


Studia Historica Slovenica



*Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije
Humanities and Social Studies Review*

2018

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S *tudia* **H** *istorica* **S** *lovenica*

Studia Historica Slovenica

Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije
Humanities and Social Studies Review

letnik 18 (2018), št. 2



ZGODOVINSKO DRUŠTVO
DR. FRANCA KOVAČIČA
V MARIBORU

ZRI DR. FRANCA KOVAČIČA V MARIBORU

MARIBOR 2018

Izdajatelj / Published by

ZGODOVINSKO DRUŠTVO DR. FRANCA KOVAČIČA V MARIBORU /

HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF DR. FRANCO KOVAČIČ IN MARIBOR

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Žiro račun / *Bank Account:*

Nova KBM d.d.

SI 56041730001421147

Prevajanje / *Translation:*

David Hazemali, Uroš Turnšek

Lektoriranje / *Language-editing*

Ana Šela

Oblikovanje naslovnice / *Cover Design:*

Knjižni studio d.o.o.

Oblikovanje in računalniški prelom /

Design and Computer Typesetting:

Knjižni studio d.o.o.

Tisk / *Printed by:*

Itagraf d.o.o.

<http://shs.zgodovinsko-drustvo-kovacic.si>

Izvillečke prispevkov v tem časopisu objavljata 'Historical – Abstracts' in
'America: History and Life'.

Časopis je uvrščen v 'Ulrich's Periodicals Directory', evropsko humanistično bazo ERIH in
mednarodno bibliografsko bazo Scopus (h, d).

*Abstracts of this review are included in 'Historical – Abstracts' and
'America: History and Life'.*

*This review is included in 'Ulrich's Periodicals Directory', european humanistic database
ERIH and international database Scopus (h, d).*

Studia historica Slovenica, Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije,
je vpisan v razvid medijev, ki ga vodi Ministrstvo za kulturo RS, pod zaporedno številko **487**.
Izdajo časopisa sta omogočili Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost RS in Mestna občina Maribor.
Co-financed by the Slovenian Research Agency and City of Maribor.

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Kazalo / Contents

Članki in razprave / Papers and Essays

JANJA ŽMAVC: Rhetorical Ethos: an Attempt at Linguistic Pragmatic Perspective on Classical Rhetoric	343
<i>Retorični ethos: poskus jezikovno pragmatičnega pogleda na klasično retoriko</i>	
JULIJANA VISOČNIK: "Piramida" na Zgornjem Motniku in njen zgodovinski kontekst	371
<i>"The Pyramid" in Zgornji Motnik and its Historical Context</i>	
DUŠAN NEČAK: Prelom za prizadeto lokalno prebivalstvo: potres v Brežicah 29. januarja 1917	393
<i>Turning point for the Affected Local Population: the Brežice Earthquake of January 29, 1917</i>	
JURIJ PEROVŠEK: Misel o Sloveniji in njeno udejanjenje v času od Majniške deklaracije do oblikovanja Države SHS in Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani	421
<i>The Idea of Slovenia and its Implementation during the Period from the May Declaration to the Creation of the State of SHS and the National Government of SHS in Ljubljana</i>	
BOGDAN KOLAR: Mirovne pobude papeža Benedikta XV. in odmevi na Slovenskem	443
<i>Pope Benedict XV's Peace Initiatives and their Echoes in Slovenian Lands</i>	
BOŽO REPE: Oktobrska revolucija in Slovenci	469
<i>The October Revolution and Slovenians</i>	
ANDREJ RAHTEN: Diplomatska prizadevanja Ivana Žolgerja za Slovensko Štajersko in Prekmurje	489
<i>Diplomatic Endeavours of Ivan Žolger Regarding the Slovene Styria and Prekmurje</i>	

S *tudia* **H** *istorica* **S** *lovenica*

ALEŠ MAVER in DARKO FRIŠ: Demokratične parlamentarne volitve
v Srednji in Vzhodni Evropi med letoma 1989 in 1991 in
njihov vpliv na oblikovanje strankarskega prostora do leta 2013 529
*Democratic Legislative Elections in Central-East Europe from
1989 till 1991 and their Influence on the Shaping of the
Party Landscape until 2013*

ANA ŠELA in SILVIJA BOROVIK: Ženski liki sodobnih slovenskih
pisateljic v izbranih zgodovinskih romanih 557
*The Female Figure in Selected Contemporary Slovenian Historical
Novels by Female Authors*

JOŽICA ČEH STEGER: Soška fronta skozi oči vojaka in pisatelja
Andreja Čeboklija 587
*The Isonzo Front through the Eyes of the Soldier and
Writer Andrej Čebokli*

Avtorski izvlečki / Authors' Abstracts 603

**Uredniška navodila avtorjem / Editor's
Instructions to Authors** 611

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H *istorica*
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historica
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Rhetorical Ethos: an Attempt at Linguistic Pragmatic Perspective on Classical Rhetoric

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Abstract:

The paper explores the possibilities of the interdisciplinary relationship between classical rhetoric and linguistic pragmatics. It presents one of the most popular rhetorical notions (i.e., *rhetorical ethos*) and its relation to *implicit meaning* (i.e., another popular notion of pragmatics). The primary objective is to analyze the rhetorical strategy of a speaker's favorable character presentation in the socio-cultural context of early Roman rhetoric. In the analysis, the Aristotelian and the socio-cultural viewpoint on rhetorical ethos is adopted and combined with Verschueren's model of linguistic pragmatics. Rhetorical ethos is further explored in terms of persuasive strategy in the context of different social roles of the orator in ancient Rome with a particular focus on the identification of *ethotic* strategies, which are related to the notion of authority. A case study based on the notion of types of implicit meaning is presented, focusing on the role of implicitness in the construction of rhetorical ethos in early Roman rhetoric.

Keywords:

rhetorical ethos, implicit meaning, early Roman rhetoric, authority, argumentation

Studia Historica Slovenica

Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije

Maribor, 18 (2018), No. 2, pp. 343–370, 57 notes, 2 picture, 1 figure, 1 table

Language: Original in English (Abstract in English and Slovene, Summary in Slovene)

Introduction¹

The disciplines of rhetoric and pragmatics are both concerned with the study of the way people use language, yet their scholarly traditions differ significantly. Standard definitions of rhetoric (beginning with the ancient Greek rhetoricians) usually focus on the perspective of public persuasion and see rhetoric as a discipline dealing with persuasive forms and language strategies, speaking and public performance, and others. Pragmatics is usually associated with a functional perspective of language and is broadly defined as the study of language use.² Regarding the obvious common points that refer to the notion of language use as well as many issues between the two fields, which have been noted by scholars in pragmatics, the question of defining the relationship between rhetoric and pragmatics has not been particularly relevant.³ Apart from Leech's idea⁴ of broadening rhetorical scope from public discourse to everyday communication, which applied a rhetorical approach to pragmatics, and the attempt at merging rhetoric and pragmatics in terms of concepts by Dascal and Gross,⁵ there has been a more or less common perspective among scholars that rhetoric is a relatively insignificant topic within linguistic pragmatics. Comparably, pragmatics as a proper approach to rhetorical theory has not been used much by rhetoricians or has been used in a very limited scope. They were almost exclusively interested in topics associated with theories of Austin's speech acts and Grice's implicature.⁶ However, relevant studies have been published in recent years, in which the dynamics of interaction between rhetoric and pragmatics have become foregrounded and have been more thoroughly

¹ The paper is based on a conference presentation at the 8th ISSA Conference on Argumentation in Amsterdam 2014 (<http://rozenbergquarterly.com/issa-proceedings-2014-interplay-of-implicitness-and-authority-some-remarks-on-roman-rhetorical-ethos/>). It has been significantly revised and upgraded on the basis of the follow-up of my research in the rhetorical means of persuasion and implicitness.

² Cf. Jef Verschueren, *Understanding Pragmatics* (London, 1999), 16 (hereinafter: Verschueren, *Understanding Pragmatics*).

³ Cf. Marcelo Dascal and Alan G. Gross, "The marriage of pragmatics and rhetoric", *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 32, 2 (1999), 107–130 (hereinafter: Dascal and Gross, "The marriage of pragmatics and rhetoric"); Geoffrey N. Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics* (London, 1983) (hereinafter: Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics*); Yameng Liu and Chunshen Zhu, "Rhetoric as the *Antistrophos* of pragmatics: toward a 'competition of cooperation' in the study of language use", *Journal of Pragmatics* 43, 14 (2011), 3403–3415 (hereinafter: Liu and Zhu, "Rhetoric as the *Antistrophos*"); Atilla L. Nemesi, "Implicature Phenomena in Classical Rhetoric", *Journal of Pragmatics* 50, 1 (2013), 129–151 (hereinafter: Nemesi, "Implicature Phenomena"); Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, *Meaning and Relevance* (Cambridge, 2012).

