
Establishment of the Counts of Hohenegg in the Appointment
of Abbot Nikola J in 1365.

JANEZ TURJAK. šel. Hôtel de la Monnaie and the Monnaie
of the Patriarchate of Aquino.

NEVEN RUDAK. Študija ženske v rodnozgodovini
Kroatije in 16. stoletju.

FRIEDRICH EIDERMAYR. Das Haus Habsburg und das
Ende der Patriarchate von Aquino.

STANIMIR DJEREN. Hohemberger, the Jewish Scientist
Prom Plig

JURJ PEREVIŠEK. The Slovenian Self-government
in November 1918.

MATJAZ RATEJ. Development of Political Catholicism
in Slovenia in 1928-1942.

ZOLTAN KANTOR. Hungarian National Politics and the
Status Quo.

MATJAZ KLEMENŠIČ. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

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