⁴ Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics*.

⁵ Dascal and Gross, "The marriage of pragmatics and rhetoric".

⁶ Liu and Zhu, "Rhetoric as the *Antistrophos*", 3404–3407.

investigated.⁷ Along with extensive historical overview of approaches and attitudes toward cross-sections, recent studies also examine different aspects of conceptual differences and similarities between both disciplines and propose new possibilities for their interdisciplinary relationship. Additionally, there has been a growing interest in the contemporary rhetoric and argumentation in the last decade. Scholars have emphasized the need of pragmatics' perspective as one of the productive approaches in the study of rhetoric and argumentation in general or have included certain principles and topics of pragmatics into their conceptual models.⁸ An example of such incorporation mainly represents Gricean and neo-Gricean theories supporting the notion of implicature. They can be found in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, the theory of argumentation schemes and the theory of rhetorical argumentation.⁹

The aim of this paper is neither to problematize the general relationship between the two disciplines nor to explore specific conceptual issues. I follow a general perspective on the possibility of efficiently combining rhetorical and pragmatic notions. As I am familiar with other attempts at combining rhetoric and pragmatics as an approach to analyze discourse,¹⁰ I want to explore the possibility of combining two notions, each representing one of the central topics/concepts within their disciplines: *rhetorical ethos* and *implicit meaning*. In other words, my interest is to provide an examination of the relationship between strategies of persuasion based on a discursive construction of the speaker's trustworthy character/image and the phenomenon of language use that is associated with the connection between what is literally "said" and what is conveyed implicitly. In section 2, I present an overview of the conceptualization of the notion of rhetorical ethos in classical rhetoric with historical and

⁷ Cf. Louis de Saussure and Peter Schulz (eds.), *Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century, Discourse, language, mind* (Amsterdam, 2005); Didier Maillat and Steve Oswald, "Defining Manipulative Discourse: The Pragmatics of Cognitive Illusions", *International Review of Pragmatics* 1, 2 (2009), 348–370; Christopher Hart, *Critical Discourse Studies in Context and Cognition* (Amsterdam, 2011).

⁸ Cf. Michael Burke, "Discourse implicature, Quintilian and the Lucidity Principle: rhetorical phenomena in pragmatics", *Topics in Linguistics* 17, 1 (2016), 1–16; Francesca Piazza, "Rhetoric and Pragmatics: Suggestions for a Fruitful Dialogue", in: *Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy*, eds. A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, M. Carapezza, (London, 2013), 537–555 (hereinafter: Piazza, "Rhetoric and Pragmatics"); Igor Žagar, "Pa, a modifier of connectives: an argumentative analysis", in: *South Slavic Discourse Particles*, eds. M. N. Dedaić and M. Mišković-Luković (Amsterdam–Philadelphia, 2010), 133–162.

⁹ Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach* (Cambridge, 2004) (hereinafter: van Eemeren and Grootendorst, *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation*); Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton, "Implicatures as forms of argument", in: *Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy*, eds. A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, M. Carapezza, (London, 2013), 203–225; Christopher W. Tindale, *Acts of Arguing. A Rhetorical Model of Argument* (Albany, 1999) (hereinafter: Tindale, *Acts of Arguing*).

¹⁰ Cornelia Ilie, "Identity co-construction in parliamentary discourse practices", in: *European Parliaments under Scrutiny*, ed. C. Ilie (Amsterdam, 2010), 57–78; Stefan D. Keller, "Combining rhetoric and pragmatics to read *Othello*", *English Studies* 91, 4 (2010), 398–411.

contemporary insight into the relationship between (public) persuasion and the (speaker's) character. In section 3, I outline the notion of implicit meaning in pragmatics and attempt to link classical rhetoric with pragmatics through an overview of the "pragmatic" dimension of rhetorical ethos, and, in section 4, I focus on *ethotic* strategies that are related to the notion of authority. As they were a typical rhetorical feature in the Roman Republic, I describe these strategies under the term "traditional rhetorical ethos" and demonstrate their originality with examples from early Roman rhetoric. Next, I combine this notion of rhetorical ethos with Verschueren's model of linguistic pragmatics to explore rhetorical ethos as a persuasive strategy in the context of different social roles of the orator in ancient Rome. In section 5, I focus on Verschueren's idea of various types of implicit meaning and present a case study, in which I analyze the role of implicitness in the construction of rhetorical ethos in (early) Roman rhetoric. The analysis aims to show how an interaction between the explicit and the implicit reflects a discursive construction of the speaker's character and its role in the argumentative discourse. The results suggest that a combined approach to pragmatics and rhetorical-argumentative theories allows the persuasive strategies to be more thoroughly reconstructed, thus offering a better insight into their dynamics.

The Notion of Rhetorical Ethos

Let us begin with one of Aristotle's famous definitions of rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever" (*Rh.* 1355b).¹¹ The importance of his definition of rhetoric lies not only in the fact that it represents an attempt to describe rhetoric as a theoretical discipline,¹² but also in the fact that it represents the first systematic treatment of the concept of rhetorical means of persuasion.¹³ Right after his introductory definition of rhetoric, Aristotle (*Rh.* 1355b25–26) explores the term of "persuasion" and introduces the notion of *pistis* (in different contexts translated as "proof", "means of persuasion", "belief"). He proposes a general classification of the two kinds of *pisteis* and a further conceptualization within the second type of *pisteis* (i.e., *pisteis enteknoi*), which embodies the three subtypes that are constructed by the speaker and belong to the art of rhetoric (*Rh.* 1355b35–

¹¹ Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, translated by J. H. Freese, Loeb Classical Library 193 (Cambridge, 1926), 15 (hereinafter: Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*).

¹² Piazza, "Rhetoric and Pragmatics", 540.

¹³ The concept also appears under the name "modes of persuasion", cf. Frans H. van Eemeren et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Argumentation Theory* (Dordrecht, 2014), 117.



Aristotle (Wikipedia Commons)

1356a1). Aristotle (*Rb.* 1356a1–4) says further:

Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove.¹⁴

The quoted passage became the foundation for the concepts of *ethos* (i.e., the presentation of the trustworthy character of the speaker), *pathos* (i.e., the speaker's arousal of audiences' emotions) and *logos* (i.e., the speaker's use of logical arguments). In the Greco–Roman rhetorical system, different ideas

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, 17.

were incorporated under the notion of ethos. In the broadest sense, rhetorical ethos denoted a speaker's favorable character presentation as well as the presentation of any character in a speech. When trying to understand how ethos worked as a persuasive strategy within the Greco–Roman public discourse, the ancient notion of character has to be considered, as it differs from today's views regarding the combination of mental characteristics and behavior. A person's character was seen as something entirely practical, that is, as a set of moral elements (regarding vice and virtue), which were perceived as the result of one's actions and their social background, such as ethnic origin, social position, profession and political engagement.¹⁵ As building elements of the speaker's public image, they played a central part in the process of (public) persuasion. Hence the appreciation of a speaker for Greco–Roman audiences was almost entirely a matter of sociocultural norms of *the polis* and the *res publica*. In other words, the discursive construction of one's "socially acceptable" character significantly contributed to the general persuasiveness of the speaker and the content of their speech as well (i.e., the strength or credibility of their case/argument). Six main conceptualizations of ethos can be identified within the Greco–Roman rhetorical system based on this general view of one's character:

1. Aristotle's conception of the credibility of the speaker is based on his discursive construction of practical wisdom (*phronesis*), virtue (*arete*), and goodwill (*eunoia*). As a part of the three technical means of persuasion, rhetorical ethos belongs within the realm of rhetorical invention. It represents one of the most important persuasive means, which has to be constructed within the speech and not on the basis of a previous assumption.¹⁶
2. In Plato and Isocrates' view, rhetorical ethos is the revelation of a speaker's moral character and his proper way of living (*epieikeia*), which pre-dates the discourse and should be reflected in the discourse.¹⁷
3. In sophistic and textbook conceptions character presentation is entirely subordinated to the speaker's persuasive intent; it thus may or may not reveal their moral character. Ethos is not an independent concept, but a persuasive strategy (or a set of strategies) that is part of other rhetorical concepts (i.e., *topoi*, *parts of speech*, *style*, and *performance*). The main function of these strategies was to enable the speaker to influence the emotions of the audience and thus intervene into their

¹⁵ For the character as a "practical" concept in modern theories of argumentation, see Douglas Walton, *Ad Hominem Arguments* (Tuscaloosa, 1998), 178 ss (hereinafter: Walton, *Ad Hominem Arguments*).

¹⁶ Cf. Arist. *Rb.* 1378a6–20; 1356a8–13.

¹⁷ Cf. Plato *Gorg.* 503d–e; 504d5–e3, Isocrates *Antid.* 278.

opinions or judgments.¹⁸

4. Roman traditional view was based on traditional Roman oratory and the notion of character presentation was focused on the speaker's pre-existing social authority. It is closely connected with argumentative practices in different institutional procedures, such as the court of law, legislative procedures, and others.¹⁹
5. Cicero's conception derived from Aristotelian and Hellenistic rhetorical precepts. His view of persuasion through the character of the speaker is integrated into the doctrine of speaker's tasks (i.e., *officia oratoris*: *docere*, *conciliare/delectare*, and *movere*) and in the doctrine of style (i.e., *genus subtile*, *medius*, and *grande*). However, his conception of rhetorical ethos was also significantly marked by traditional Roman views on the persuasive function of the speaker's character.²⁰
6. In Quintilian's conception persuasion through the character of the speaker was mostly based on Cicero's view. A notion of *ethos* as a part of emotions is developed, which can already be found in Cicero (i.e., *ethos* as gentle emotions—*lenis affectus*, as opposed to more violent emotions—*vehemens affectus* or *pathos*).²¹

Modern research of rhetorical ethos is diverse and ranges from the study of historical and current theoretical conceptualizations of character presentation to its practical applications. Apart from historical approaches, which include the diversity of Greco–Roman views of rhetorical ethos, theories of rhetoric and argumentation mainly focus on "Aristotelian ethos". As a concept, it is either incorporated into theoretical models of argumentation²² or combined with other perspectives on persuasion and/or argumentation, which are part of discourse studies, pragmatics, communication theory, and others.²³

¹⁸ Cf. *Rb. Al.* 1431b9–19, 1436a33–39, etc. With exception to Aristotle's model of the three *pisteis*, which presents *ethos* and *pathos* as two distinct categories, most of other ancient notions demonstrate a certain conceptual and semantic overlap of a character presentation and arousal of emotions.

¹⁹ Cf. Cic. *De sen.* 61.7.10, *Brut.* 111.4–112.1; Quint. *Inst.* 5.12.10.1–4; Gell. *N. A.* 4.18.3–5.

²⁰ Cf. Cic. *De or.* 2.115–116, 2.182, 2.212.

²¹ Cf. Cic. *De or.* 2.183; Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.1.

²² Cf. Alan Brinton, "Ethotic argument", *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 3 (1986), 245–258; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation*; Walton, *Ad Hominem Arguments*.

²³ Cf. Tindale, *Acts of Arguing*; Ruth Amossy, "Ethos at the crossroads of disciplines: rhetoric, pragmatics, sociology", *Poetics Today* 22, 1 (2001), 1–23; Michael Leff, "Perelman, ad hominem argument, and rhetorical ethos", *Argumentation* 23, 3 (2009), 301–311; Janja Žmavc, "The ethos of classical rhetoric: from *epieikeia* to *auctoritas*", in: *Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory: Twenty Exploratory Studies*, eds. F. H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen (Dordrecht, 2012), 181–191 (hereinafter: Žmavc, "The ethos of classical rhetoric"). In this paper, I only focus on rhetorical and argumentation theories and their attempts to include general views on the ethos of other disciplines. For different modern notions of




Figure 1: Greco–Roman conceptualizations of rhetorical ethos

The Linguistic Pragmatic Dimension of Rhetorical Ethos

From the perspective of pragmatics, persuasion can be seen as an interactive process in which linguistic choices are made with specific aims.²⁴ Ethos, pathos, and logos thus represent three inextricably connected approaches to persuasive language use, in which the speaker, the audience, and the subject are linked together with time and the place of occurrence. The dynamics of their activation in the discourse (i.e., which approach is foregrounded as a persuasive strategy) and the nature of their linguistic and non-linguistic manifestation (e.g., the patterns of word choices, explicit/implicit choices, etc.) depends on the wider sociocultural and situational context in which the discourse is anchored. In other words, the use of strategies of character presentation, emotional appeal, or argumentation of speakers depends on the time, the place, and the sociocultural background of the audience.

I shall focus on the notion of traditional ethos and its representations as they can be reconstructed from the texts of the early Roman Republic. As a gen-

ethos, see Maria Zaleśka, "Rhetorical patterns of constructing the politician's *ethos*", in: *Rhetoric and Politics. Central/Eastern European Perspectives*, ed. M. Zaleśka (Cambridge, 2012), 20–50.

²⁴ Cf. Jan-Ola Östman, "Persuasion as implicit anchoring: The case of collocations", in: *Persuasion across Genres. A Linguistic Approach*, eds. H. Halmari and T. Virtanen (Amsterdam–Philadelphia, 2005), 192 (hereinafter: Östman, "Persuasion").

eral conceptual framework, a socio-cultural viewpoint on rhetorical ethos is adopted and combined with the notions from linguistic pragmatics to explore the functions, forms, and contexts of Roman ethos and its explicit/implicit nature. The implicit part is of particular importance because it can carry relevant or even crucial information for the speaker's construction of a trustworthy character and consequently a successful persuasion of their audience. Such a perspective is grounded in the characteristics of the early Roman rhetoric and the speaker/orator as a focal point of public persuasion in the *res publica*. It is known that the majority of the public deliberative, judicial, and epideictic performances were limited to the members of the governing elite in Roman society, particularly in the 3rd and 2nd century BC.²⁵ Rhetorical ethos therefore represented a persuasion strategy of a particular social groups and at the same time reflected and secured the speakers' dominant social position.

A pragmatically oriented approach towards the analysis of rhetorical ethos allows to investigate the implicit meaning as part of the ethotic rhetorical strategy. In the process of conveying meaning, such an approach is based on "strategic avoidance of explicitness"²⁶, especially regarding the discursive representations of a speaker's authority as one of the important socio-cultural phenomena in the context of the early Roman rhetoric. The notion of implicit meaning has been thoroughly studied within linguistic pragmatics, which defines it as a "range of meanings that go beyond what is given by the language form itself, or what is literally said".²⁷ Following Verschueren's conceptualization, three important characteristics of implicit meaning must be taken into account when we approach language "as a form of action anchored in a real-world context, or what is perceived as such"²⁸: (a) because a complete explicitness in language is impossible to achieve, the implicit meaning emerges from the contextually embedded action character of speech or text; (b) implicit meaning is not a fixed entity but is shaped and reshaped in the course of linguistic interaction; it is a part of the meaning-generating processes where it interacts with explicit meaning; (c) conventional means for conveying implicit (and explicit) meaning are manipulable and can be strategically exploited. At this point, it is also

²⁵ Cf. Joy Connolly, *The State of Speech. Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome* (Princeton–Oxford, 2007) (hereinafter: Connolly, *The State of Speech*); George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World 300 B.C.–A. D. 300* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1972) (hereinafter: Kennedy, *The art of Rhetoric*); Catherine Steel, *Roman oratory. Greece and Rome* (Cambridge, 2006) (hereinafter: Steel, *Roman oratory*); Catherine Steel and Henriette van der Bloom, *Community and Communication. Oratory & Politics in Republican Rome* (Oxford, 2013) (hereinafter: Steel and van der Bloom, *Community and Communication*).

²⁶ Verschueren, *Understanding Pragmatics*, 31.

²⁷ Ibid., 25. Cf. also Piotr Cap and Marta Dynel (eds.), *Implicitness: From lexis to discourse* (Amsterdam, 2017).

²⁸ Ibid., 25–26.

worth mentioning Östman's general remarks on the notion of persuasion.²⁹ He sees implicitness as the essential part of persuasion and marks the distinction between explicit and implicit choices of meaning as communication, which is simultaneously taking place on several levels (i.e., the explicit and implicit level). Östman underlines that "implicit communication is not hidden communication" since the speakers make linguistic choices (though they are implicit) and interlocutors or addressees are expected to decipher the manner in which their message is anchored implicitly.³⁰

By applying Verschueren's and Östman's general remarks to rhetorical ethos, let us try to define the implicit nature of the construction of the speaker's character. Considering ancient cultural presuppositions on the character and the role of the speaker in the Roman society, an orator (among other things) had to be capable of strategically exploiting "the impossibility of being fully explicit"³¹ in presenting himself as an authority. In practice, he would "use different linguistic devices to accomplish different kinds of anchoring".³² Needless to say, implicitness in the context of persuasion is not typical only for Roman rhetoric as a social practice or rhetorical ethos as a theoretical notion.³³ However, due to the socio-cultural context, rhetorical ethos as a traditional feature of Roman public address can be seen as a strategy with a particularly significant persuasive function.

Let us touch upon the methodology used in the case study. The main research question was: What happens with the construction of the speaker's character from the explicit/implicit perspective? In the search for answers, the theory and methodology of linguistic pragmatics were combined with the analysis of rhetorical ethos in the texts of early Roman orators.

In the rhetorical framework, Aristotle's concept of rhetorical ethos as part of the three means of persuasion (*ethos-pathos-logos*) was used and contextualized with the theoretical perspectives of Roman rhetoric as a social prac-

²⁹ Östman, "Persuasion", 192-193.

³⁰ Ibid., 192. To properly explore the process of implicit anchoring in language, Östman (Ibid., 194-199) further presents a pragmatic toolkit of three parameters (i.e., *coherence, politeness, involvement*), which can be applied to the analysis of implicit communication.

³¹ Verschueren, *Understanding Pragmatics*, 31.

³² Östman, "Persuasion", 192.

³³ Let us point out just two examples: (a) one of the cornerstone elements in rhetorical argumentation, Aristotle's enthymeme, is fundamentally grounded on the implicit element (i.e., major premise); (b) there are conventional linguistic strategies within the classical concept of *ornatus* (e.g., wide range of tropes and figures of speech) that are based on deliberate avoiding of explicitness and are used to communicate implicature-type added meaning. Cf. Nemesi, "Implicature Phenomena"; Jef Verschueren, *Ideology in Language Use. Pragmatic Guidelines for Empirical Research*, (Cambridge, 2012), 171 (hereinafter: Verschueren, *Ideology in Language Use*).

tice.³⁴ At this point a linguistic pragmatics perspective becomes relevant. Contrary to a narrower rhetorical view of rhetorical ethos as one of the means of persuasion, the linguistic pragmatic approach allows an insight into various contextual dimensions of rhetorical ethos as well as the dynamics of their linguistic activation in the discourse. Moreover, linguistic pragmatics can provide a well-established theoretical framework and methodological toolkit to analyze the generation of meaning. The study of implicit meaning was mainly motivated by Grice's famous theory of implicature, which has been extensively treated in different theoretical perspectives.³⁵ The following analysis is based on Verschueren's theoretical model of linguistic pragmatics, which represents a dynamic of meaning generation in connection to social structures, processes, and relations.

Here is a brief summary of the core elements of Verschueren's theory. In Verschueren's opinion, the use of language represents an activity that generates meaning. It consists of the continuous choice making, not only on the various levels of linguistic structure but also pertaining to communicative strategies and even at the contextual level.³⁶ In his research of implicit meaning, Verschueren focuses on the investigation of conventionalized carriers of implicit meaning, which link explicit content to relevant aspects of background information and are conceptualized as *types of implicit meaning*. He distinguishes between the more highly coded (1) *presupposition* (implicit meaning that must be pre-supposed, understood, taken for granted for an utterance to make sense) and (2) *implication* (known as logical implication, entailment, or conventional implicature, that is, implicit meaning that can be logically inferred from a form of expression). The other two types need to be inferred by addressees: (3) *generalized conversational implicature* (implicit meaning that can be conventionally, or by default, inferred from forms of expression in combination with

³⁴ Cf. Kennedy, *The art of Rhetoric*; Steel, *Roman oratory*; Steel and van der Bloom, *Community and Communication*; Richard L. Enos, *Roman Rhetoric. Revolution and the Greek Influence* (Prospect Heights, 1995); James M. May, *Trials of Character. The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos* (Chapel Hill–London, 1988) (hereinafter: May, *Trials of Character*).

³⁵ Cf. Robyn Carston, "The explicit/implicit distinction in pragmatics and the limits of explicit communication", *International Review of Pragmatics* 1, 1 (2009), 35–63; Stephen C. Levinson, *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature* (Cambridge, 2000); Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, "Relevance theory", in: *The Handbook of Pragmatics*, eds. L. R Horn and G. Ward (Oxford, 2004), 607–632. For a summary of extensive research on implicature, see also Nemesi, "Implicature Phenomena", 134.

³⁶ The concept of linguistic choices and notions of *variability*, *negotiability*, *adaptability* that make sense of process/activity of choice-making, as well as contextual correlates of adaptability that motivate and/or are affected by the choices, are outlined in his book *Understanding Pragmatics*. Liu and Zhu point out the similarities between Verschueren's "key notions" and certain rhetorical concepts, such as *adaptation*, *choice*, *salience*, which can be found in contemporary rhetorical scholarship (Liu and Zhu, "Rhetoric as the *Antistrophos*", 3405).

assumed standard adherence to conversational maxims), and (4) *particularized conversational implicatures* (implicit meaning inferred from the obvious flouting of a conversational maxim in combination with assumed adherence to a principle of conversational cooperation).³⁷ In Verschueren's opinion these conceptions of implicitness help to investigate how different types of implicit meaning, functioning at different levels, interact with explicit meaning in the meaning-generating processes in any discourse.³⁸ To get meaningful interpretations of the strategic interplay between explicit and implicit in the construction of rhetorical ethos, I applied different principles from Verschueren's pragmatic approach, such as (a) investigation of different aspects of context from the general to the specific levels (i.e., *wider social, political and historical context* of early Roman rhetoric and related texts; *immediate context of situation* referring to the "actors" involved in the analyzed discourse; *linguistic context*—a textual/speech dimension of contextualization) and (b) investigation of certain conventions of language use, which are mobilized in the analyzed discourse as linguistic choices relevant for the construction of ethos (e.g., *language code and style, patterns of word choice, carriers of implicit meaning, activity type*).

Roman Rhetorical Ethos, Authority, and Implicitness—A Linguistic Pragmatic Perspective on the Strategies of Character Presentation of Early Roman Orators

In the last two sections of the paper, I present a case study based on the analysis of the role of implicitness in the construction of rhetorical ethos in the early Roman rhetoric. Descriptions of the early Roman orators and fragments of their extant speeches have been selected to identify the main elements of the speaker's ethos, their explicit and implicit linguistic manifestations, as well as to determine the function of ethotic strategies with persuasive effect. Because implicit meaning, an essential part of this analysis, represents a notion that is highly context-dependent, historical and social context is presented.

The following paragraph offers a short outline of relevant historical and political background. It presents the social and cultural aspects of rhetoric during the early Roman Republic as they motivated and/or were affected by the linguistic choices of the early Roman orators. Before it came into close contact with the conceptualized Greek *rhetorike tekhnē*, the early Roman rhetoric (3rd/2nd century BC), an oratorical practice, reflected Rome's social and politi-

³⁷ Verschueren, *Understanding Pragmatics*, 27–36.

³⁸ Cf. Verschueren, *Ideology in Language Use*, 159.

cal situation. Public oratory played an important part in society; nevertheless, a group of Roman aristocratic families, who played an important part in the economic and political growth of *res publica*, influenced all socio-cultural activities including public speaking. Persuasive techniques that were practiced in the early Roman rhetoric (i.e., the native oratory) in some part represented a tool of political power. At the same time, however, their central function was to sustain and transmit traditional political, social and cultural values of the dominant social group.³⁹ Social and political structures, such as courts (with *patronus–cliens* system), political offices (*contio* and *senatus*—each with specialized audiences and procedures for speakers) as well as funerals (a well-known "place" for emotional character presentation and establishing connections between individual's traits and cultural patterns), offered leading opportunities for orators as well as determined their key persuasive strategies.⁴⁰ Since Roman orators, based on their social and political ranking, represented a widely renowned authority and were a focal point of traditional (native) forms of public speaking in Rome, persuasion was deeply influenced by the use of strategies of the speaker's character presentation.⁴¹ The concept of Roman (traditional) rhetorical ethos is based on the Roman conception of a person's "character" as an inherited trait from one's ancestors, which remained constant from birth and determined one's actions. As a strategy of persuasion, the presentation of a speaker's character represented a broad concept on the quantitative and qualitative level, which differed significantly from the Greek conceptions of rhetorical ethos.⁴² Roman ethos was a combination of *collective* and *individual ethos*. It consisted of political and military accomplishments of a speaker's family members (i.e., collective ethos of the *gens*) and of speaker's authority, which arose from the actions of the speaker himself and proved his ethotic value. Individual ethos was based on the set of virtues, acknowledged in Roman society as praiseworthy and vital for one's public activity: (1) *gratia* 'influence and popularity based on the number of services owed to the speaker'; (2) *gloria* 'glory as a consequence of speaker's past actions (i.e., *res gestae*)'; (3) *existimatio* 'reputation based on his oratorical and political skills'; (4) *dignitas* 'dignity as a result of speaker's social status and moral conduct'; (5) *auctoritas* 'authority as a consequence of exhibition of wisdom gained through practical experience, expert knowledge and a sense of responsibility in public and

³⁹ Cf. Kennedy, *The art of Rhetoric*; May, *Trials Of Character*; Connolly, *The State of Speech*.

⁴⁰ Cf. Steel, *Roman oratory*; van der Bloom, *Oratory and Political Career*.

⁴¹ This circumstance influenced further development of Roman rhetoric, which is particularly evident in Cicero's speeches and theoretical discussions on rhetoric (cf. May, *Trials Of Character*, 5–6).

⁴² For discussion see Žmavc, "The ethos of classical rhetoric", 181–189.



Scipio Africanus
(Wikipedia Commons;
attribution: Miguel
Hermoso Cuesta)

private life'.⁴³ Another characteristic of Roman ethos as a strategy of persuasion refers to its linguistic manifestations in the discourse. Since it reflected socio-political circumstances and cultural assumptions about human nature and

⁴³ See Balsdon (1960) and May (1988) for ancient sources on the use of different notions.

character, Roman rhetorical ethos conveys a pre-existing nature (i.e., ethos is not constructed *in* the discourse but reflected *by* the discourse) and contains emotional connotations (i.e., a fusion with pathos). As a final remark, it should be added that Roman rhetorical ethos commonly also carries an argumentative function. Arguments based on the speaker's character represented a legitimate source of proof and were discursively realized either in the form of "ethical narrative" (i.e., facts that were represented as reflections of speaker's character—e.g., the defense of Cato the Elder)⁴⁴ or as a part of authority's argument (i.e., arguments based on the explicit or implicit premise "because I say so"—e.g., the purported defense of Scipio Africanus).

Now, consider the following examples 1–4 in the proposed context:

- (1) *Quid de Paulo aut Africano loquar aut ut iam ante de Maximo? quorum non in sententia solum, sed etiam in nutu residebat auctoritas.*

And what shall I say of Paulus, and of Africanus, and of Maximus, of whom I have spoken before? These men had power, not only in their speech, but in their very nod. (Cic. *De sen.* 61.7.10; emphasis added)

- (2) *In Scauri oratione, sapientis hominis et recti, gravitas summa et naturalis quaedam inerat auctoritas, non ut causam sed ut testimonium dicere putares, cum pro reo diceret.*

In the oratory of Scaurus, a wise man and upright, there was great dignity and a certain innate authority, so that when he spoke for a client you had the feeling of one giving testimony, not of one pleading a case. (Cic. *Brut.* 111.4–112.1; emphasis added)

- (3) *Inde enim illa nobilis Scauri defensio: 'Q. Varius Sucronensis ait Aemilium Scaurum rem publicam populi Romani prodidisse: Aemilius Scaurus negat'.*

Hence Scaurus' grand defense: "Quintus Varius of Sucro alleges that Aemilius Scaurus has betrayed the common interests of the Roman people; Aemilius Scaurus denies it." (Quint. *Inst.* 5.12.10.1–4; emphasis added)

- (4) *Valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum, animosque eorum, apud quos agetur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam cum erga oratorem tum erga illum, pro quo*

⁴⁴ A fragment from Cato's defense speech *De sumptu suo* (On my expenses) is preserved, in which Cato the Elder, being accused (164 BC) of leading a luxurious private lifestyle contrary to his public demands for frugal government of the state, successfully defended himself by the narration of his good deeds for the country (*individual ethos*) and the recitation of his ancestors' deeds (*collective ethos*).

dicet orator. Conciliantur autem animi dignitate hominis, rebus gestis, existimatione vitae; quae facilius ornari possunt, si modo sunt, quam fingi, si nulla sunt.

A potent factor in success, then, is for the characters, principles, conduct and course of life, both of those who are to plead cases and of their clients, to be approved, and conversely those of their opponents condemned; and for the feelings of the tribunal to be won over, as far as possible, to goodwill towards the advocate and the advocate's client as well. Now feelings are won over by a man's merit, achievements or reputable life, qualifications easier to embellish, if only they are real than to fabricate where nonexistent. (Cic. *De or.* 2.182; emphasis added)

Examples 1–4 represent reports on the early Roman orators and characteristics of their oratory. Despite the fact that the actual speeches are not preserved, it is interesting to observe in Cicero and Quintilian's descriptions of the early Roman oratory how the character of the speaker is constantly foregrounded. It is presented as an important (i.e., effective) persuasive strategy (4) and is directly associated with the Roman oratory tradition as the catalog of historically significant Roman figures suggest in examples 1–3. The traditional Roman rhetorical ethos is also founded on one's social status and moral virtues (4) that may not even include linguistic manifestation (example 1). In examples 1–3 a moral authority (that "precedes the speaker") in the form of presupposition is implied, and the character of the speaker as the source of proof is evident in examples 2–3.

The Ethotic Value of "because I say so": the Anecdotic Defense of Scipio Africanus

From descriptive accounts of rhetorical strategies, which focus on ethos and were used in abundance by the early Roman orators, according to Cicero and Quintilian, let us now turn to another famous fragment from the early Roman oratory, in which the ethos reveals a similarly foregrounded position. The quotation represents a fragment from the purported defense of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (235–183 BC), a famous Roman politician and a military general from the early Roman Republic, who was known for his oratorical skills and public performance. Scipio Africanus' alleged speech refers to historic events around 184 BC when the tribune Marcus Naevius charged him with

accepting money from King Antiochus of Asia.⁴⁵ The verbatim quotation can be found in *The Attic Nights*, a commonplace book written by Antonine scholar Aulus Gellius (125/128–180 AD); however, several ancient authors report that Scipio Africanus delivered a speech at this occasion with similar content. The event is part of the collection of Scipionic anecdotes, which originate from the annalistic literary (historiographical) tradition and represented a fundamental element in the construction of heroic and moral(istic) discourse as part of the early Roman Republican imagery.

Despite the general acceptance of Gellius' verbatim quotes as authentic, the passage on Africanus seems to be "Gellius' own elaboration of the annalistic theme than a passage in the circulating speech".⁴⁶ However, when taking into account other extant fragments and examples from the early Roman oratory, Gellius' depiction of Scipio Africanus' speech can help us explore the idea of variety of practices in the construction of rhetorical ethos in the early Roman rhetoric, since Gellius was educated in rhetoric and above all well read in Latin and Greek authors (Roman oratorical tradition included).⁴⁷ The following case study, which highlights some of the characteristics of the early Roman persuasive strategies, does not question if Scipio Africanus said what Gellius (or previous sources) attributed to him, but *how* Gellius represents Scipio Africanus as an orator in the socio-cultural context of the early Roman Republic. From an intertextual perspective, the quoted passage from Gellius accounts for a specific type of discourse. Due to various strategic communicative goals (e.g., to emphasize an event, to highlight character traits of a person, to add a source credibility to his descriptions, etc.), the author (i.e., Gellius) presents "exact" words (i.e., the speech) of the speaker (i.e., Scipio Africanus) along with the language use that relates to the linguistic and socio-cultural context of the speaker.⁴⁸ From

⁴⁵ A short historical background of the event: After Antiochus had advanced into Greece, Publius Africanus' brother Lucius was given the command, Africanus serving as his legate; they defeated Antiochus at Magnesia. In 187 BC, Lucius was accused of refusing to account for 500 talents received from Antiochus; Africanus may have been charged but not condemned in 184 BC. For the problems with accuracy and reliability of traditional sources and a possible reconstruction of historic events see Erich S. Gruen, "The 'Fall' of the Scipios", in: *Leaders and Masses in the Roman World. Studies in the Honor of Zvi Yavetz*, eds. I. Malkin and Z. W. Rubinsohn (Leiden, 1995), 59–80.

⁴⁶ Leofranc Holford-Strevens, *Aulus Gellius. An Antonine Scholar and His Achievement. Revised Edition* (Oxford, 2003), 194 (hereinafter Holford-Strevens, *Aulus Gellius*)

⁴⁷ For the relevance of Gellius' verbatim quotes to the study of the early Roman oratory and problems related to the sources for the early Roman oratory, in general, see Henriette van der Bloom, *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge, 2016), 11–21 (hereinafter: van der Bloom, *Oratory and Political Career*).

⁴⁸ Stylistic aspects of Gellius' language use are extensively treated in Holford-Strevens, *Aulus Gellius*, 48–64. The author thoroughly discusses quotations, indirect reports and other types of intertextual references in *The Attic Nights* from the morphological and syntactical perspective (i.e., the authentic pre-classical and republican Latin words uses as well as the author's archaisms and neologisms from the period of Antoine Latin).

antiquity onwards, these strategies constituted a literary tradition of history writing. Moreover, the whole literary tradition of the 2nd century AD reflects tendencies of the scholarly study of ancient texts (from the early and late Republic) and their vocabulary. The idea of the analysis of Gellius' quotation is thus to acknowledge the "literary/interpretative" role of the quoted text, yet at the same time try to identify the main elements of the discursive construction of Scipio Africanus' ethos and to determine its function in the context of his defense. Special attention is paid to the strategies where the interplay between explicit and implicit meaning generation is relevant for the representation of his authority since the latter represents the primary source of proof in the case. Considering the socio-cultural context of the early Roman Republic (i.e., the role of the public orator), an attempt is being made to find out whether Scipio Africanus' ethos as persuasive strategy is manifested predominantly through presuppositions or implications and implicatures and how it is a set of *propositions* of "who and what Scipio Africanus was" related to the issue of the case.

Let us now see what Scipio Africanus said in his defense according to Gellius:

- (5) *Cum M. Naevius tribunus plebis accusaret eum ad populum diceretque accepisse a rege Antiocho pecuniam, ut condicionibus gratiosis et molibus pax cum eo populi Romani nomine fieret, et quaedam item alia crimini daret indigna tali viro, tum Scipio pauca praeatus quae dignitas vitae suae atque gloria postulabat, (b) 'Memoria,' inquit, 'Quirites, repeto, diem esse bodiurnum quo Hannibalem Poenum imperio vestro inimicissimum magno proelio vici in terra Africa pacemque et victoriam vobis peperit spectabilem. (c) Non igitur simus adversum deos ingrati et, censeo, relinquamus nebulonem hunc, eamus hinc protinus Iovi optimo maximo gratulatum.' (d) Id cum dixisset, avertit et ire ad Capitolium coepit. (e) Tum contio universa, quae ad sententiam de Scipione ferendam convenerat, relicto tribuno, Scipionem in Capitolium comitata atque inde ad aedes eius cum laetitia et gratulatione sollemni prosecuta est.*

When Marcus Naevius, tribune of the commons, accused him before the people and declared that he had received money from king Antiochus to make peace with him in the name of the Roman people on favorable and easy terms, and when the tribune added sundry other charges which were unworthy of so great a man, then Scipio, after a few preliminary remarks such as were called for by the dignity and renown of his life, said: "I recall, fellow citizens, that this is the day on which in Africa in a mighty battle I conquered Hannibal the Carthaginian, the most bitter enemy of your power, and won for you a splendid

peace and a glorious victory. Let us then not be ungrateful to the gods, but, I suggest, let us leave this worthless fellow, and go at once to render thanks to Jupiter, greatest and best of gods." So saying he turned away and set out for the Capitol. Thereupon the whole assembly, which had gathered to pass judgment on Scipio, left the tribune, accompanied Scipio to the Capitol, and then escorted him to his home with the joy and expressions of gratitude suited to a festal occasion. (Aul. Gell. *NA* 4.18.3–5; emphasis added)

In the depiction of the wider historical and literary context of *The Attic Nights*, two things should be kept in mind. Firstly, in the Latin literature of the 2nd century AD, the return to archaic linguistic and literary models became a "new dominant taste".⁴⁹ This led to the rediscovery of archaic (i.e., the early Roman) literature and oratory and its wider use: either in the form of direct imitation in public or as part of various literary intertextual strategies. Secondly, Gellius, having great literary sensibility and being the author of a particular type of literature (i.e., a lexicographical collection of miscellaneous material), had a profound interest in all archaic Latin, oratory included.⁵⁰ This is evident from numerous inclusions of fragments and testimonies about speeches, speech acts, and occasion of public speaking.⁵¹ Since they are an integral part of short anecdotal accounts, his oratorical intertextual elements are always tailored to a particular context. The story about Scipio's defense is a part of a chapter, in which Gellius presents events in the life of Scipio Africanus with a prefatory note of their annalistic origin and moral significance.⁵² From descriptions of the event and the character of Scipio Africanus (i.e., the co-text of the speech/quotation in (5a), (5d) and (5e)), a traditional portrayal "of what was thought appropriate to a noble Roman" is evident.⁵³ The image of Scipio Africanus consists of a depiction of an elite member of society, who is privileged to speak and is worthy of admiration due to his merits and moral character (5a), which also grant him liberty and authority in public conduct (examples (5d) and (5e)). Such characterization belongs to a discourse of "admiration for

⁴⁹ Gian Biagio Conte, *Latin Literature. A History*, translated by Joseph B. Solodow, revised by Don Fowler and Glenn W. Most (Baltimore–London, 1994), 580 (hereinafter: Conte, *Latin Literature*)

⁵⁰ In the investigation of the referential framework that constitutes the cultural, social and linguistic context of the cited passage in example (5), I followed Verschueren's theory of contextual correlates (1999).

⁵¹ Cf. van der Bloom, *Oratory and Political Career*, 19.

⁵² Cf. Gell. *NA* 4.18.1

⁵³ Kennedy, *The art of Rhetoric*, 6.

the stern and sturdy virtue of old Rome".⁵⁴ However, paralleled with less problematic fragments (regarding authenticity) from the early Roman oratory that contain blunt and authoritative public address of an aristocratic orator (e.g., cited examples 1–4), Gellius' construction of the event depicts similar socio-cultural contextual elements that motivate and/or are affected by the linguistic choices in the quoted speech. Additionally, there are elements of the immediate/situational and linguistic context that can be identified on the discursive (i.e., textual/speech) level and are relevant for the implicit meaning generation in Scipio's ethos construction:

- Utterer: In (5b) Scipio Africanus presents himself as a renowned authority to the audience and uses his own voice (first person singular) when referring to his role in the past historical event and the importance of his actions for Romans. In (5c) he switches to the use of the 1st person plural when he positions himself as part of the collective (i.e., the Romans) and present actions, which should be taken to prevent anger of the gods.
- Interpreters: (I) people of Rome—primary audience, directly addressed by Scipio to secure their attention and influence their decision; (II) Marcus Naevius, tribune of the commons—a prosecutor, presented in (5c) as a side participant and indirectly addressed by the use of pejorative description (i.e., *bic nebulo*, "this worthless fellow").
- Mental states: The use of the first person plural and a hortatory subjunctive mood in the second part reveals utterer's personal and emotional involvement in the actions he is proposing.
- Aspects of social/institutional settings: Within a "defense speech" performed in the context of judicial event in (5e) (i.e., *contio ... ad sententiam ... ferendam convenerat*, "assembly ... gathered to pass judgement"), religious practices in (5c) (i.e., *adversum deos ingrati*, "not be ungrateful to the gods"; *gratulatum*, "render thanks") and "institutions" in (5c) and (5e) are invoked (i.e., *Iovi Optimo Maximo*, "Juppiter greatest and best of gods"; *in Capitolinum*, "for the Capitol") as a reminder of the role of religion in Roman social structures (e.g., Juppiter as the bestower of military victory).
- Temporal and spatial anchor of the discourse: As a response to the accusations, a relevance of past events for a present state of affairs is emphasized, and a new spatial point of reference is given. In (5c) the

⁵⁴ Holford-Strevens, *Aulus Gellius*, 255. This strategy represents a constant element in Roman literature that precedes Antonine period and was much admired by Gellius. For the specifics of Gellius' attitude towards antiquarian traditions and the literary taste of Antonine period, see Holford-Strevens (*Aulus Gellius*, 255–259) and Conte (*Latin Literature*, 580–584).

present spatial point is "judicial" and bears a negative connotation as a representation of an unnecessary and improper trial. It is marked by linguistic choices of a description of the accuser, who should remain at the present place (i.e., *relinquamus nebulonem hunc*, "let us leave this worthless fellow in"), and of the swiftness of leaving the present location by the utterer and the rest of the audience (i.e., *eamus hinc protinus*, "let us go at once in"). The new spatial point, which is suggested by the utterer, is "religious" and bears a positive connotation as a place where a sacred duty needs to be performed.

- Markers of co(n)textual cohesion in (5b) and (5c): anaphora (*vestro-vobis*), self-reference (*repeto, vici, peper**i, censeo*), contrasting (*ingrati-gratulatum; nebulo-Iuppiter*).

Table 1: A schematic presentation of explicit and implicit information in Scipio's defense, relevant for the construction of his rhetorical ethos⁵⁵

	EXPLICIT	IMPLICIT	ETHOS
(5b)	...vici... (I conquered)	- The use of the 1 st person assumes a shared background knowledge that he was a commander of a Roman army (not a warrior in an individual combat or a common soldier) and that he (not someone else) defeated Hannibal.	The fact that he was a commander implies the importance of his social status.
(5b)	<i>Hannibalem Poenum imperio vestro inimicissimum magno proelio</i> (Hannibal the Carthaginian the most bitter enemy of your power)	- <i>Inimicissimum</i> and <i>magno</i> , "the most bitter" assume a shared background knowledge of a great danger for Scipio and Romans (<i>vestro imperio</i> , "your power") and that it may not have been an easy task. - The use of <i>pars pro toto</i> (analogy with the use of the 1st person—a commander instead of an army) implies two great military minds juxtaposed.	Description of the event implies the highest possible military achievement and thus establishes undisputed <i>gloria</i> and <i>auctoritas</i> within Scipio's ethos.
(5b)	<i>pacemque et victoriam vobis peper</i> <i>i inspectabilem</i> (I won for you a splendid peace and a glorious victory)	<i>Pax, victoria inspectabilis</i> "splendid peace and a glorious victory" describe praiseworthy final actions of the great danger.	Both actions (<i>res gestae</i>) serve as implicit proofs of Scipio's <i>gloria</i> and <i>auctoritas</i> .
(5b)	<i>Memoria, Quirites, repeto, diem esse bodiurnum, quo ...</i> (I recall, fellow citizens, that this is the day, on which)	- <i>Memoria repeto</i> presupposes Scipio's ability to remember nationally significant anniversary (<i>diem bodiurnum, quo...</i> , "I recall, ... that this is the day, on which") and implies a contrast with his prosecutor, who apparently ignores that fact.	Responsibility in public life (part of <i>auctoritas</i>) is implied.

⁵⁵ The table is partially based on Verschueren's example of analysis of the strategic interplay between the explicit and the implicit (Verschueren, *Ideology and Language Use*, 180–182).

(5c)	... <i>relinquamus nebulonem hunc ... eamus Iovi optimo maximo gratulatum</i> (... let us leave this worthless fellow, and go at once to render thanks to Jupiter, greatest and best of gods)	- The portrayal of his prosecutor as <i>nebulō</i>, "a worthless fellow, who should be left behind" (<i>relinquamus</i>, "let us leave") implies insignificance (compared to <i>Iuppiter optimus maximus</i>, "Jupiter, greatest and best of gods") and unfitness to join the solemn ceremony (repeated 1st person pl. <i>relinquamus...eamus...gratulatum</i>, "let us leave ... go...to render thanks").	The portrayal of the prosecutor implies a contrast with Scipio Africanus' character and emphasizes his moral qualities (<i>dignitas</i>).
(5c)	<i>Non igitur simus adversum deos ingrati</i> ... (Let us then not be ungrateful to the gods ...)	- The use of potential subj. <i>non simus ingrati</i>, "let us ...not be" implies a proposition: <i>To prosecute Scipio on such day might seem like an act of ingratitude and impiety toward gods who granted Scipio and Rome a military success.</i> - The use of <i>igitur</i>, "then" presents a proposition, with which it occurs as logical and sufficient conclusion from preceding proposition (i.e., victory over Hannibal and peace).	The speaker's moral qualities are implied.
(5b)	...<i>Hannibalem Poenum imperio vestro inimicissimum magno proelio vici in terra Africa pacemque et victoriam vobis peperī spectabilem</i> (...in Africa in a mighty battle, I conquered Hannibal the Carthaginian, the most bitter enemy of your power, and won for you a splendid peace and a glorious victory)	With a detailed description of what he did, Scipio might flout Grice's <i>maxim of quantity</i>, since more information than needed is given by the accused: Roman audience was undoubtedly well aware of the anniversary and the military accomplishments of Scipio—the description might carry implicature of importance of Scipio (<i>auctoritas</i>), as well as evoke the danger and fear of the Roman people (emotional effect): <i>I am a paramount person for Rome; Remember the terror and fear you felt at that time.</i>	The speaker's <i>auctoritas</i> is implied.
(5b–c)	the whole utterance	The whole utterance might flout Grice's <i>maxim of relevance</i> since Scipio's battle with Hannibal in Africa is not relevant to the case about accepting Antiochus' bribery in Asia. The statement might carry implicature: <i>The fact that I, Scipio, have won such a historic battle in Africa is enough to drop the charges related to the events in Asia.</i>	The speaker's character as the source of proof is implied.

With these correlates in mind, let us consider the strategy of construction of Scipio's ethos through the interplay between explicit and implicit information. In the quoted fragment (5b–c) the construction of speaker's authority is entirely based on his *individual* ethos and represents a foundation for the standpoint that charges against him must be dropped. The authority is justified by the speaker's specifications of (1) past actions, (2) social status and moral conduct, as well as (3) *auctoritas*. As means for such presentation, the following examples can be identified (see *Table 1*), where the strategic interplay between explicit and implicit information is also evident.

Reading Scipio's defense in the broader frame, that is, as a particular language activity type (i.e., judicial oratory) with its typical structure, language, code and style, the fragment from Gellius can also be analyzed as a part of refu-

tation. The general argumentative pattern consists of the main argument from authority about Scipio Africanus' merits and moral conduct (i.e., his ethos), followed by the *ad hominem* argument (i.e., the abusive *ad hominem* argument) about his opponent.⁵⁶ Both arguments support the conclusion about dropping charges against Scipio Africanus. The argument can be reconstructed in the following scheme:

- (6) (a) Premise 1: *I am an authority, and I believe that charges must be dropped.*
- (b) Premise 2: *My accuser is not an authority (he is a nebulo).*
- (c) Conclusion: *Charges must be dropped.*

In the fragment, both premises remain implicit and so does the conclusion. But Gellius' description of the situation (i.e., the co-text of the quotation) and the above-indicated pragmatic aspects of the quoted speech might provide us with enough information for such a general meaning construction. The question is: Why would Scipio Africanus, one of the most famous Romans, use the implicit argument from authority to succeed in a trial against him? Indeed, a coherent answer cannot be provided from the analysis of Gellius' fragment. However, we can rephrase the question and include results of the background analysis into a tentative answer that would, in some part, explain (alleged) Africanus' linguistic choices regarding the construction of his ethos, which were identified in the schematic presentation above. Namely, we can ask ourselves, to what types of implicit meaning in Gellius' representation of an early Roman orator do premises and conclusion belong to and why? Taking into account the investigation of the referential framework and strategies of language use, it would seem that Scipio Africanus' implicit argument from authority (i.e., his ethos) can be seen more as a presupposition and not as an implication or implicature. The elements of Scipio's authority (i.e., his merits, social status, etc.), due to the Roman cultural presuppositions, represented a shared background knowledge and not something to be logically inferred from a form of expression or conventionally (much less) conversationally inferred by his addressees. His ethos as a persuasive/argumentative strategy can be seen as the effect of the use of implicitly communicated content, which had a pre-discursive nature and preceded him as an utterer/orator. In other words, he might be able to use his ethos as the main argument regardless of its relevance to the conclusion/charges because of the Roman socio-cultural context, which legitimated such use. As for the other two elements in the argument scheme, we can interpret

⁵⁶ Walton, *Ad Hominem Arguments*, 6.

the conclusion in (6c) as implication, based on the sufficient grounds that Scipio Africanus is offering in the context of his "self-characterization", and a second premise in (6b) as implicature. The *ad hominem* contains a characterization of Africanus' accuser/opponent (i.e., *nebulo*).⁵⁷ What *nebulo* stands for and why he cannot be seen as a proper authority in the trial, which is taking place on the anniversary of Scipio Africanus' defeat of Hannibal, is something that, according to Gellius, audience at the trial must have inferred from speaker's description of his past actions, social status, and moral conduct. And this may be another reason why Scipio Africanus took the effort of enumerating his *ethotic qualities* otherwise known to the audience: to imply the enormous social and moral incompatibility between the two public speakers—that his opponent's character is opposite, which would make his ethos inconsistent with the accusations he has set forth against Scipio and therefore lacks a valid proof for the case. Or in the form of a reconstructed generalized "traditional Roman" ethotic argumentative scheme:

- (7) (a) Premise 1: The ethos of an orator is such and such.
- (b) Conclusion: The cogency of the orator's claim is consistent with ethos.

Conclusion

From the analysis of the strategic use of explicit and implicit meaning generation in the construction of ethos of Scipio Africanus, we can observe that the orator's argumentation relied on the impact of his self-characterization made upon the cultural presuppositions of the time. Such strategies were common and are evident in many other fragments of Roman orators. Indeed, there are limitations to the study of the use of rhetorical concepts in classical rhetoric, which, in the context of Roman rhetoric, inevitably face two problems. The first issue represents the substantial influence of Greek Hellenistic rhetorical system. Adopted by Romans by the end of the second century BC, it quickly became the ground for a development of new "contaminated" persuasive strategies, which influenced language use in general, as well as reshaped the entire Roman literary production and understanding of traditional oratory. The other difficulty lies in the lack of sources, which limits more thorough analyses based on larger corpora of texts. However, the case study showed that with a combi-

⁵⁷ Holford-Strevens says that the word 'nebulo' is likely Gellius' invention (*Aulus Gellius*, 194). Nevertheless, considering the situation and the reputation of Scipio Africanus as an orator (portrayed as skillful and bold), it can be assumed that some disqualification would be used instead.

ned approach of rhetoric and linguistic pragmatics a helpful reconstruction of strategies of *ethotic* persuasion in Roman oratory can be made. It revealed that it is the importance of one's character in the Roman society that made these strategies a focal point of persuasion and a formal means of proof. With its predominantly implicit characteristics, this is a unique Roman perspective on the rhetorical ethos that, despite the adoption of Greek rhetorical system, vitally influenced a further development in the Roman rhetorical practice and theory.

Janja Žmavc

RETORIČNI ETHOS: POSKUS JEZIKOVNO PRAGMATIČNEGA POGLEDA NA KLASIČNO RETORIKO

POVZETEK

Raziskovanje retoričnega ethosa v klasični grško-rimski retoriki je precej raznoliko in sega od historičnih in teoretskih konceptualizacij pa vse do praktičnih vidikov in analitičnih pristopov. V najširšem pomenu besede bi ga lahko opredelili kot prepričevalno strategijo, ki je temeljila na učinkoviti predstavitvi govorcevega značaja/podobe. Slednji je v grško-rimsko družbi veljal za izrazito pragmatično kategorijo, ki ni bila osredinjena na osebni, intimni svet posameznika temveč na vrednotenje posameznikovih dejanj kakor tudi na družbene kategorije, kot so izvor, položaj, poklic in politična usmerjenost. V kontekstu retorike je to pomenilo, da je predstavitev tovrstnih značilnosti omogočala konstrukcijo verodostojne in družbeno sprejemljive podobe, ki je neposredno in ključno prispevala k prepričljivosti govora. Z izjemo historičnih perspektiv je večini raziskovalnih smeri bolj ali manj skupno, da v ospredje postavljajo Aristotelovo pojmovanje retoričnega ethosa ali ga kombinirajo s sodobnimi teorijami argumentacije in diskurza. Ne glede na morebitne historične in konceptualne zamejitve v pojmovanju ethosa kot retorične strategije, pa je pri vsaki rekonstrukciji in oziroma oblikovanju modela, ki se sklicuje na antične principe, treba upoštevati vsaj tri izhodišča, ki pomembno določajo njegove lastnosti in analitično uporabnost. Retorični ethos je v tem pogledu treba razu-

meti predvsem kot: a) primarno vpet v grško-rimski socio-kulturni svet, ker gre izvirno za element iz govorniške prakse; b) mnogoplasten teoretski koncept v grško-rimskem retoričnem sistemu, ki se bistveno razteza onkraj Aristotelove in Izokratove konceptualizacije; c) retorično reprezentacijo znotraj antičnih kulturnih predpostavk o značaju, ki se lahko odraža s pomočjo različnih jezikovnih strategij, a z enotnim retoričnim ciljem, to je zagotoviti govorčev uspeh pri prepričevanju poslušalcev.

Tudi v raziskovanju rimske retorike (kakor tudi retorike kot veščine javnega prepričevanja sploh) velja za eno ključnih predpostavk družbeno in kulturno okolje, v katerem se (je) le-ta kot strategija jezikovne rabe udejanja(la). Rimsko državo je vodila skupina aristokratskih družin, ki so usmerjale njen ekonomski, politični in kulturni razvoj, zato je bilo javno nastopanje kot oblika družbenega delovanja omejeno na člane vladajoče elite. V zgodnjem obdobju rimske retorike, ki kronološko sovпада z zgodnjo in deloma pozno rimsko republiko, se ta okoliščina odraža v posebnostih rabe prepričevalnih strategij in pojmovanju njihove vloge znotraj javnega diskurza. Zlasti v kontekstu argumentacije (tj. *logosa*) kot tiste strategije, ki je omogočala (ali lajšala) delovanje nekaterih družbenih struktur, je raba argumenta verjetnosti (značilnega zlasti za starogrške oblike javnega govora) predstavljala manj pogosto obliko prepričevanja. V poudarjeni obliki ga nadomešča argument (govorčeve) avtoritete, ki *logos* tesneje naveže na *ethos* in – gledano z retorične perspektive – govorca na ta način postavlja tako v središče vsebine govora kot (retoričnega) dogodka na sploh. *Orator Romanus* je namreč na podlagi svojega družbenega in političnega položaja predstavljal splošno priznano avtoriteto in središčno točko tradicionalnih/prvobitnih oblik javnega govora. Posledično retorični *ethos* (tj. primeri konstrukcije govorčeve podobe) iz tega obdobja odraža tudi nekatere značilnosti, ki so povezane s strateškim izkoriščanjem eksplicitnega in implicitnega. Povedano drugače, pri konstrukciji verodostojne podobe in splošnem prepričevalnem uspehu pri poslušalcih imajo pomembno vlogo jezikovne strategije, kjer govorniki s tem, kar eksplicitno izrečejo, o sebi skušajo povedati še nekaj drugega. Čeprav iz tega obdobja nimamo ohranjenih veliko daljših zapisov govorov, s pomočjo katerih bi bilo mogoče opraviti natančnejšo analizo posebnosti v rabi etotičnih strategij, nam zlasti Ciceronova in Kvintilijanova poročila o zgodnjih rimskih govorcih ponujajo dovolj jasno sliko o govorčevi podobi kot pomembni in primarno izpostavljeni retorični strategiji (pogosto tudi kot podlagi/sredstvu za dokazovanje), ki se neposredno navezuje na rimsko (nativno) govorniško tradicijo, temelji na posameznikovem družbenem položaju in njegovi predobstoječi moralni avtoriteti ter kaže na jezikovno rabo, kjer tovrstne kategorije največkrat ostajajo neizrečene in so le implicirane. S pomočjo pragmatične analize ohranjenih fragmentov, ki omogoča raziskovanje različnih kontekstualnih vidikov (od splošne, družbeno kulturne ravni pa

vse do neposrednega, situacijskega in jezikovnega konteksta) in različnih konvencij jezikovne rabe, ki so mobilizirane v analiziranem diskurzu in med katere sodijo tudi tipi implicitnega pomena (npr. predpostavke, implikacije, implikature), pa lahko ugotovimo, da v zgodnji rimski retoriki ethos pogosto nastopa v vlogi prepričevalne oz. argumentacijske strategije, ki je učinek implicitno komunicirane vsebine. Tak ethos je po svoji naravi predobstoječ, pred-diskurziven in govorca/izjavitelja v dani situaciji časovno in vsebinsko presega, saj zaradi rimskih kulturnih predpostavk o govorčevem družbenem položaju in moralni avtoriteti predstavlja del skupne vednosti, ki so jo poznali (in imeli za dovolj samoumevno) tako govorec kot poslušalci, zato o njej ni treba eksplicitno govoriti (tj. je šele vzpostavljati), temveč jo govorec strateško uporablja za drugačne prepričevalne namene (npr. za potrebe utemeljevanja in pojasnjevanja vsebinsko nepovezanih elementov).

Retorični ethos kot prepričevalna strategija, je torej posledično odražal in sočasno pomagal ohranjati dominantni družbeni položaj govorcev. Omenjene družbeno-kulturne posebnosti lahko predstavljajo dobro izhodišče za analizo retoričnega ethosa kot jezikovno pragmatičnega fenomena, ki, vpet v kontekst zgodnje rimske retorike, predstavlja časovno in prostorsko specifično komunikacijsko prakso. A ne gre zanemariti, da so prav tovrstne okoliščine zaradi splošne uveljavljenosti znotraj javnega govora v starem Rimu vplivale tudi na nadaljnji razvoj rimske retorike kot discipline, kar je posebej očitno v Ciceronovih govorih in razpravah. Slednji se namreč kljub izraziti usmerjenosti h grškim virom in helenističnemu sistemu retorične tehnike prav v kontekstu retoričnega ethosa pogosto naslanja na prvine rimskega tradicionalnega govorništva.

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Naslov: **RETORIČNI ETHOS: POSKUS JEZIKOVNO PRAGMATIČNEGA POGLEDA NA KLASIČNO RETORIKO**

Studia Historica Slovenica

Časopis za družboslovne in humanistične študije / *Humanities and Social Studies Review*
Maribor, letnik 18 (2018), št. 2, str. 343–370, 57 cit., 2, slike, 1 diagram, 1 preglednica

Kategorija: 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

Jezik: angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: retorični ethos, implicitni pomen, zgodnja rimska retorika, avtoriteta, argumentacija

Izvleček: V prispevku obravnavamo nekatere posebnosti javnega diskurza v obdobju zgodnje rimske republike. S povezovanjem principov klasične retorike (Aristotelov koncept o retoričnem ethosu) in jezikovne pragmatike (Verschuerenov model jezikovnega pragmatike) analiziramo primere konstrukcije govorne verodostojne podobe v družbeno kulturnem kontekstu zgodnje rimske retorike. Retorični ethos obravnavamo skozi oris različnih družbenih vlog (javnega) govornika v antičnem Rimu in pri tem skušamo identificirati etotične strategije, ki se tesneje navezujejo na pojem avtoritete ter na ravni jezikovne rabe osvetljujejo vlogo implicitnosti pri konstrukciji govorne podobe.